Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1979

Chiarella v. United States
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Chiarella v. U.S. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 66. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives,
Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

PREL~MITNARY

MEMORANDUM

April 13, 1979 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 78-1202
CHIARELLA

Cert to CA 2
(Kaufman & Smith;
Meskill, dissenting)

v.
UNITED STATES

Federal/Criminal

SUM1-1ARY: Petitioner was convicted of

Timely

~is ~ g

material, ~ ublic

inform-ation in connection with the purchase and sale of securities in
...----___

--

violation of SectionslO(b) and 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a), and SEC Rule 10-b-5. He contends:
(1) his activities were not proscribed by§ lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5 because
he had no fiduciary relationship to, and did not derive the information

-

from, the issuer of the shares he purchased and so d;

(2) that "retroactive"

application of the Second Circuit's expansive interpretation of 10-b-5

C.f.~. lh\~ ?ebf(l~
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~
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violated his right to due process;

(3) tha~ the trial court erroneously

refused to instruct the jury that specific intent to defraud is an essential
element of the violation alleged; and (4) that admissions used against him
at trial, which were derived from statements made to the N.Y. Dep't of
Labor in connection with an application for unemployment compensation,
were privileged under N.Y. law and therefore

inadmissi~le

under Fed. R.

Evid. 501.
FACTS:

Petitioner was an employee of a financial printing establishmerl

near Wall Street that printed tender offer disclosure statements for a
number of corporations.

By examining the data contained in the disclosure

statements, petitioner was able to _deduce the names of the companies
that were the targets of the yet-undisclosed tender offers.

He would

then buy stock in the targeted company and sell it upon announcement of
the tender

offe~.

After his activities were discovered, petitioner

entered a consent decree with the SEC requiring him to disgorge his profits.
He was also fired and

lat~r

indicted under Section 32(a) of the '34 Act

on 17 counts charging violations of Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5.
After denial of his pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for failure

.'

to charge an offense, petitioner was tried and convicted by a jury. He .got
concurrent sentences of one-year imprisonment on

~·- 13

counts, with all

.

but one month of the sentences suspended. He was sentenced to a five-year
term of probation on the other four counts.
CONTENTIONS AND HOLDINGS BELOW: On appeal petitioner first argued
that Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5 did not proscribe his conduct because
he had no fiduciary relationship to, and did not derive his nonpublic
information from, the issuer whose shares he traded.

Petitioner

principal! ~

relies on General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d

Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969),

which holds that a

corporation planning a tender offer for, or merger with, another
corporation may buy the target company's stock on the open market without
disclosing its plans and yet not violate Section lO(b) or Rule 10-b-5.
Petitioner reasons that, if the source of his nonpublic information may
buy and sell the shares of the target company prion to the announcement
of the tender offer, then he should be able to do so also, subject only
to the same. 5% ·purchase limitation .imposed under the \villiams Act.
The CA majority disagreed.

Though conceding that this was a case

of first impression, the court reasoned that the same principles that
prohibit a corporate insider or its fiduciaries from trading on material,
nonpublic corporate information applied to "market insiders" as well.

1

The court held that

"Anyone--corporate insider or not-..:.who regulah y ,receives material
nonpublic information may not use that ~1nformation to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.
And if he cannot disclose, he may abstain from buying or selling'.'
(emphasis in original) .
A test of "regular access to market information," that is, information
that affects the price of a company's securities without affecting the
firm's earning power or assets (e.g., a "buy" recommendation to be issued b y
an investment adviser),

would apply.

In support of its holding, the

CA relied on Affiliated Ute· Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972),
for the proposition that a duty to disclose arising out of regular access
\

to market information is ~ot stranger to Rule 10-b-5.

General Tire,

on which petitioner relied, was distinguishable because a tender offeror
was not regularly the "recipient of market information other than that
concerning its own stock, ·· and, - with respect to tender offers, was the
creator of the information rather than its recipient. Moreover, the pre-

\.

offer trading in which the offeror engages , involves an economic risk
to which other traders are not subject because, when the offer is
announced, the offeror will be buying , new shares, not selling the ones
obtained at the pre-offer price.
In dissent, Judge Meskill rejected the majority's application of
10-b-5 as a departure from prior precedents that limited the duty to
disclose under 10-b-5 to persons with a special fiduciary or inside
· relationship to the company affected by the information.

Unlike the

majority, Judge Meskill found no support for the notion of a "market

--

h:

insider" in the concept of a "quasi-insider" incorporated in § 1062
of the new Securities Code proposed by the American ·Law Institute.

/1L /

Moreover, the concept of a "market insider" was unprincipled and
limitless in its potential reach.
p~d, ~ nee.

~

In Judge Meskill's view, § lO(b)

And, silence is fraudulent under lO(b)

only when there is a duty to speak owed to the sellers of the stock
he purchased.

To be sure, petitioner owed a duty to his company's

client not to misuse confidential information, but the concept of "fraud"
embodied in lO-b-5 does ·not bring within its ambit "all breaches of
fiduciary duty in connection with a securities transaction." Sante Fe
Industries v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977).
Petitioner next argued that the CA's application of the novel rule
it derived from 10-b-5 violated his right to due process because he
did not have "fair warning" that his conduct was criminally proscribed.
The CA's "unforseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of [the] narrow
and precise statutory language" of Rule 10-b-5 operated like an ex post
facto law and violated his right to due process. Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378

u.s.

347, 352-54 (1964).

5

.,

TheCA disagreed. Though agreeing that no prior · case had settled
the precise fact pattern at issue in this case, the CA believed that its
holding was a logical and forseeable application of the congressional
policies underlying the "disclose or abstain" rule of SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969). Moreover,

the SEC had filed complaints against other

financial printing houses that had engaged in activities similar to
petr's, and the consent decrees that emanated from those proceedings had
been well publicized in the financial printing industry. Indeed, 8-by-10inch signs had been posted throughout petr's plant, which advised him
that use of information learned from customer's copy would subject
petitioner to criminal liability, as well as immediate discharge.

Similar

notices had been given ·all employees in the union newspaper, on the back
of timecards, and in separate cards distributed to the employees.
Judge Meskill reasoned that the warning to wbich a criminal defendant
was entitled must emanate from the statute itself or prior judicial
interpretations, so he failed to see the relevancy of the employer's signs
--other than as circumstantial evidence on the issue of willfulness or
intent.

Under settled principles of . due process of law; petitioner

wa~

entitled to a "clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed"
by the statute, United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287 (2d Cir. 1975),

which the majority's novel construction of the statute failed to afford him .

~

Petitioner next argued that, in light of· Ernst
~25

u.s. · 185,

~ntent

&

Ernst v. Hochfelder,

193 (1976), the jury should have been instructed that specifi c

to defraud was an essential element of the crimes charged. The

"willfullness" formulation in ·terms of a "realization of wrongful conduct"
derived from Section 32(a) and un·i ·ted State·s

v.

Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971), and United States v.
Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976),

was insufficient because that

defined only the general intent necessary to criminalize any rule violation,
rather than the intent necessary to establish a substantive violation under
the particular rule at issue here--10-b-5.

Unlike petitioner, the CA majority reasoned that Hochfelder did
not require anything more than "knowingly wrongful" conduct to establish
a 10-b-5

violation--"some element of scienter" such as "knowing and

intentional conduct" rather than mere negligence. 425

u.s.

at 197, 201.

Last petitioner argued that the use of admissions contained in
statements made to the N.Y. Dep't of Labor in connection with an
unemployment compensation claim that were mandated by, and privileged
under, state law were inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 501.

Petitioner

notes that under one of the 13 specific rules of privilege formulated by
this Court in submitting the federal rules to Congress, a person making
a report required by law has a privilege to prevent any person from
disclosing the report. Supreme Court Standard 502.

Though not adopted

in that form by Congress the Standard reflects a privilege derived from
7
principles of common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States
within the meaning of Fed. · R. Evid. 501.
The CA majority again disagreed.

State-created privileges were

not controlling in federal criminal cases except to the extent that they
reflect principles of federal common law.

Thus, to the extent that the

N.Y. statute on which petitioner relied created an evidentiary privilege
under state law, it mattered not because the privileg.e was unknown to
' · the common law.

~

ANALYSIS:

Although I am inclined to believe that the CA's

extension of the principles of Texas Gulf Sulphur to the circumstances
of this case is defensible, the announcement of a new category of
"'insiders" saddled with a duty . to disclose under Rul
criminal proceeding
~o

in a

raises a very troubling due process problem.

---·

---

~

/
save the statute from
a void-for-vagueness attack, I would be

inclined to hold that specific intent to defraud is an essential
element of a criminal violation of Section lO(b) and Rule 10-b-5.
Cf., Screws v. United States, 321 U.S. 91 (1945).

Hochfelder neither

supports nor precludes such a holding since that case's scienter
holding was expressly limited to the "intent" element of a 10-b-5
civil action for damages.

~25

u.s.

at 193.

But, whatever one's views on the merits, I regard at least the
~

first three questions presented for review as sufficiently substantial
to warrant plenary review. though the want of any clear conflict with
prior decisions of this or other courts might bode against plenary
review at this time. At the very least, this petition warrants a response
from the Solicitor General.
There is no response.
3/30/79

Walsh
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June 7, 1979 Conference
List 1, Sheet 4
Motion of Chiarella to Dispense
with Printing the Appendix

No. 78-1202
CHIARELLA

v.
UNITED STATES
SUMMARY:
(Rule 36(8)).

Petr moves to dispense with printing the appendix
None of the questions involved turn on an extensive

analysis of the record.
The Clerk advises that the SG has no objection to this motion.
DISCUSSION:
5/29/79
PJC

\.....-\

The request seems appropriate.
Marsel
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Ellen

DATE:

September 28, 1979

RE:

Chiarella v. United States, No. 78-1202
November argument (?~ p~)

____

......................
This is a criminal
prosecution under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
1.

There are four issues:

Whether Rule 10b-5's "disclose or abstain" prohibition

applies to an employee of a financial printing firm who obtained nonpublic information concerning a prospective tender offer by
"decoding" the offeror's disclosure statements prior to publication.
2.

-

Whether this petitioner had fair notice that his conduct

......_____....

.........

was proscribed by §10(b) and Rule 10b-5. ( fn.u-~ ~
3.

Whether the scienter requirement of Rule 10b-5 is

satisfied by a finding of knowingly wrongful conduct rather than
specific intent to defraud.
4.

Whether Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

required the district court to exclude an admission made in
connection with an application for New York state unemployment
benefits and at least partially privileged under New York law.

J

2.
I.

BACKGROUND
In 1975 and 1976 petitioner was a "markup man" employed by

Pandick Press, a financial printing firm in New York City.
was to select type fonts and page layouts.

His job

Among the documents he

worked on were the "raw material" for 5 separate takeover bids.
Because of the extreme need for secrecy, these were sent to Pandick
"in code": the names of the companies involved were either omitted or
fictionalized, and the real names inserted into the pre-set type at
the very last minute.

Petitioner, however, was a knowledgeable stock

trader who spoke with his broker 10 or 15 times a day.

He studied

the documents and deduced the identities of the parties from the data
contained in them (price histories, par values, and the number of
letters in the fake names).
target company stock.

He then bought substantial amounts of

When the tender offer was publicly announced,

he quickly sold out and turned a handsome profit.

In the course of

the 15 months covered by the indictment, he netted $30,000 in five
transactions.
No one has told us what led to petitioner's undoing.
SEC became aware of him in early 1977.

The

In May, he agreed in a

consent decree to disgorge his profits to the sellers of the target
stock.

The same day, he was fired from his job.

In January, 1978,

he was indicted on 17 counts of willful misuse of material non-public
information in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
After moving unsuccessfully to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that it did not charge a crime, he was convicted by the jury on every
count.

He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment with all but one

month suspended, and to a consecutive term of five years' probation.

3.
The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction in an opinion by
Judge Kaufman, in which Judge Smith joined.

Judge Meskill dissented

in an opinion in which he voiced disagreement with the majority's
conclusion that Rule 10b-5 reaches petitioner's conduct at all, and
concluded that such an extension should in any event not have been
made in a criminal case.
II.

THE REACH OF §10(b) and RULE 10b-5
This is the most critical issue in the case.

The core

concern of Rule 10b-5 as interpreted in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case,
401 F.2d 833 (CA2 1968) (en bane) (hereinafter sometimes TGS) has
always been thought to be

~rading

by individuals having some special

-

relationship with the issuer corporation, and therefore having access
.

to confidential information about it.

Since Chiarella does not fit

this mold, he claims he falls without the ambit of 10b-5.
A.

CA2's analysis.
The CA2 majority disagreed, announcing a rule that "Anyone -

corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material nonpublic
information may not use that information to trade in securities
without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose [or abstain]."

The

authority cited by CA2 in support of this rule consists in its
entirety of a broad view of the policy of 10b-5, a peculiar reading
of the comments of the ALI Federal Securities Code, and a broad
reading of this Court's decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406

u.s.

128 (1972).

First, CA2 quoted the TGS court's view that Rule 10b-5
protects the investing public's justifiable expectation of relatively
equal access to material information.

The securities markets cannot

4.
function properly if those who occupy strategic positions in the
market mechanism can reap personal gains from their position.

The

ban on corporate insider trading is just one instance of this policy,
and CA2 1 s rule simply gives it full effect.
Second,

CA2 noted that the ALI 1 s Federal Securities Code

had declined to establish a disclose or abstain rule for 11 quasiinsiders11 under §1603, its insider trading rule.

Quasi-insiders were

defined as 11 people like judges• clerks who trade on information in
unpublished opinions, Federal Reserve Bank employees who trade with
knowledge of an imminent change in the margin rate, and perhaps
persons who are about to give profitable supply contracts to
corporations with which they are not otherwise connected. 11 The court
drew support, however, from the ALI 1 s suggestion that 11 egregious 11
cases would fall under
general proscriptions.

~1602,

the codification of Rule 10b-s•s

A full reading of the comments dramatically

undermines even this limited support.

They begin by noting that 11 it

is hard to find justification today for imposing a fiduciary•s duty
of affirmative disclosure on an outsider who is not a •tippee•n.
Although the ALI thought that a 11 new category 11 of quasi-insiders
11 Would be convenient 11 , it rejected it because
itself to definition.

it 11 does not lend

. Where, for example would one place the

outsider who is about to make a tender offer - or his depositary
bank? 11

In such cases, the relatively more specific §1603 should be

used where possible.

11 But, to the extent that a sufficiently

egregious case of trading while silent cannot be rationalized on an
•insider• analysis, a plaintiff may fall back on

~1602(a)

(1) [barring

•fraudulent acts• and 11 misrepresentations 11 in connection with

5.
purchase or sale of securities]."

It is hard to draw support for

anything but a strict pase by case analysis from this studied refusal
to take a position.

The ALI is willing to allow Rule 10b-5 to serve

its catch-all function in prohibiting clearly fraudulent conduct.
Beyond that, it left the area to "further judicial development", and
specifically rejected any "universally applicable theory of 'market
egalitarianism'".
Affiliated Ute is no more helpful.

This Court there found a

10b-5 violation where defendants had bought shares in an Indian
corporation directly from Indian sellers and arranged for their sale
to non-Indians without disclosing that their value on the resale
market was far higher than the sellers believed.

CA2 said this case

was an example of its thesis that "a duty to disclose arising out of
regular access to market information is not a stranger to the world
of 10b-5."

This is true in a narrow sense, but no broad rule

applicable to "market insiders" can be drawn from the case.

Justice

Blackmun's opinion for the Court is brief and cryptic on this point,
focusing on the facts of the case before him. He noted first that
there would be no liability if the defendants had been transfer
agents only - a dictum which in itself would seem to dispose of CA2's
broad rule since transfer agents inevitably do have regular access to
market information.

There was liability only because the defendants

had actively developed a resale market and accepted standing orders
for Indian stock.

They acknowledged a duty to ensure the propriety

of the sales, and the Indian sellers were relying on their expertise.
These activities as a whole were a course of business that operated
as a fraud on the Indian sellers because the defendants "devised a

6.
plan and induced the mixed-blood holders • . . to dispose of their
shares wihout disclosing to them material facts .

"

Since the

individual defendants were "market makers", they possessed an
affirmative duty to disclose that fact.

The Ute case has been viewed

as a "trust and confidence" case, with the defendants performing a
fiduciary role for the sellers.

It seems to me to be a prime example

of Rule 10b-5 performing its catch-all function.
Finally, CA2 distinguished the established rule that tender
offerors do not violate 10b-5 by purchasing target company stock
without disclosing their intentions.

The leading case states baldly

that "we know of no rule, applicable at the time [a reference to the
subsequently enacted Williams Act], that a purchaser of stock, who
was not an "insider" and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective
seller, had any obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a
seller's demands and thus abort the sale."

General Time Corporation

v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968).

CA2 held

that the offerors are not within its new rule because they have no
regular access to market information and because they undertake
substantial economic risk.

Of course, offerors are now covered by

the Williams Act, which requires disclosure but permits offerors to
purchase up to 5% of the target's stock beforehand.
B.

The case for reversal.

Petitioner's argument is a straightforward one.

Section

10(b) prohibits the use in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance"
in contravention of SEC rules.

Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful

(1) to employ an device, scheme, or artifice to

7.

defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact ••
. , or
(3) to enqage in any act, practice or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security .
. The question is whether Chiarella's scheme involved fraud or
deceit.

Although Rule 10b-5 is admittedly broader than the common

law, no one (with the possible exception of Judge Kaufman and two of
his colleagues who concurred in SEC v. Great American Industries,
Inc~,

407 F.2d 453 (CA2 1968){en bane)), contends that absolute

parity of information is a goal of the Securities Acts.

On the

contrary, the Acts should preserve incentives to perform market
_._,

-...;:.

research in order to discover undervalued stocks and thereby brinq

------------~----------~--------------------------------·

about a more efficient allocation of resources.

Thetefore, failure

to disclose is not fraud in the absence of an affirmative duty to
disclose.
Petitioner wisely does not rest his case on any distinction
between "market" and "inside" information.

Instead, he says that the

duty to disclose has traditionally been limited to persons having a
special relationship with the company affected by the information.
Thus, the rule of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961), and Texas
Gulf Sulphur is limited to "those persons who are in a special
relationship with a company and privy to its internal affairs".
SEC at 911-912.

---

--

The duty arises from

40

the special trustee-type

relationship between corporate insiders and the shareholders of that
corporation.

The courts have repeatedly held that "the essential

8.
purpose of Rule 10b-5 • . • is to prevent corporate · insiders and
their tippees from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed
outsiders."

Radiation Dynamics;

Inc~

v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890

(CA2 1972).

I

~

As General Time, supra, shows, the Second Circuit has in the
past flatly rejected the notion that anyone but a corporate insider

I

I

has an insider's duty to disclose. 403 F.2d at 164.
courts have agreed (see Petr's Brief at 28-29).

Several district

And the commentators

all acknowledge that petitioner's conduct falls well outside the
traditional scope of 10b-5, although some have suggested that it may
fall within the policy of the Rule.
There is thus no real dispute that the Second Circuit has
worked a major extension of Rule 10b-5.

This is so even if the

holding is narrowed as suggested by the SG (see infra).

In so doing,

the court and the SG ignore this Court's recent warnings that a
flexible construction of the Securities Acts in light of their
remedial purposes, Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and
Co~,

404 U.S. 6, 12 (1972), cannot be allowed to expand them

indefinitely.

E.g., Teamsters v. Daniel, 47 USLW 4235 (1979)(pension

Casualty

plan not a security); Touche, Ross & Co. v. Redington, 47 USLW 4732
(1979)(cannot use "remedial purposes to construe §17(a) more broadly
than its language permits); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. · v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977)(10b-5 does not cover all fiduciary breaches); Ernst &
Ernst · v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter required); Blue
Chip

Stamps · v~

Manor Drug · Stores 421

plaintiff under §10(b) ).

u.s.

723 (1975)(offeree

Indeed, your comment, concurring in Blue

Chip · stamps, has some relevance: "If such a far-reaching change is to

9.
be made, with unpredictable consequences for the process of raising
capital so necessary to our economic well-being, it is a matter for
the Congress, not the courts."

-

Although CA2 is not actually

---

--

rewriting the statute, it is redefining "fraud" in a way not
...
previously contemplated by the Commission and in a way that may have
extensive unforeseen effects.

Arguably, some orderly consideration

of the consequences - by the Commission if not by Congress - is in
order.
In fact, the SEC has previously addressed the precise

-._.-

practices at issue here (trading on non-public knowledge of a tender

----

......

offer) and recommended that the
10b-5.

attacked under Rule

Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d

Cong. 1st Sess. xxxii (1971).

The position that "market information"

should not be regulated under 10b-5 was reiterated in 1973.
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10316, 2 SEC Docket 229.
Specific rules to cover trading on tender offer information were
proposed under §14(e)

(not 10(b)) of the Act this year.

44 Fed. Reg.

9956 (Feb. 2, 1979).

Of course the SEC has also brought a number of

enforcement actions against "market insiders", including printers,
under 10b-5.

And it is not necessarily inconsistent to attack the

conduct under 10b-5 even if it is also covered by other, more
directly relevant sections of the Act.

The cited comments do

suggest, however, SEC agreement with petitioner's view that orderly
rulemaking is preferable to an attempt to cover everything with Rule
10b-5.
I am less persuaded by Judge Meskill's view that the Court
should not expand Rule 10b-5 in a criminal case because criminal

1 0.

statutes are to be narrowly construed.

This Court recently addressed

the problem of criminal sanctions under open-ended remedial statutes
in the context of the Sherman Act.
Gypsum · co., 438

u.s.

422 (1978).

United States v. United States
The Court cited with approval the

Attorney General's conclusion that Sherman Act criminal penalties
should be reserved for cases in which the law was relatively clear
and the conduct egregious.

Id., at 438-439.

to the "notice" issue in the case.
construction of 10b-5, however.

This is highly relevant ~

It does not bear on the correct

There seems to be general agreement

-

---

that there cannot be two versions of the statute - one for civil and
'--..

one for criminal cases.
287 (CA2

1975)~

See United · states v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283,

United · states v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341, 355-6 (CA9

1976)(Sneed, J. concurring).

If the statute has been construed so

broadly in civil cases as to deprive criminal defendants of due
process, then some prosecutions may have to be dismissed.

But the

construction of the statute is nevertheless unchanged.
C.

The case for affirmance.

The SG does not defend CA2's broad brush approach in this
~

~-

__.............

___.

Court. In fact, the Securities Industry Association convincingly
opposes that approach in a somewhat hysterical amicus brief which
argues that there are many market insiders (specialists, block
positioners, floor traders, risk arbitrageurs, and various dealers)
who perform a valued stabilizing function by trading on "inside"
information.

Of course, these professionals are closely regulated by

rules adopted under other sections of the Act.

In general, however,

Rule 10b-5 is applied even to highly regulated offenders (e.g.,
broker-dealers).

Thus, the amicus fears that CA2's rule will

11•

severely disrupt an established pattern of professional practice.
The rule would also threaten the arguably legitimate practice of
"warehousing" by tender offerors, whereby certain institutional
investors are advised of a possible tender offer in advance.

This

technique has been defended as an interim method of financing for
purchases that the offeror could legally make.

In its Institutional

Investor Study Report, supra, the SEC suggested that "if such
activities are to be prohibited, this should be done by a rule
specifically directed to that situation rather than by an expanded
interpretation of Rule 10b-5 resting on a somewhat different theory
than that underlying that rule • .

.

"

Others have disagreed.

See

sources cited in Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry
into the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U.Pa.
L.Rev. 798, 813 (1973).

Whatever the correct result, the exampl.e

illustrates the 1ifficulties with a broad rule for "market insiders".
Such a rule seems to require an analysis of the social value of the
challenged activities in each case.
these hypothetical cases.

I am unclear as to the merits of

But the uncertainties are enough, together

with the SG's skittishness about CA2's position, to convince me that
affirmance can only be justified on a considerably narrower ground.
Seeking a more acceptable theory for affirmance, the SG and

~(f

}_~

~the amicus derive the necessary duty to disclose from Chiarella's

~ overt breac~

of

a~ relat~ip.

The theory

is~that

he

committed common law fraud by converting to his own use confidential
information entrusted to him with the expectation that it would
remain private.
corporation

This worked two separate

an~e

on the

frauds:~e

on the offeror

tar~et com~n; sh~reholders.

1 2.

1.

Common law theories.

With respect to the offeror, Chiarella earned secret profits
through his employer's agency relationship in violation of the law of
agency.

Pandick was an agent because it assumed a fiduciary duty to

use confidential information entrusted to it only for designated
purposes and acted under the control of and for the benfit of its
customers.

Chiarella was a sub-agent with identical fiduciary

responsibilities.

His wrongful action could haveharmed the offeror

by driving up the price of the stock through artificial demand: in
act Chiarella's purchases of target stock on two occasions

-

~ ~stituted

more than half its trading volume on that day.

In

addition, such unusual trading patterns could reveal the offeror's
plans, particularly when a single investor known to his broker to
work in a printing firm shows a pattern of predicting tender offers.

--

This theory was charged in the indictment and went to the .
jury.
The
.

~kp~blem~-t_h_a_t_i_t_i_s_h_a_r_d_t_o_f_i_n_d_t_h_e_e_l_e_m_e_n_t_o_f_d_e_c_e_p_t_ion
~ or manipulation required by Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430
~

u.s.

482 (1977).

The SG argues the tort is deceit, because an agent

contemplating one of these transactions must disclose it to his
principal in advance.

This seems a bit facile since Chiarella's

{

however, this Court endorsed a similar

u.s.

6 (misappropriateion by

corporate officers of proceeds of sale of bonds violated 10b-5;
corporation was "duped into believing it . . . would receive the
proceeds").

~

~

theory in the pre-Green case of Superintendent of Insurance v.
Banker's Life · and Casualty, supra, 404

~

~

conduct would have been tortious on the SG's theory even if he had

di~ losed~;uably,

?~ ~

-1--o~

1 3.

With respect to the shareholders, there is ~e common law
authority for a duty of disclosure where "one party had access to

~

~.

material information that was hidden from the other and good faith
required candid dealing".

A few cases imposed the duty when a

purchaser had misappropriated or illegally obtained information that
formed the basis for the transaction.

But the principal authority

for this point is an old English case which rested on equitable
principles in denying specific performance.

Professor Keeton thought

CA.<..

that the same principle should apply law.
Concealment and

Non~Disclosure,

"

Keeton, Fraud

~

15 Texas L.Rev. 1, 25-26(1936).

Harper and James take a much more limited view, although they
recognize that new duties of disclosure have recently been developed.
1 The Law of Torts 589-590 (1956).

My sense is that cases could be

found to support either view.
2.
I

Rule 10b~S applied to "outsiders" (~

"f SG/:

~~)

Even if conduct like Chiarella's is not common law fraud, it

~esso

close to it as to fall within the core concerns of §10(b)

and Rule 10b-5.

The fact that the information was market information

(concerning market demand), rather than corporate information
(concerning the value of the assets or earning power of the issuer)
makes no difference to the policies underlying the rule.

Nor should

it matter that the information was not obtained from the issuer
corporation or anyone associated with it.

Although the leading cases

have all assumed that insider trading requires that the information
be obtained through some relationship with the issuer corporation,
there are cases imposing liability without such a connection.
Affiliated Ute is among them, as is Zweig v. Hearst Corp., CCH Fed.

14

Sec. L. Rep. §96,851

0

(CA9 1979) (financial columnist who bought stock

in corporations prior to extolling them in print, then sold when the
price went up); and Courtland v. Walston &

Co~,

340

F.Supp. 1076,

1082-1084 (SDNY 1972)(investment adviser who bought stocks prior to
recommending them in market letter, then sold).

The SEC has obtained

a number of consent decrees in similar situations.
Healey, Lit. Release No. 6589 (1974)

E~g~,

SEC v.

(employee of tender offeror

utilized knowledge of target company to profit in its stock); In

r~

Blyth &· co., 43 SEC 1037 (1969)(market professional traded on the
basis of inside information obtained illegally from a government
agency); In re Herbert

L~

Honohan 13 SEC 754 (1943) (use of

information about sealed bids); SEC v. Hancock, LIT. Release No. 505
(1949)(investment company employee tipped a broker about planned
purchases); and a number of cases in which information about
forthcoming acquisitions was misappropriated by outsiders or by
employees of the acquiring company.
Since there was fraud in connection with the purchase of
securities, and since the absence of an insider relationship is not
dispositive, the judgment should be affirmed.
quite persuasive.

I find this argument

The Court would not have to say anything more - as

in the cases cited, Rule 10b-5 operates here in its "catch-all"
capacity by picking up new ingenious schemes that are egregious if
not technically within the definition of common law fraud.

1

Although

such a disposition would provide little guidance, I have great
difficulty accepting the rules proposed by the SG and the amicus.
The SG proposes that liability may properly be imposed
whenever confidential information is converted or misappropriated in

1 5.

violation of some confidential relationship, whether or not it
derives from the issuer.

The problem is that the SG has to go beyond

traditional concepts of conversion to reach this case, so that the
rule is already fuzzy.

The amicus proposes that liability may be

predicated on the "deliberate and purely personal utilization of
market information, where the information was received solely by
virtue of a confidential business relationship, and where there is a
clear showing 'that an expectation of fair dealing • . . is
justified.
problem:

The test unfortunately suffers from a serious vagueness
it superimposes on the imprecise standard of materiality

the further imprecise test of fairness and could therefore inhibit
investor trading.

Moreover, it easily blurs into the broad "parity

of information" rule it was adopted to avoid.
The SG has attempted to distinguish the legitimate activity
of tender offerors and market professionals on the ground that they
participate in bona fide economic activity within a scheme of
regulation. Congress has already balanced their interests against
those of the investing public.

There are, however, many others who

possibly ought to be allowed to trade.
case?

What about the "warehousing"

What about individuals or companies who are about to give a

profitable contract to an issuer corporation?

What about government

employees who know of impending changes in economic policy?

Because

of these problems, the law review article that orginially proposed
this "fairness" test abandoned it and argued that liability should be
imposed only on certain identifiable groups of professionals who have
held themselves out in such a way as to create an expectation of fair
dealing.

Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra, 121 U.Pa.L.Rev. at

16 •

822.

This combines an element of the "regular receipt" notion with

the "misappropriation" test of the SG.

Liability would be limited to

people who provide services to the securities industry and therefore
regularly receive material nonpublic information to be used for
limited legitimate purposes.
(1979).

Note, 92 Harv. L.Rev. 1538, 1547

This test would not apply to the president of the offeror

corporation who trades on his knowledge of a tender offer.

It would,

however, apply to Chiarella.
Such a standard would be inapplicable to many cases that
plainly violate the spirit of 10b-5, and thus is seriously
underinclusive.

But courts should not try to cover all possible

situations by creating broadly applicable rules under a section that
was designed as a catch-all.
a case by case analysis.

Such a section by its nature calls for

Moreover, the SEC has .the power to remedy

the situation by adopting specific rules, as it has in fact proposed
to do.

44 Fed. Reg. 9956, supra.

The relatively narrow proposed

rule may thus avoid the pitfalls of judicial legislation under
broadly worded statutes, while providing some guidance to investors
and to courts.
III.

DUE PROCESS - NOTICE
CA2 held that its rule was "but a logical application of the

congressional policies underlying the rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur."
The fact that there is no litigated fact pattern precisely on point
is not determinative as long as there was "a clear and definite
statement of the conduct proscribed".

Since the SEC had previously

brought a widely publicized enforcement action against printers in
identical circumstances (ending in a consent decree), Chiarella could

17.
not contend that there was no such "statement."

Moreover, Pandick

had posted a sign notifying its employees that they would be fired
and would be liable for criminal penalties if they used any
information learned from customer copy or talked about it except to
give or receive instructions.

Although Chiarella testified that he

did not read the sign, he conceded that he passed it at least 640
times.

"Few malefactors ever receive such explicit warning."
A.

The case for reversal.

Petitioner does not seriously contend that he lacked actual
notice that his conduct would be viewed as illegal by the SEC.

In

fact he admitted on the stand that he was aware he was going "against
the SEC."

But this Court has held that "whether a criminal statute

provides fair warning of its prohibitions must be made on the basis
of that statute itself and the other pertinent law, rather than on
the basis of an ad hoc appraisal of the subjective expectations of
particular defendants."
n.5 (1964).

Bouie

v~

· city of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 355

In the same case, the Court said that "there can be no

doubt that a deprivation of the right of fair warning can result not
only from vague statutory lanquage but also from an unforeseeable and
retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory
language."

Id. 352.

The test is whether the statute as interpreted

at the time of the offense "give[s] a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden." United
States · v~

Batchelder, 47 USLW 4611 (1979).

Criminal liability is not

available unless the words of the statute "plainly impose it". United
States · v~

Naftalin, 47 USLW 4732 (1979).
There is no doubt that the result of this case works an

----------------------------

/ I~
expansion in the law of 10b-5.

'----------------------

1 8.

Although petitioner's conduct fell

--

within the policy underlying the rule, there was and is considerable
doubt that that policy should be applied beyond the classic insider
situation.

A number of cases had held that it should not, and the

ALI model code had concluded that the law was too uncertain to permit
codification.

Although the SEC had interpreted the statute more

broadly, there was at least enough conflict among the authorities to
support petitioner's contention that he was forced to guess at the
meaning of the statute.

Certainly, the case is not one in which the

law is relatively clear and the conduct egregious, so as to permit a
criminal prosecution under the dicta in US Gypsum, supra p. 10 .
B.

The case for

affirmance~

The statute and rule themselves in the clearest terms
broadly prohibit all fraudulent schemes.

Cf. United States

v~

Naftalin, supra (holding that criminal penalties may be imposed for
frauds against brokers -as well as investors -under §17(a) of the
1933 Act because the proscription was "plainly imposed").

This Court

and others had applied Rule 10b-5 outside the corporate insider
context.

Affiliated Ute, supra.

Moreover, the agency charged with

interpreting the statute had expressed its view that Chiarella's
precise conduct was illegal.

Thus, the law was "relatively clear."

In this situation, Chiarella had at least as much notice as
do offenders in Sherman Act "rule of reason" violations, Nash v.
United · states, 229 u.s. 373, 377 (1913), or in prosecutions for the
sale of goods at "unreasonably low prices", United · states v. National
Dairy · Products · corp., 372 u.s. 29, 31-36 (1963).

Indeed, his

conduct was so unreasonable, so egregious, and so plainly wrong -

19 •

even under common law principles - that he can scarcely claim to have
been unfairly surrrised.
C.

The jury · instructions.

In a related argument, petitioner contends that even if the
Act and Rule may be interpreted to cover his activities on CA2's
theory that he had "regular access to market information", that was
not the theory on which he was tried.

As this Court held in Rewis v.

United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971), the jury must be charged as
to each element of the offense.

A new element introduced on appeal

cannot be used to justify a conviction if the jury was not charged
that it must find it.

Here, the jury was not instructed that it must

find regular access to market information.

This argument is a little

thin since petitioner would probably have conceded the point at
trial.

If this Court adopts a narrower theory of liability as

proposed by the SG or the amicus, the argument is equally attenuated.
On the SG's view, there would be no need for a finding of regular
access at all - a finding of misappropriation would be enough and the
the jury was charged on that point.

If one of the intermediate

positions recommended by the amicus is adopted, we have the same
situation as we would under CA2's rule:

There should technically

have been a finding under the "fairness test", but the facts are
overwhelmingly clear that the test would have been satisfied.
IV.

INTENT
The district court charged the jury that it could convict

only if it found that Chiarella had acted "knowingly" and
"willfully", defining those terms to mean that "the defendant must be
aware of what he was doing and what he was not doinq" and that he

20.
must be acting deliberately and not as a result of "innocent
mistakes, negligence, or inadvertence or other innocent conduct."

He

concluded that "all that is necessary • . . is that the government
establish a realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a
wrongful act • • . and that the knowingly wrongful act involved a
significant risk of effecting the violation that occurred."

This

instruction has been approved as sufficient under the "willfulness"
requirement of §32(a) of the 1934 Act, the authorizing provision for
criminal prosecutions.

United States

v~

Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (CA2

1970); United · States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388 (CA2 1976).
Petitioner argues, however, that Rule 10b-5 itself requires
more than the criminal penalties provision.

Under Ernst &· Ernst v.

Hochfelder, he says, the government must prove a specific intent to
defraud.
for

425 U.S. 185, 193 (question was whether a cause of action

dam~ges

will lie without allegation of "'scienter' - intent to

deceive, manipulate, or defraud"), 194 n.12 ("In this opinion the
term 'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.

In certain areas of the law recklessness is

ocnsidered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of
imposing liability for some act.
question whether .

We need not address here the

reckless behavior is sufficient for civil

liability . . . under 10b-5").
Petitioner accordingly asked the trial court to instruct as
follows:
Intent to defraud means the specific intent to deceive,
cheat or trick someone. And, an intent to deceive,
before being considered the specific intent which
satisfies the statute, must be coupled with what may be
best described as an evil ambition to injure someone

21.
and deprive him of something of value.
CA2 held that the trial court pr0perly refused to instruct
on specific intent.

Your Hochfelder opinion, read as a whole, does

not define what element of scienter is required since the only
question was whether negligence (no scienter at all) would be enough.
Although the two references quoted above suggest that the Court had
specific intent in mind, there are numerous references elsewhere in
the opinion to willful, purposeful, and knowing conduct in more
general terms.
open.

Moreover, the question of reckless conduct is left

Therefore, Hochfelder cannot provide the answer.
Specific intent was not viewed as necessary by any of the

cases or commentators cited in Hochfelder as favoring scienter, and
the only court to reach the question since then held the Peltz-Dixon
charge sufficient.
359.

United States v. Charnay, supra, 537 F.2d at 357-

The SG adds that a number of other courts have now joined CA9's

conclusion, many of them holding that recklessness is sufficient.
Brief at 85 n.65, citing cases from CA3, 5, 6, 7, and 10.

Chiarella

testified that he knew his conduct was "wrongful" and "against the
SEC".

This was sufficient, as the jury found.
Petitioner argues that the general intent requirement is

inconsistent with Hochfelder.
CA2's

~easoning

shows.

This argument is insubstantial, as

The decision must turn instead on the

policies underlying Hochfelder, an analysis petitioner has not
undertaken.

I am hard pressed to construct a rationale in his favor.

It seems clear to me that Congress did not intend to limit §10(b)
liability to individuals who subjectively intended to defraud their
"victims".

As in this case, most fraudulent schemes are inflicted on

2 2.

stockholders unknown to the perpetrator.

Although he may have known

his conduct was wrong, it will be difficult to show that he intended
to deceive.

I also doubt that the Court can justifiably require a

showing of specific intent only in criminal cases.

This would appear

to fly in the face of the statutory scheme, since §32 explicitly
resolves the question of the need for a higher threshold of scienter
in criminal cases ("willfulness").
This Court's refusal in US Gypsum to require specific intent
under the Sherman Act also supports the decision below.

The Court

found that a requirement that defendants have a "conscious desire to
bring [anticompetitive effects] to fruition" would be "unnecessarily
cumulative and unduly burdensome."

438 U.S. at 446.

Finally, petitioner's suggested instruction was wrong even
if specific intent is a requirement.

"Evil ambition to injure

someone" is never an element of a crime, since "motive" is always
distinguished from "intent".

The fact that petitioner desired only

to make money, not to hurt anyone, is utterly irrelevant under any
rule.
IV.

PRIVILEGED EVIDENCE
This issue arises from petitioner's application to the New

York State Department of Labor for unemployment compensation after he
was fired.

He was instructed to supply a statement giving the

reasons for his discharge, and responded as follows:
I was discharged for violations of the company rules
re: disclosure of client information. The allegation
is true.
It was a matter of printing of stock tender
offers nd I utilized the information for myself . • . •
_,____________________________________________________
__
This statement
was admitted against petitioner at trial.

23.
New York Lab. Law §537 provides in part that
Information acquired from employers or employees
pursuant to this article shall be for the exclusive use
and information of the commissioner • . • and shall not
be open to the public nor be used in any court in any
action or proceeding • . . unless the commissioner is a
party • . • . Such information . . .
in the
commissioner's discretion, amy be made available to the
parties affected in connection with effecting
placement.
Petitioner contends that this statute absolutely privileged
the above-quoted statement as a matter of state law, and that the
federal court ought to have respected that privilege under Rule 501
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

CA2 disagreed, noting that state

privileges are not controlling in federal criminal cases under Rule
501 except to the extent they reflect

11

the principles of the common

law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience.
11

11

Since the §537 privilege was

Unknown to the common law 11 and federal policy strongly favors

admissibility in criminal cases, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 708-713 & n.18 (1974), the statement was admissible.
A.

The case · for reversal.

Petitioner argues that §537 creates an absolute privilege,
and that the statement could not have been admitted against him in
the courts of New York.

Although federal courts have come to

differing results in cases involving state

11

required reports 11

privileges, there is a consensus that Rule 501 requires federal
courts to weigh the applicable policies in the tradition of the
common law.
The policies favoring extension of a privilege are as
follows.

New York has a strong interest in facilitating the work of

24.
its unemployment department by obviating unnecessary investigations.
This interest should not be ignored in the absence of a strong
federal interest.
state policy.

Here, a number of federal authorities support the

Proposed Rule 502 of the FRE would have required

federal courts to respect state "required reports" privileges.
Congress did not, in refusing to enact the specific scheme of
privileges because it desired to proceed on a case by case basis,
disapprove any of the enumerated privileges. S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d
Cong. 2d Sess. 6, 13 (1974).

Thus, proposed Rule 502 may provide

guidance to the courts in fashioning a federal law of privileges (by
adopting certain state privileges, in this instance).
Required reports privileges are common in federal statutes
(See Petitioner's Brief at 63) and to some extent reflect a federal
policy parallel to New York's.

The specific statutes emphasized by

petitioner are unhelpful, however.

He cites the Railroad

Unemployment Insurance Act as providing a parallel privilege in a
federal unemployment scheme.

In fact, however, that statute only

bars publication of information "in any manner revealing an
employee's identity" - surely not a concern in these circumstances.
45 U.S.C. §362(d).

Equally unavailing is 26 U.S.C.

~3304(a)(16)(B)

which requires that state unemployment tax laws contain safeguards
against misuse of certain wage · information made available for very
limited purposes.
Finally, the privilege should be respected to avoid the
possibility that the unemployment statute could infringe petitioner's
privilege against self-incrimination.
These three federal sources support New York's policy and

25.
override the federal interest in the truth-determining process in
I

criminal cases, particularly where, as here, the statement was
largely cumulative.

Petitioner walks a thin line here between his

assertion that this interest was not violated and the SG's assertion
that in that case the admission was harmless error.

Even if the

evidence was cumulative, he says it forced him to take the stand to
explain his admission, thus prejudicing him.
B.

The case for affirmance.

Since there was no common law required reports privilege,
petitioner must show substantial policy reasons to justify a
departure from the general rule that evidentiary privileges are not
favored.

Herbert v. Lando, 47 USLW 4401

(1979); United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 709 (1974). His attempt to do so is not
persuasive.
First, the New York privilege is not absolute.

The statute

itself allows disclosure where countervailing interests are strong
enough.

The information may be revealed to third parties in the

course of placing applicants for employment.

There is no indication

that it may be admitted in New York criminal trials.

But the New

York Department of Labor interprets the statute to permit disclosure
of confidential files to the FBI, and the report in question was
released for use at the trial of this case with the approval of the
New York Commissioner of Labor.

This in itself would seem sufficient

to destroy petitioner's claim that New York's strong policy interest
ought to be respected.
Although the SG is less successful in refuting petitioner's
federal policy arguments, they do not appear to be so substantial as
to require exclusion of evidence that the state has agreed is

26.
admissible.

The statutory argument is unpersuasive since the cited

statutes invoke different policy concerns and do not suggest any
broadly applicable required reports privilege.

As to Proposed Rule

502, the SG says (1) the rule does not apply since New York approved
the use of the statement in this case, (2) the statement was not
"required by law" since it was the product of a voluntary application
for unemployment benefits (somewhat disingenuous), and (3) Congress's
decision to require the courts to look to common law should give us
pause in relying on the proposed rule 502 to adopt state privileges.
The fifth amendment argument would appear to be largely foreclosed by
your opinion for the Court in Garner v. · united States 424 U.S. 648
(1976)(information supplied on tax return properly admitted against
petitioner since he failed to claim the privilege at the time), and
by the plurality view in California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 , 427-431
(1971)(statute requiring motorist to stop and furnish name and
address after accident not unconstitutional).

The only unanswered

question is whether petitioner could, as a practical matter, have
claimed the privilege.

If the fifth amendment appears to you to be a

serious concern, you might ask at argument what consequences would
flow under the New York scheme from a claim of privileqe and a
refusal to state the reasons for discharge under the New York scheme.
The parties have not discussed this, and it is important to the
Garner analysis.
Finally, the admission of the statement was probably
harmless error, since the fact that Chiarella engaged in the
proscribed conduct was not really disputed and was established by
substantial independent evidence.

The admission here said little

27.
about the central issue in the case - Chiarella's state of mind at
the time of the offense.

His brief in this Court comes close to

admitting that the statement was of little relevance.

If so, it is

difficult to see why it forced him to take the stand, as he claims.
V.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
1. With respect to the scope of Rule 10b-5, CA2's rule is

-------

plainly too broad.

At the other extreme, I would be prepared to

(91-~

accept the argument that conduct as egregiously dishonest as

~..vc...
Chiarella's, falling within the proscriptions of the common law or 4..J......,'f24.
..Y.e-11 ~ .....~
very nearly so, violates Rule 10b-5 when practiced in connectio~~!it~

..

~~

the purchase of stock.

As in Affiliated Ute, the Court could

affirm ~

on the basis of the "catch-all" nature of 10b-5 without saying
If the Court is disposed to give more guidance (a course which,

~

more. ~

after~

trying to make sense of Affiliated Ute I agree is highly desirable),
the case is considerably more troublesome.
The SG's position is essentially that trading on undisclosed
"stolen" information violates the rule.

I wouldn't have any problem

with this if it were limited to actual common law conversions
involving an element of deception.

But it is extremely questionable

that that standard was met here, since the fraud on the offeror was
not "deceptive" and the fraud on the shareholders may not have been
actionable at common law.
As to the amicus' test (seep.

I~),

I am scared by the

vagueness of the "expectation of fair dealing" language.

It would

require courts to evaluate the legitimacy of business behavior in a
wide variety of cases with no congressional guidance.

If the test is

limited to certain market professionals, it is less troubling but
also less useful.

I wonder if it really adds much to a case by case

28.

approach.

If you think it does, the proposed rule could easily be

justified as within the policy of §10(b). ' It is more difficult to
give a principled explanation of the derivation of a duty to disclose
I

by analogy to the corporate insider duty.

I am

~nclined

7

to think

that Congress intended to cover this type of "cunning device," and
that the duty can adequately be justified by reference to the common
law tradition and its modern development.
2.

Although I have no great sympathy for Mr. Chiarella

himself in view of the facts of this case, I am much troubled by the
imposition of criminal liability with the law in such a state of
flux.

Most persuasive is the ALI's refusal to take a position.

I

cannot say that the law was "relatively clear" under US Gypsum,
although Chiarella's conduct was certainly egregious.
posted by Pandick are of course not determinative.

The signs

I would therefore

reverse on this issue.
~-----------------~~
3.
I simply don't see any basis for requiring specific
intent under Rule 10b-5.

Hochfelder makes no such demand, and the

congressional policy and statutory structure militate against any
such limiting requirement.
4.

The exact status of the privilege under New York law is

a puzzle to me.

If the statement would in fact have been excluded at

all New York criminal trials, I would find this a difficult question.
The policy shown by Proposed Rule 502 and the self-incrimination
concern would make me lean toward exclusion.

But the New York labor

commissioner releases such statements to the FBI and expressly
authorized the use of Chiarella's statement below.

In these

circumstances, it seems absurd to hold that it should have been
excluded out of deference to state law.
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1202, United States v. Chiarella

I

believe

that

a

review

of

the

iury

instructions

supports the conclusion of Mr. Justice Stevens that the jury was
never presented with the theory that now forms the basis of the
SG's argument-that petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring
corporation that is actionable under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5.
After some general
criminal
Securities

trial,
Acts

the
of

instructions on a iury's duty in a

iudqe
1933

and

explained
1934.

the
He

purposes

emphasized

of

the

that

the

"philosophy ... at the heart of the securities laws is one of full

and fair disclosure of material facts to prospective purchasers
of securities. R. at 676. In this vein, the iudqe stated that:
The charges in this case involve allegations that
Vincent Chiarella traded on the basis of material nonpublic information without disclosing this confidential
information.
In simple terms, the charge is that
Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of information he
acquired in the course of his confidential position at
Pandick Press and secretly used that information when
he knew other people trading in the securities market
did not have access to the same information that he had
at a time when he knew that information W3S material to
the value of the stock.
R. at 677.
After the judge read the indictment, which restates the
language of Rule 10b-5 and details the financial transactions at
issue here, he read the lanqauge of 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to the
jury.
guilty

The

jury

it

must

was
find

told

that

that

in

order

Chiarella

to

find

either

(1)

the

~-'

defedant

employed

any

device, scheme or artifice to defraud or (2) engaged in any act,
practice, or course of business which operated or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person. R. at 681.
The judge stated that a "scheme to defraud"
to

obtain

Chiarella

money
to

by

trick or

disclose

deceit,

material,

and

that

non-public

"a

is a plan
failure

by

information

in

connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit."
R.

at 683.

Accordingly, the iury was instructed that Chiarella

employed a scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose .•. material
non-public information in connection with the purchases of the
stock." R. at 685-86.

Alternatively, the jury was instructed that Chiarella's
conduct would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person if
"Chiarella's

alleged

conduct

of

without disclosing material,

having

non-public

purchased

securities

information would have

or did have the effect of operating as a fraud upon a seller."
R.

at 686.

all

The

judge had earlier stated that fraud

the means which human

ingenuity can devise

"embraces

and which are

resorted to by one individual to gain an advantage over another
by

false

misrepresentation,

suggestions

or

by

suppression of

truth." R. at 683.
The judge then instructed the jury that an element of
the

offense

willingly.

was
In

that

the

the

course

acts
of

be

committed

these

knowingly

instructions,

the

and
judge

suggested the "central issue .•• is what was Mr. Chiarella's state
of

mind

when

he

involved ... knowing
have

any

was

that

realization

engaged

this
that

in

violated
he

was

the

company

doing

a

transactions
pol icy?

Did

he

wrongful

act

or

not? .•. Had Mr. Chiarella not seen the notices posted next to his
time clock and elsewhere for many months, as he testified?" R.
at 682.
In
theory that
disclose
bought

sum,

the

Chian~lla

material,
the

jury

stock

instructions were premised upon the

violated 10(b)

non-public
of

target

merely by his

information

to

corporations.

failure

sellers

when

Although

to
he
the

instructions briefly mention the company policy against use of

confidential

information,

of

the

instruction on the requisite state of mind for the offense.

The

jury

the

was

never

that

instructed

that

discussion

violation

is

of

part

a

dutv

to

printer's customers could constitute actionable fraud.
The

question of Chiarella's duty to the customers of

his employer was mentioned at other stages of the trial.
opinion denying a motion to dismiss the

indictment,

judge

using

compared

Chiarella's

conduct

in

In its

the trial

information

to

embezzelment committed by a bank employee. And the prosecution
apparently relied upon a similar theme in its closing argument.
The prosecution's argument lead Chiarella's attorney to make an
unsuccesful request that the trial judge explictlv instruct the
jury

that

the

tender offeror was

activity. R. at 701.

not

a

victim of

fraudulent

Nevertheless, the jury was not instructed

that violation of a duty to the acquiring corporation would be a
fraud reached by section 10(b).
Because a
the

basis of

a

criminal

theory not presented

u:s.

United States,

401

not be reached

in this case.

SG's

theory

conviction may not be affirmed on

was

808,

presented

814

to

a

(1971),

jury,

see Rewis

v.

the SG's theory need

Even if it is thought that the
in

addition

to

the

parity-of-

information theory, a criminal conviction may not be upheld on
the basis of an alternative theory which the jury may not have
adopted. See United
Cir.

1978);

cf.

States~

Leary v.

Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (2d

New York,

395 U.S.

n, 21-22 (1969);

Stromberg~

United States, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Thus, this case

may properly be disposed of simply by holding that the parityof-information
describe
need

theory

conduct

not decide

corporation

presented

actionable
whether

to

under

the

jury does not properly

? ect ion

1 0 (b) .

The

opinion

the breach of a duty to an acquiring

could constitute fraud under section 10(b).

November 29, 1979

78-1202 Chiarella

Dear Potter, Bvron ann Bill:
At Conference, the three of you and I voted to
reverse broadly on the qround that the Federal Securities
Acts are not aoplicable to this tyPe of fraud. The Chief,
Bill Brennan, Thurqood and Harry voted to affirm CA2's
sweeoinq opinion 100%.
John took an intermediate position. Prior to
Conference John did what I had not done: he checked the
record and concluded that the jury was instructed only that
Chiarella breached a duty to the persons from whom he
purchased shares at the time he oossessed material, nonpublic information. John thinks, as we do, that the
Securities Act~ imposed no duty on Chiarella with respect to
the sellers - persons with whom he had no relationship
whatever. Thus, John has told me that he could join an
opinion reversing the conviction on the only theory submitted
to the jury.
He would not reach what may be called the second
theory: whether petitioner also breached a duty to the
acquiring corporation that is actionable under ~lO(b) and
Rule lOb-5. Although John is not at rest on this second
theory, he considers it to be different because there is an
identifiable agency relationship between petitioner (throuqh
his employer Pandick) and the acquirinq corporation.
I have concluded that John is quite riqht that the
jury was instructed only on the first theory, namely, that
the charge was a criminal fraud upon the seller of the
shares.
I therefore think that the proper way to write the
opinion is in accord with John's views. We would reverse on
the first theory. There hardly could be a duty imposed by the

2.

Securities Acts upon Chiarella to disclose information to
persons with whom he had no relationship - direct or
indirect. Whether he committed a common law fraud
under state law is an issue not before us.
I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared by my
clerk, Jon Sallet, based on his examination of the jury
instructions.
Absent dissent, I
opinion alonq the foreqoinq lines. Unless it can
this way, I see little chance of a Court opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice \fuite
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
lfp/ss
Enc.

November 28, 1979

78-1202 Chiarella

..
Dear John:
As vou know, the above case has been assiqned to me
to write.
I am inclined to accommodate my views to yours, as
I understand them. Indeed, I now aqree with you as to the
limited character of the instructions.
I enclose a draft of a proposed letter to the
Brothers who also voted to reverse. I would appreciate
knowinq whether I have correctly stated your position, ann
whether you would consider favorably an opinion written alonq
these lines.
Sincerelv,

Mr. Justice Stevens
lfp/ss

_inpttntt

<!Jcurt llf tfrt~h j\fattg

..uJrittghm. ~. <!}. 2ll,;tJ!.'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 29, 1979

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella

Dear Lewis:
In view of your letter and its enclosure,
I fully agree with your proposal to write an opinion
along the lines you suggest.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc - Mr. Justice White
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

,ju.p-rtutt QfO'llrlltf tlt't ~tb ,jtatts

jiluftinghtt4 ~. ~· 2llc?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

December 3, 1979

Re:

No. 78-1202 - Chiarella

Dear Lewis:
I can go along with the approach suggested in your
letter of November 29th. I would have preferred to see it
written more broadly, but under the circumstances it just
can't be, and I will be willing to join an opinion that
simply expresses no opinion as to whether the breach of a
duty to an acquiring corporation could constitute fraud
under§ lO(b) (which I understand to be the recommendation
of your law clerk, Jon Sallet, from the last sentence of/
page 5 of his memorandum). I would be unwilling to join,
at least for the present, any opinion which stated that
there was a breach of duty in such circumstances.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copy to Mr. Justice Stewart
and Mr. Justice White

JS
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No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States

MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The

question

in

this

case

is

whether

a

person

who

learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that
it

is

planning

an

corporation violates
1934 if he

fails

attempt
~

to

secure

control

of

a

second

10(b) of the SAcurities Exchanqe Act of

to disclose

the

impending

takeover prior to

tradinq in the tarqet company's securities.
T

Petitioner is a printer by trade.

In 1975 ann 1976 he

2.

corporations were concealed by blank spaces or false names.

The

true names were sent to the printer on the night of the final
printing.
The petitioner,

however,

was able to deduce the names

of the target companies prior to the
information contained

final

in the documents.

printing

from other

He purchase<'! stock in

thP. target companies and sold the shares

immediately after the

takeover attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
earned

slightly more

months.

Subsequently,

(Commission
activities.
decree

than

with

or

SEC)

In
the

$30,000

the

in

the

course

Securities

and

Exchange

began

an

1977,

petitioner

May

Commission

in

investigation

which

profits to the sellers of the shares.2

of

entered
he

agreed

of

fourteen

Commission

his

into
to

a

trading
consent

return

his

On the same day, he was

<'lischarged by Pandick Press.
In January
counts of violating
1934

(1934

Act)

1978,
~

and

petitioner was

10(b)
SEC

indicted on seventeen

of the SecuritiP.s
Rule

10b-5.3

Exchange Act of

After

petitioner

3.

TI.

SAction

10(b)

of

the

1934

Act,

u.s.c.

15

~

78i,

prohibits the use "in connection with the puchase or sale of any
security ..• rofl
contrivance

any

manipulative

in contravention of such

the

Commission may presrribe."

SEC

promulgated

Rule

1 Ob-5

decE=>ptivA

or

rulE=>s

and

device

requlations

Pursuant to this section,

which

providAs

in

pertinent

or
as
the

partS

that
It shall be unlawful for any person. directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commercA, or of the rna ils or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, schemA, or artifice
to defraud, ror]
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operatA as a fraud
or a deceit upon any person, in connect ion with the
purchase or sale of any security.
~

17 C.F.R.

240.10b-5 (1979).

This cnse concerns the legal pffect of the petitioner's
si.lence.

That

iury to

convict

failed

to

is,

the

Dist"t"ict

the petitionE=>r

Court's
if

it

charqe

found

permitted

the

that he willfully

inform sellers of tarqet. company sAcurities that he

4.

Although

is

the

language of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425

u.s.

185,

197

( 1976)'

constitute

a

the

~

starting

1 0 (b)

point

does

manipulative

or

not

of

our

inquiry

state whether

deceptive

silence may

device.

~10(b)

was

designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices
that serve no useful function. Id. at 202, 206.
legislative

history

nor

the

statute

itself

guidance for the resolution of this case.
promulgated

in

1942,

the SEC did not

But neither the
offers

specific

When Rule 10b-5 was

discuss

the

that failure to provide information might run afoul

possibiity

of~

10(b).7

The SEC took an important step in the development of

~

10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated
that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed
information obtained from a director of the issuer corporation
who was also employed by the brokPraqe

firm.

Cady,

Roberts

&

Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). A corporate insider must abstain from
trading

in the

shares of his

corporation unless he has

first

disclosed all inside information known to him whjch is material

5.

~·,

at 911.

The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from

two elements:
to

inside

( 1) The existence of a relationship gi_vinq access

information

corporate

purpose,

corporatP

insider

intended

and
to

(2)

takA

to

the

be

unfairnPss

advantage

trading without disclosure.

availablP

of

for

a

a]lowinq

a

information

by

of

secret

only

rd., at 912 & n.15.8

Tho.t the relationship between a corporate insiner and
the stockholders of his corporation qives rise to a disclosure
obligation

is

not

a

novel

twist of

the

law.

At

common 1 aw,

misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance upon
the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to disclose
material

information

prior

to

consummation

of

a

transaction

commits fraud only when he is undPr a nuty to do so. And a duty
to discJose material information arises when onP party has data
"that

the

other

rparty]

is

entitled

fiduciary or similar relation of

trust

to
and

know

because

of

a

confidence between

them."9 In its Cady, Roberts necision, the Commission recognized
a

relationship

of

trust

and

confidence

existing

between

the

6.

stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supo. 808, 829
( D • De 1 . 1 9 5 1 ) .
Federal iudicial necisions have found violations of

~

10(b) where corporate insidPrs used undisclosed information for
thAi r

own benefit.

F.2d 833

E.q.,

(CA2 1968)

SEC v.

Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,

cert. C\enied 404

u.s.

1005 (197/.).

401

Federal

cases have emphasized, in accordance with the common law rule,
that

"ftlhe

in format ion
Corp. v.
1975).

party
must

charged

be

under

with
a

failinq

duty

to

disclose

to disclose

it,"

market

Fr ig i temp

Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275,

282 (CA2

Accordingly, a purchaser of stock who has no duty to a

prospective
fiduciary

seller

has

no

because

he

obligation
~Talley

General Time Corp.

is
to

neither
reveal

an

insider

material

nor

facts.

a

See

Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164

{CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393

u.s.

1026 (1969). 11

This Court followed the same approarh in Affiliated Ute
Citizens

v.

United

American

Indians

States,

formed

a

406

u.s.

corporation

128

(1972).

to manaqe

A qroup of
joint

assets

7.

Id~,

its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock.
Two

14 6.

shareholders
effectively

the

of
in

bank's

disposing

traded

in

of their

two

managers

assistant

separate

aided

at
the

stock which

they knew wr:1s

markets--a

primary market

consisting of Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank,
Indian

and a resale market consisting entirely of non-Indians.
sellers charged that the employees had violated

~

10(b) and Rule

10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices prevailing
in

the

resale

disclosure

market.

would

The

exist

if

acted as transfer agents.

Court
the

recognized

employP.es

and

that
the

no

duty

bank merely

But the bank had assumed a duty to

act on behalf of the shareholdP.rs,

and the Indian sellers had

relied upon the employees when they sold their stock.
152.
to

of

Id. , at

Because the employees were charged with a responsibility
the

shareholders,

they

could

not

act

as

market

makers

inducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the
nature of the non-Indian market.
In

sum,

~

10b

was

Id. at 152-53.

designed

to

eliminate

fraud

in

8.

that a duty to disclose arises from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction.

Because corporate

insiders have a duty to place the shareholder's welfare before
their own,

they may not benefit personally by tradinq on the

basis of undisclosed information.12
III

In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating
~

10{b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received

no confidential information from the target company.
obtained

"market

information"

about

Rather, he

events which affected

the

price of the target company's securities but did not affect its
earning power or the conduct of its business.13 Petitioner's use
of that information was not a fraud under

~

10{b) unless he was

subiect to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.
By failing to specify any such duty, the trial court effectively
instructed the iury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone; to
all
told

sellers,
simply

indeed,

to the market as a whole.

to decide whether

petitioner

The

iury was

used material,

non-

9.

material
trade

nonpublic information may not use that information to

in

securities

disclose."

only

F.2d

588

original).

without

incurring

an

1365

(CA2

1358,

affirmative

1978)(emphasis

to
in

Although the court said that its test would includE"

persons

in format ion,

who

id.

regularly

at 1 366,

receive

material

Appeals,

like

the

nonpublic

its rationale for that 1 imitation is

unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14
of

duty

trial

court,

failea

to

Th~ Court

identify

a

relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could give
rise to a dutv.
that

the

Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief

federal

securities

laws

have

"created

a

system

providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and
intelligent investment decisions."

588 F.2d at 1362. The use of

material information not generally available is fraudulent, this
theory suqqests,
or

sellers

an

because such information qives certain buyers

unfair

advantage over less

informed

buyers

and

First,

not

sellers.
This

reasoning

suffers

from

two defects.

10 •

the

selle~s

of the tarqet company securities, for petitioner had

no prior dealings with them.

He was not their aqent, he was not

a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed
their

trust

stranger

who

and

He

confidence.

dealt

w] th

the

was,

sellers

in

fact,

only

a

throuqh

complete
impersonal

market transactions.
We

cannot

affirm

convic;tion

petitioner's

without

recoqnizing a qeneral duty existinq between all pRrticipants in
market transactions to forqo action based on material, nonpublic
information.

Formulation of such a

broad duty,

which oeparts

radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a
specific
should

relationship

not

be

between

undertaken

two

absent

parties,
some

see

explicit

n.

9

supra,

evidence

of

congressional intent.
As

language

or

neither

the

we

have

seen,

legislative
Conqress

no

such

history

nor

parity-of-information rule.

the

of

evidenc;e

section

Commission

has

emerqes

10(b).
ever

from

the

Moreov~r,
adopted

I

R

Instead the problems caused bv the

£

11.

member

of

national

i3.

securitiP.s

exchange

from

effecting

transaction on the exchange for its own account.
7 8k ( a ) ( 1 )
exempted

( 1 9 7 2-1 9 7 8

S u pp. ) .

But

Congress

from this prohibition spP.cial ists:

any

15 U.S.C.A.

has

~

specifically

broker-nE'alers who

execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's
stock,

while

at

corporation's

u.s.c.
SPss.

~

the

stock

on

78k{a) ( 1) {A);

99

same

(1975).15

their
see S.

The

time

buying

own

behalf.

Rep.

exception

advantage
orders.

at

that

the

same

comes

Ibid.16

time

from

t.hey

their

selling

that

11(a.)(1)(A),

~

No.

94-75,

is

based

recognition that specialists contribute to a
marketplace

and

94th Cong.
upon

fair

15
1st

Congress's
and oroerJy

exploit.

the

informational

possession

of

buy

and

sell

Similarly, the Williams Act17 limits but does

not completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
corpora.tion

stock

before

public

announcement

of

the

offer.

Congress' careful action in the these areas contrasts, and is in
some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are asked to
adopt in this case.

1 2.

tender offer

to

institutional

investors who

are

then able

to

purchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is
made

public

situations,

and

the

price

of

shares

rises.18

In

a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target

corporation on the basis of market information which is
to the seller.
presumably

be

warehousing

altered

if

its

recognizing

that

different

he

had

the

however,

under

"somewhat

unknown

In both situations, the seller's behavior would

Significn.ntly,

after

both

the

nonpublic
has

r1~ ted

regul~te

tender

Commission

authority
act ion

theory"

to

information.

under

~

than

that

1 0 (b)

would

to

bar

offers19

rest

underlying

on

a

insider

tradinq.20
We
theories
before,
language
Ross

&

of
the

see

basis

liability
19 34

and
Co.

no

the
v.

Act

for

in

this

cannot

statutory

Redington

quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436

applying

be

case.
read

scheme

As

we

"more

reasonabl v

47 USLW 4732,

u.s.

such new and different

4735

have
broadly

emphasized
than

permit."
(June

18,

its

Touche
1979),

103, 116 (1978). Section 10(b) is

1 3.

'
contrary result is without support in the legislative history of
§

10 (b)

and would be

inconsistent with the careful regulatory

plan thnt Congress has enacted for regulation of the securities
markets.

Cf.

Santa Fe

Industries

Inc.

v.

Green,

4 30

U.S.

at

479.21

IV
In its brief to this Court, the United State offers an
alternative
argues

that

theory

to

support

petitioner

petitioner's

breached

a

duty

conviction.
to

the

It

acquiring

corporation when he acted upon information which he obtained by
virtue

of

corporation.
conviction

his
The
under

position
breach
§

as
of

1 0 (b)

a
this

for

printer

employed

duty

said

fraud

is

to

perpetrated

by

that

support
upon

a

the

acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory is valid for it
was not submitted to the iury.
to find

The iury was told that in order

the petitioner guilty it must conclude that he either

(i) employed a device, scheme or. artifice to defraud, or

(ii)

14 •

connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit."
Id.

at

683.

petitioner

AccordinqJy,
employAd

a

disc1ose ... material

the

iury

scheme

to

non-public

was

instructed

defraud

information

if
in

he

that

the

"did

not

r.onnection

with

thA purchases of the stock." Id. at 685-86.
Alternatively,
convict

if

the

"Chiarella's

iury was

aJleqed

instructed

conduct

securities without (Usc losing material,

of

that

havinq

non-public

it

could

purchased

information

would have or did have the effect of operatinq as a fraud upon a
seller."

Id.

at 686.

"embraces

all

which

resorted

over.

are

another

The i udqe had earlier stated that fraud

the means which human

by

to by onA

false

inqenuity

individual

can devise

and

to qain an advantaqe

misrepresentation,

suqqestions

or

bv

suppression of the truth." Id. at 683.
The

jury instructions demonstratE'! that petitioner was

convicted merely because of his

failure

to disclose material,

non-public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of

target

corporations.

The

jury

was

not

instructed

on

the

15.

upon the existence of such a duty, whether it has been breached,
or whether such a breach consitutes a violation of§ 10(b).22
The iudqment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

FOOTNOTES
1.

Of

the

five

transactions,

four

involved

tender

offers and one concPrned a merqer. United States v. Chiarella,
588 F.2d 1358, 1363 n.2 (CA2 1978)
2.

SEC v. Chiarella, No.

77 Civ.

2534 (GLG)

(S.D.N.Y.

May 24, 1977)
3.

~

32(a) of the 1934 Act sanctions criminal penalties

against any person who willfully violates the Act. 15 U.S.C.A.
78ff(a)

(1978).

violntinq

the

~

PPtitioner was charqed with seventeen counts of
Act

because

he

had

received

seventeen

letters

confirming purchase of shares.
4.

United

States

v.

Chiarella,

450

F.

Supp.

95

(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
5. Only Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) are at issue here.
10b-5(b)
untrue

provides
statement

that
of

a

it

shall

material

be
fact

unlawful
or

to

"[t]o
omit

to

make

Rule
any

state

a

material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the liqht of the circumstances under which they were made, not

FN2.

7. See SEC Release No. 1230 (May 21, 1942).
8.

In Cady, Roberts the broker-dealer was liable under

section 10(b) because he received non-public information from a
director

of

brokeraqe

the

firm.

issuer
Because

who
the

was

also

director.

associated
could

not

with
use

the

inside

information, neither could the partners of his brokerage firm.
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). The transactions
involved in Cady, Roberts invo]ved sale of stock to persons who
previously may not have been
Id. ,
Judqe

<'It 913

n. 21.

&

Learned

Hann

shareholders

in the

The Commission embraced
that

"the

director

r-r

of

corporation.

the reasoning of

officer

assumed

a

fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale: for it would
be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantaqe of his
position to induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary
although he was

forbidden to do so once the buyer had become

one." Id., at 914 n.23, quoting Gratz v. Clauqhton, 187 F.2d 46,
49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied 341
9.

u.s.

-

q20 (1951).

Restatement of the Law 2d,

Torts

~

551(2){a).

See

FN3.

10. See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
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838 {1975)(hereinafter Fletcher): 3A Fletcher,
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213

u.s.

419,

431-34

(1909):
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11.
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F.2d 453, 460-461

Great American 1ndus.,

(CA2 1968), cert. denied 395

u.s.

Inc.,

407

920 (1969):

Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637-38 lCA7 1963).
12.

"Tippees"

of

corporate

insiders

have

been

held

liable under 10(b) because they act on the basis of information
derived from a corporate insider and have a duty not to profit
from

the

use

of

inside

information.

See

Shapiro

v.

Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (CA2 1974).
The tippee's obligation may be viewed as arising from his role
as

a

participant

after

the

fact

in the

insider• s

breach of a

fiduciary duty. Subcomittees of American Bar Association Section
of

Corporation,

Banking,

and

Business

Law,

Comment

Letter

on

FN4.

1 2 1 U • P a • L • Re v • 7 9 8 , 7 9 9 ( 1 9 7 3 ) •

14.
to

market

The Court of Appeals said that its "requ]ar access
information"

test

would

embracing "those who occupy

create

workable

R

rule

f

strategic places in the market

mechanism." United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (CA2
These considerations are insufficient to support a duty

1978).

I

{
to

disclose.

A

duty

arises

from

the

relationship

between

\

)
merelv~~e~-~£~?:~
parties,

see

nn. 9

supra

10

&

and

accompanying

The Court of Appeals also suggested
corporation

itself would

tender offeror
takes

a

creates,

substantial

unsuccessful.

Id.,

not be a
rather

economic

"market

~hat

at 1366-1367.

that

its

and

not

the acquiring

insider"

than receives,
risk

text,

because a

information
offer

will

and
be

Again, the Court of Appeals

departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a duty.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in

~k~
a manner
does

not

J

a~.e~

violate

~

- -j.t.
our analysis here, that a tender offeror
10(b)

when

it

makes

nrP-rlnno11nropmont-

FN5.

Tim~

General

Corp. v. TaJley Industrjes, 403 F.2d 159, 164 (CA2
deni~d,

1968), cert.
15.

393

u.s.

Secur.iti~s

2

1026 (1969).
and Exchange Commission,

Report of

the Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Conq.

1st.

Sess.

57-58,

(1963)(hereinafter

Special

Study).

Because of the compilation of buy and sell orders collected in a
specinlist's

"book,"

the

specialist's transactions on his

own

behalf are based on material, nonpublic information indicating
consumer desire for a particular issue.

Id., at 76.

16. The spPcialist provides liquidity and continuity to
the market by buying or selling for his own account. During any
one period of

tra~ing

to buy or sell

there may not be enough customers who wish

a sped fie stock in order to allow continuous

trading at prices reflecting the true value of stock.

Without

the intervention of specialists, an investor might not be able
to

find

a

purchaser offering

wishes to sell.

the

going

rate

at

the

time

he

The seller would be forced either to wait for

another buyer to enter the market, which reduces the liauiditY

FN6.

positioners, registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs,
from~

and risk arbitrageurs
trading.

15 U.S.C.A.

94-75 at 99:

~

11's general prohibition on member

78k{a)(1){A)-{D)

(1978): SeeS. Rep. No.

see also Securities Exchange - Act Release No.

34-
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17.
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purchase 5% of the target company's stock prior to disclosure of
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18. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra n.16,
at 811-812.
19. SEC Proposed

Rule~

240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-88

(1979).
20.
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{ 1971). See Dooley,

Restrictions,

66

Va.

L.

Rev.

{forthcoming issue).
21.

The Court of Appeals correctly noten that Iii 10{b)

should not be construed more narrowly in criminal actions than

FN7.

probation.

Id~,

22.

at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, J., dissentinq).

The conviction would have to be reversecl even

the jury had been instructed that

if \
j

it could convict petitioner

either (1) because of his failure to disclose mRter.ial nonpublic

I

I

information to seller or (2) because of the breach of a duty to
the

acquiring

conviction

corporation.

if

it

is

We

impossible

may
to

not

uphold

ascertain

a

criminal

whether

the

f

/

{

defendant

has

been

punished

States v. Gallaqher,
v. New York, 395

u.s.

for

non-criminal

conduct.

Uni tP.d

576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978): see Leary
6, 31-32 (1969): Stromberq v. California,

I
283

u.s.

35, 369-70 (1931).

I

Mr. Justice:
Attached is a copy of ehiarella with your chanqes
and additional changes made by the four of us. Of particular
note are the following chanqes:
(1) The addition of secondary sources to notes 10,
11

&

Hi.

(2) The Affiliated 5te discussion now refers to the
defendants as managers or officers. The Court's opinion
refers to them as managers, officers, and employees.
(3) Note 20 is now simply descriptive. Althouqh I
believe that the CA2 principle is compatible with the rule of
leniency, there is no reason to "decide" that issue in this
case.
I am told by the library that Professor Loss'
treatise has not been updated since 1969, althouqh they say
he published a pamphlet within the past few weeks that
contains general views on the securities laws. I am
attempting now to obtain that work.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

l

No. 78-1202

Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
't d St te
Appeals for the Second
U me
a s.
c·IrCUl't,
[January -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.

(
I

I

Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976 he
"Worked as a "markup man" in the composing room o
·
·
Pandick Press, a financial printer
mong documents that petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate takeover bids. When these documents
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or
false names. The true names were sent to tbe printer on the
night of the final printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
he target companies before the final printing from other wah~d et~~~r
formation containeq in the documents.
e purcliase s oc
n the target companies and sold the shares immediately after , t:, lw.M<J I~
he takeover attempts were made public. 1 By this method,
~tit;-~

.

1

Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned

78-1202-0PINION
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petitioner realized t in of slightly more than $30,000 in the
course of 14 months. Subsequently, the Sf'curities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner
entered into ~ent decree with the Commission in which
he agreed to return his profits to the sellers of the shares.~
On the same day, he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.a After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the in clictmen t.' he was brought
to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted
certiorari, 441 U. S. - - (1079). and '""e now reverse.
II

Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78j. prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission .m ay prescribf'." Pursuant to this section,
tho SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 which provides in pertinent part 5 that
------"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or incli ~
n mrrgrr.
Hl78).
2

United States v. Chiar!'lla. 58S F. 2n 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2

SEC v. Chiarella, Xo. 77 Civ. 258-.! (GLG) (RDNY :\by 24, Hl77).

Reciion 32 (a) of thr Hl:-34 Art. sanriion~ criminal penaltie~ again~! an~·
who willfully violnlrs the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (HJ72197S Rupp.). Petitioner wa~ charged with 17 counts of Yiolating thr Art
hecnn.::e ho had received 17 lcttrrs confirming purclw se of !'harP:<.
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Snpp. 05 (SDNY 1978).
~
5 Only Rules lOb-5 (a) and (r) arc nt issur here.
Rule lOb--5 (b~
pro,·ideR thnt. it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statemenl of a
material fact or to omit t o statr a maicrial fnct necessary in order to
3

prr~on
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rectly, by the usc of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifico to
defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act. practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1970).
This cai"e concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
thr potitioner if it founcl that he willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that \Yould make their shares 1norc
valuable ..: In order to decide whether silence in such circumstances violates§ 10 (b). it is necessary to revie·w the lunguage and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the fed eral courts.
Althotwh the starting point of onr inquiry is the language
of the statute. Ernst & Ernst Y. llochfelder, 425 F. S. 185, 197
(1076) , § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or dcccpti,:e clnicr. Section 10 (b) \\"as
desig•1cd as a ct;tch-all clauso to prev0nt fraudulent practices.
!d. , at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resoluti on of
this case. When Rule 10b-5 " ·as promulgated in 1!)42. the ____..mnk0 the ::;tatements made, in thC' light of th0 circumstance::: und0r ll"hi <"h
the~· were mad0, not mislendil'g." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (h) (1970). TllC'
portion of the indictment ha::;0d on this provi~ ion was di~mi ~"cd h0 rn u ~e
tlw petitioncr made no st3tC'm r nt ~ at nil in comwction with tlw pm<"h:lHC'
of stock.
" H ccord, at 682- 683, 686.
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REC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
~ 10 (b) "·hen it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undis1
information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was a registered representative of the brokerage firm. Jn Cady, Roberts (C· Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961),
the Commission decided that a corporate insider must abstain
from. trading in the shares of his corporation unlf'ss he has
first disclosf'd all material inside information known to him.
The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
(( ra ln affirmativr duty to disclose rnaterial information
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insic!Prs.' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must discloBc material facts which arc known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment." !d.,
at 911.

\ jI

The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from . ///1 n,~q
The existence of a relationship
access to ins1 e "1Jf'a 1
information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (} ) the unfairness of allowing a corporate _1
_
insider to take advantage of ~ information by trading
without disclosure. !d., at 912, and 11. 15. 8
""
/

~)
\ ·, ~ (

4/it!j

c __

7

Src SEC'

Rrlra~e

No. 8230 (l\'l:ay 21. 1042).

~In c-;fdl{. Rob-"rt s. tllf• brokrr-rlr· d:• r \Y:I~ J;al>IP llNlrr ~ 10 (b) hr('tnl~('
it rrcPivrd lJOnpublic information from a corporate insirlPr of thP isPuPr.
Sinrr the insider could not usp thP information, neither could the 11artners
in the brokrrago firm with which he was a~soriated. Cady, Robel'ts &
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 ( Hl61). The tran~artion in Cady, Roberts involved
sale of 10.tock to per~ons who previouftly may not ha vc been ~harcho lder,;
in tho corporation. !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Comm ission embraced
the
.Jmtge Le.u,ed lh"d lho1 "the <h'"etoc oc offiocc """~

'""'"'""of
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosu re obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentntion made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the fal!"c statcment is fraudulent. But one who fails to
disclose matrrial information prior to the consummation of a
.J.
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
~
so. And tt duty to disclose H1!ilt~rial inftH"IR!itiQl~arisrs when
\l._l_h_h_&_r_v.e_~t_•_IS"'....JL-----,o:-l:1e::l
:-: :)::a:r:-t~y?h-:a:-s"tl(hrhr "that the other [party] is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and ronfidPnce betwcrn them." 0 In its Cady, Roberts decision, the
Commission recognized a rC'lationship of trust and confidence between the sharPho1ders of a corporatio11 allcl those
insiders who have obtained confidential information by reason
of their position with that corporation. 10 This relatiollship
gives rise to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of
preventing a corporate insider from tak ring l advanta?;C' of the ...__ _ __

t. \{, -,l.. {

n fiduciary rrh1tion to thr bu~·pr IJ~· thr \' err ~a le: for il ''"mdd he n
sorry distinction to allow him to u~r the advantage of hi,; pol'ition to
induce the bu~· er into the po~ition of a b rneficiar~· nlthongh hr "·a~ forhiddc•n to c'o ~o u JH' l' the lm~·cr h·tcl br,.ome on r. " Jd .. at Pl~. n. :?:l,
fJuoting Gratz Y. Clavghton. 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (C.'\2 1051). crrt. drniPd,
341 U.S. 920 (1051).
"Tirst:ltrmrllt of ih r L ~l'l' ~d , Tl ; rt~ §:i.i l (2)(a) (10711 ). 8Pr' .lamt·~ &
Gray, Mi s reprr~r ntation-Pa rt II, 37 Mel. L. Rev. 488, 52:3-527 (1071\).
As rrgards f-:ec uritir* transactions, thr Amrricnn Law In~titutr rrrognizr~
that. "silence wh r n there is a duty to Rpeak may br a fraudulrnt act."
ALI, Federal Sreuritirs Code § 262 (b) (Proposrd Official Draft 1978) .
10 Srr 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 838 (1975) (hrrrinafter Flctchrr); 3A Flrtcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, J 174;
3 L. Loss, Scemitirs Hrgulation 14-!6- 14+8 (2d eel. 1961); 5 L. Los~, at
35.57-3558 (1069 S.l,!l2p.). Sre al~o Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 431434 1909 · Bra hfi v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5
(1010). Srt• gl'!H'rall~· Note, Hnlr JOl-5: Elrm"nt ol a Privnte Higltt o
Action, 42 ~Yll L. Bt•v. 511. 552-55:~. ancln. 71 (J06S): 75 Han'. L. Hrv.
14-W, 1450 (]9(\2) ; Dnum & Phillip~, The Implication of Ca rly. Roberts,
17 Bu~. Law .C 039,945 (1962) .
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uninformed ninority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
-·The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 830 (C'A2 1968). cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "rt]he party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigite1np Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F. 2ct 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Tall ey
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159. 164 (CA2 1068) , cert. deniecl.
393 U.S. 1026 (1969)."
This Court followPd the same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 ( 1972). A group of
American Indians formrd a corporation to manage joint assets
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation rrquested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. Id. ,
at 146. Two of the hank's assistant managers aided the
shnreholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
~yas traded in two 8rpara te markets-a primary market of
_____Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale~

l

SPf' ::l.,o SEC v. Grrat American I ndus .. lnr .. 407 F. 2d 4Pi:) JI)O
(CA2 1968). reri. denied, 305 U. S. 920 (1060): Kohler v. Kohler Co .,
31\l "F'. 2d fH1, G:37-63R (CA7 HJG:)): Noir, supra n. 10. 42 NYU L. Hr1·.
n t 5.'i·t: :.'\ ok Thr Rrg11lntion of Co:·por~1r Trncler Offrr Undrr Frdrr:tl
Srcurit.irs Law: A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 350, 373-374 (1966).
Rrr geJwr:dl~' Note. CiYil tinbilii,· under Hulr X-10b-5, 42 Va. L. l1e1·.
537, 554-56 1 (1956).
11

"'
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
10 duty of disclosure would exist if t.J:Te. ofEgeps an~~
~ 1
1
bank merely acted as a transfer agent. But the bank,£.hacl ~
assumed a duty to act on behalf of the shareholders. and the
Indian sellers had relied upon its personnel when they sold
their stock. Id., at 152. Because these officers of the bank
were charged with a responsibility to the shareholders, they
could not act as market makers incli~eing the Inclians to sell
their stock 1vithout disclosing the lffl:'4i'ttl'oe-~~~
market. !d., at 152-153.
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under ~ 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's IYclfare before their own. will
110t benefit personally through fraudulent use of material
non public information.'"
J

'" "Tipprr,;" of rorpor:1tr in~idrr~ ha1·r brrn held liablr nnctrr § 10 (b)
brr:m'<r they have a duty not to profit from thr usr of i1 . ~idr information
ihat they know is confidrntial and know
,;hould know cnmr from a
corporate insider, Shapiro v. ltf errill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner ce· Smith. -+95
F. 2d 228, 237<!38 (CA2 Hl71). Thr tipprr's obligation h:1.· brrn Yir\\'rd
a~ arising from hici role a~ a participant. aftrr the fact in ihr inRider'~
hrrach of a fiducia1-:-· dut~·. Subcommittrrs of American Bar A~~oeia tion
Srction of Corporation. Bankin~J:, and Bu~inrss Law, Comment Lcttrr on
l\fatrrial, Non-P11blic Inform:1tion (Oct. 15, 1973) rcprintrd in BNA,
Srruritirs Rrp;11lation & L:tw Rrport No. 233, at. D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, Hl74).
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III
In this case. the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential information from the target company.
1\Ioreover. the "market information" upon which he relied
clicl not concern the earning power or operations of the target
company. but only the plans of the acquiring company.' "
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disc1ose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failccl to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner O\ved a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed. to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he ln1ew other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "r a] nyone--corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpuhllc infon11ati.on may not use that information to trade in securities \Yithout incurring an affirmative
fll<ty to disrlor-e." 588 F . 2d l:i58, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis
in original). Althm;gh the comt sairl that its test would include
only persons who regularly receive material non public information, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
See Fleischer, l\1nndhrim & ::\furphy, An Initial Inquiry into thC' RC'to Disr·lo~r ~1n.rkct Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 79 , 709
(1073).
1 ' The Court of A pprals said tlw t its "rrgular access to market information" te~t would rreato a workable rule embracing "those who
occupy ... strategic placr~ in the markrt mechanism." United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2cl 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considrrations
arc insufficient to ~upport. a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the
relation~hip bet\YCC'n partiel', 8ec nn. 0 and 10, supra, and accompanying
1

"

~pon~ibilit~·
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and inte1ligent
i11vestmcnt ch'cisions." 588 F. 2cl, at 1362. The usc by anyone of material information not generally available is fra11clulent, this theory suggrsts, because such information gives
crrtaill buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellPrs.
This r0asoning suffers from two defects. First, not every
instancr of financial unfairness eonst!tutcs frandPlent ach\'ity
under § 10 (b). See Santa F'e Industries I nc. v. Green. 430
U. S. 462 . 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
make sil0nce fr:-tiH1ulPnt ·--n rluty to disclose--is absent in this
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship ''"ith
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed th0ir tr11st and confidence. He was, in fact, a com1rxt, nnd not mrrrl~· from onr'~ abilit~· to nrquirr information brt'au~r of
hi~ position in t hr m1rket.
The Court of AppenlR abo f'tlf!gr~trd thnt thr acquiring corpor:1tion
it~rlf would not hr n "markrt in~idrr" hrrnnsr n tendrr offrror rreatrR,
rathrr thnn rrrci,·rs, in[ormntinn nml takr~ n ~ubstnntinl rconomic risk
thnt. its offer will be un~uccr"~ful. Id .. at 18nG-1807. Agni11, the Conrt
of 1\.ppeal~ depnrtrd from 1hr nnnl~·pis appropri~1te to rrrognition of a
dut~·. Thr Comt of Appc·1lR for thr Srcond C'irC'uit prcYiou~ly hrlrl, in
:c mn11ncr C"n~i-drnt wilh our nnnl~·sis here, that a tenclrr oiTcror clors not
yjo]ate § ](I (h) when it mnke~; preannrnwcrmC'I't purchn~rs p:-eriscly
.{)('rnme thrrr i;-; 110 rcla t ion~hip bet wrrn t hr offeror nnd thr Rrllrr:
"\Vc know o[ no rule of law ... thnt a purcku:;rr of stock, who wnR not
nn 'insidrr' :•nd had 110 fiduciu~· rPlation to n pw~pective sellrr, hnd an~·
obli[.!;fltion to revenl circum~tnnrl'R that might rnii'c n srller's dcmnnds nnd
thuR abort thr 8alr." General Time Corp. v. Talleu Industrirs, 403 F. 2d
150, 164 (CA2 106R), crrt. drnird, 393 U.S. 1026 (1069).
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general du, between all participants in market
transactions to foro·o based on material, nonpublie informatwn. Formulation of such a broad duty, which departs
radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from
a specific relationship between two parties. sec n. 9. Stl]Jra,
shou d not be undertaken absf'nt some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence cmNges from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither
the Conp:ress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Instead the problems caused by misuse of market information have heen addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market info"mation may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer:
___.Cm'!?:rcss· careful action in this nnrl other ar<'as ln contra~ts. an~
1
" 15 U. R C. § 78m (d) (J) pNmit~ a trnclrr ofTrror to purrha~r 5~
of thP target comp:m,·'~ stor·k prior to di;1Cio"nre of it~ plans for

arCJui~ition.
1 " ~rrtion 11 of thr Hl34 Art grnrrall~- forbid8 a mrmbcr of a national
Rrcuritics exrhange from effrrting am· tr:msaction on the exchangr for it~
mm account. 15 U.S.('_ A. §78k(n)(J) (Hl72-1978 Rupp.). But
Congress has specificall_,. rxPmptrd sprrialist~ from this prohibition-brokrrdralrrs who execute order~ for custom('!'~ trading in a specific coqwmtion':>
~t 'l rk. while nt the ~arne timr bu~·ing and ~<rlling that corporntinn'H stock
O!l tlwir own brhalf.
§ll(a)(l)(A), l.'i U.S. C. A. §7Rk(a)(l)(A)
(Hl72--J!l78 8upp.); scr S. Rrp. No. 0-1-75, 94th Cong., 1st Se~~-. !1!1
(1075): 2 Securities and Exchangr Commi<sion, Rrpnrt of the Rprrial
Rtud~· of Securitirs lVIarket~->, IT. R. Doc. ~o. 95, 88th Cong., bt. Sr ..;s.,
.57- 5fi., 7() (1!)63). SPe grnrrally S. Robbin:;, Tlw SrrmitiC's MarketH
Hll-193 (1966). Tlw exce]Jtion is baRrel upon Congrrs~' rrcognition

!hot '""''"''''' contdbute too '"'' ood o'dcd)· m"kelplocc ot iho

"m/
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1s m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arC'
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "\Varehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to ~
•
puchasP Ftock in thP target company before the tender. off0r is ~ ~ {.J:AAJ Q.tJ ILII
ade public and the price of shares rises. 17 In•4H~t~ sill€ !
te. ~ 0 r;.!IV.q
6
· . a bnyer of f'ccurities purchases stock in a target corW
II
poration on the basis of market information which is unknown
to the seller. In both situations. the seller's behavior presuma ly wonld b0 Dlterec if he hDcl th0 nonpublic information.
Significantly, ho\vever. the Commission has acted to bar warehonc:in<?: uncl0r ih autl: ority to r0rr·nlfl te t endcr 0Ff0rs '~ after
recognizing that action under ~ 10 (b) would rest on a "some'"hat. different theory" than that previot1sly used to regulate
insider tradin~· as fraudulent activity. 1 n
We see no basi<> for a11plying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before. the
HJ04 Act. cannot bf' rr::td "'morr broadly than it:o languag:r and
____- ~
1he 8tatutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross &~
Cn. v. Redingto!'. 47 r. R. L. \Y. 4732. 4735 (Jm1e 18. 1079).
t imc t hr~· rxploit t h" infonm1 ion:tl nrh·:1ntagC' that. come" from thPir po~
of hnY and ~rl! onlrr~.
.. nt 7S-.SO. Similar conrern~ with
w nne toning of thr m:>. rket prompted Congrr~~ to exrmpt market
makrr~. hlock p ositionr r~, rrgi~trrrd odd-lnt dealer~ , bon:t fidr n rbitrnv:rnr~,
and risk arbitr:urrur~ from§ ll's rrrnrrnl 11rohibition on mrmber trading.
11) F. S.C. 1\. §78k(a)(l)(A)-{D) (1972- Hl78 Supp); srcS. Rrp. ;\To.
04-75 . at 90. Sre al-<o Srrnri1ir~ Exrhange Art R <'lra~r ~o. ~-1-00,')0, 38
F<'d. Reg. 3902. 3\ll.S (1973).
17
F!ei~rlwr, l\'fundhrim & l\inrph~·. supra n. 16, at 811-812.
JRf=;F,C ProJ~o,;rd Ruk ~240.1-lr-2. 44 Frd. Rrg. 0987-0088 (1070).
1
~ 1 f?EC Tn"tituli on,1 1 In':c~tnr 8111d.1· R"port, IT. R. Do". ~o. 0:?-tH.
02d Cong., 1st Srs~., xxxii ( 1971).

Rrs~irn
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quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) ~ described as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent \vith
the carefu_!L_e~ttltt~ePy plan that Congress has enacted for reg1ilation of'tt1e securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S., at 479. 20

,---~

IV
In its brirf to this Court, the Fnitecl State's offers an altrrnative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporatio~
n when
he acted upon information that he obtained by v· ·e of
his position as an employee of a printer employed y tho
corporation. The breach of this d11ty is said to· support a
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not dC'cide whethN this theory has mC'rit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule 10b-5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business \vhich operated or would operate as a fmud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge----------stated that a "scheme to defraud'' is a plan to obtain money
The Court of AppcalR ~trttrd that § 10 (b) should no! br ron~trurd
morr narrmdy in criminal actions than in ciYil enforrrmcn! action~.
5:-.,•; F. 2d, at 1:l!iS, n. W . Yr! it i>< worth noting that thiR i:-; appniTn11y
the first case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon n purrha><rr for § 10 (b) nondisclo~ure. Petitioner was sentenced to a yrar
in prison, suspended except. for onr moni h, and a .five-yrar term of
probation. Id, at 1373, 1378 (Me~kill, .J., di~senting).
20
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~~TATES

,,
1o)

by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose
matcrinl, non--public infonnation in connection ,\·ith his purchase of stock wm•ld coustitute deceit." !d., at 683. Aceol'dingly, the jury was instructed that the petitio11cr employed a
sche1110 to defraud if he "did not disclose . . . material liOnpublic information in connecti011 with thP purchases of the
~tock." !d., at 685-686.
Alternatively. the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's allogcd conduct of having purchased securities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a frnud
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, suggestions or by snppression of the truth." !d., at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on tho
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury,
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn
v. United States , 471JSLW 4607, 4609 (Juno 4, 1970), we will
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes ~
violation of ~ 10 (b). 21
-

-

·-

1

The com·iction would hnvr to br rrYrr,;ed even if lhe jury hnd brrn
that it could convict petitionrr rithcr ( 1) bccau~r of hi~ fnilurc to disclose mnlrrial, nonpublic informntion to orller or (2) brcausc of
the breach of a. dut)· to the 11cquiring corporation. We mny not uphold
a crimind conviction if it i~ impossiblr to ascertain whether the defendant has been puniohcd for noncriminnl conduct.
United States v. Gallagher, 576 F. 2cl 1028. 1046 (CA2 1978); sre Leary v. New York. 305
"

in~tructrcl

~
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370
(1931).

'J.'o: 'l'n~ L::LJ.di. J
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.
I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room
of Pandick Press, a financial printer located in New York City.
Among documents that petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate takeover bids. When these documents
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or
false names. The true names were sent to the printer on the
night of the final printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover

78-1202-0PINIO~
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attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange ComHllSSion (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a
consent decree with the Cormnission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the sellers of the shares! On the same
clay. he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of
violating ~ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.~ After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, 1 he was brought
to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We grantee!
certiorari, 441 U. S. (1979) , and we now reverse.
II
Section 10 (b) of the 1034 Act, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78j. prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . [ ofl any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursnant to this section,
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb- 5 which provides in pertinent pnrt 5 that
"It shaH be unlawful for any person, directly or imli1 Of the five tran8action~, four involvrd tender offrrs and one concerned
n merger. United States v. ('hiorrlla . .')SS F. 2d J358, l~G~ , n. 2 (C.I\2
1978).
2 SEC Y. Chiarella. No. 77 CiY. 21534 (GLC) (SDNY 1\Jay 24, 1977).
:J Section 32 (a) of tho 1934 Act s:tnc tionc; criminal penaltirs against any
prr:•on who willfully violate~ thr Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (19721!178 Snpp .). Petitionrr \\"a s charged with 17 crtmtR of Yiolating the Act
hr f':t n ~o he had received 17 let lrrs confirming purclu1Re of shareR.
4 United States v. Chiarella, 4.'50 F. Supp. 95 (SDNY 1078).
fi Only Rulrs lOb-5 (n)
and (c) nrr nt j f(~ llr here. Rul e lOb-5 (b)
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rectly, by the use of any nwans or instrumentality of
interstate commercr, or of the mails or of any farility
of any national securities exchange,
11
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artificr to ·
defraud, [or]
11

(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of nny security." 17 C:FR § 240.10b-5 (1979).
This case concerns thr legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitim1rr if it fonnd that he ·willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcomin~ takeover bid that would make their shares more
valuable. 6 In order to decide " ·hether silence in such circumstancrs violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to rPview the lan ..
guage and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statutr. Ernst & Ernsl Y. Jlochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whrther silence may constitute a maniptlluti,·r or drrrptivr clrvire. Section 10 (b) was
clrsigncd as a ratch-ull clau~r to nrrvent fraudnlrnt prncticrs.
!d., at 202, 206. But neithrr thr legislative history nor the
statute itself affords sprcific guidance for the resolution of
this c::tse. When Rulr 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the
pro,·ides that ii ~hall be unlawful "r iJo mnke nny untrue st::drment of a
mairrial fact or to omii. lo 8ifltP a mairrinl fact. necrssary in ordrr to
makP the sintements madr, in ihr lip:ht of the circumctanres under whirh
the~· were made, not mi~lc;Hling." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1970). Thr
portion of the indirtml'nt ba;;rd on ihis provision was cli~misscd brrau~e
thP petitioner made no sbiC'mrni~ a1 all in connection with t11C' pmrhasr

or

~tack.

"Record, at 682-G 3, 6 G.
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REC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
~ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation \Vho was also a registE'rcd representative of the
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
(] 061). the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from traclin!-!: in the shares of his corporation unless
he has firi:'t disclosed all material inside information known to
him. The obligation to disclosE' or abstain derives from
"[a]n affirmative duty to rlisclose material information
[which 1 has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders.' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known. would affect their investment .iudgment." !d.,
at 911.
Tho Commission emphasized that tho duty arose from
(i) The existence of a rcbtionship afford ing acce~:s to inside
information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose. nnd (ii) tho unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure. !d., at 912, and n. 15. 8
Sec SEC Rclea~c No. :3230 (May 21, 1942).
' Tn Cady. J.'ob ,rts. t hP hrokrr-dealrr w l ' liable under § 10 (b) bc('aH~P
it. received nonpublic information from a corporate insjder of the is~uer.
Rinrc the insider could not usc the information, neither could the partners
in the brokcrnge firm with which be wa:-; as,:ociated. Cady, Roberts &
C'o., 40 S. E. C. 907 ( 1061). The t ran~action in Cady, Roberts involved
~ale of stock to J1Crsons who previou:-;ly may noL have been ~harchold er;;
in tho corpomtion . Id ., at 913, and n. 2l. The Commis ion cmbrarccl
the reasoning: of .J uclp:r Lc:ll'nrd Hand that "the director or offieN n~:-;umcd
7
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fail s to
cl.iscJose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is undcr a duty to do
so . And the duty to clisc1 0f"<' aris<'s when on e party has information "that the ot 1ler rpnrtyl is Pntitlecl to know because
of a fidu ciar y or s~n 1 il:w relation of trust and confickncc
betwc011 thcm.''" Tn its Cady. RolJerts decision. the C'om.mission r<>cogniz<>cl a rrlntionshir> of trust and confidence
betwN•n tlw si-Jart'h olders of n corporation ancl those insidrrs
who ]1/H'f' ohtainrd C011ficlential info rmation by rc'ason of thr.ir
poF"ition with thnt corporation. 10 This rPlatiom:hip ~ivf"' ri r<>
to :1. dutv to rli scloc:r h~'rauc:;p of th<> "nccrsf:ity of prevrntinq; a
corporate insidrr from takrinr:l ndvantflgf' of the uninfornw d
a fiduciary rebtion to the bu~ ·rr hr ihr nry ~n l r; for it would hr n
Rorr~' distinct ion to allow him to u ~e the ndvan!nge of his pol'iiion to
induce the bu~·er into the po ~ii ion of n brnrfiriar~· nlthm1gh he wn R forhiddrn to ,ln ~n onr·r tlw hll\'l'l' h:• r! hc':·omr onP." !d .. ni !ll.t. n ~.j
quoting Gratz v. Clm1ghton. 187 F. 2cl 40, 49 (Ci\2 Hl,') l), crrt. drnierl,
8+1 U. S. 920 (Hl51) .
n HrRt·Ji rnwn i of tl ,r l ·m 2d. Tori,; ~ ').')1 (2)(n) (Hl70). Rr~' .T:>mr~ &
Grnr, Mi Rrrp rr~rn tnii on-Pnrt TT, 87 Mel. L. Rrv. 4 R, 523-527 (lfl7R).
/\H reg11rclR 'ePuritie~ tr. n~nc1ion~, t],,, .\m "rir;;" Law Tn~iiiPi<' rrro:rnize~
thnt. "silence when there is n duiy to Fprnk mn~' br n fraudulent nri ."
AU, F edernl Srrurities Code § 202 (b) (Propo8rrl Official Draft 1978).
10 Ree 3 W. Flrtchcr, C~·rloprclin of the Lmv of Private Corpor:~tionR
§ 888 (Hl75 ) (herrinn fter Fletrher); 3A Fletch er, §§ 1168.2, 1171 , 1174:
8 L. Lo RR, Sf'r miiir.~ Regulation 1440- 1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. L oss, at
811.'5 7-3558 (1969 Supp.). See also 8trona v. Repide. 213 U.S. 419, 4814:34 (l!l09): BrophJI v. Cities 81'n•ir·r Co .. 81 Drl. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d fi
(1049). ~ef' <rrnernll~· 'otr Ru!C' lO!).fl: I <: I rmf'ni~ of a PriYntr Ri~J:hi of
Action. 43 ·yp L. Rrv ..'i-!1, 55:2-R.'l:~. nnd n. 71 (HJGR); 75 Hnrv. L. R ev.
1 l•l!l . 14.'\0 (Jq02): Dnum & Vhilli]lH, Thr Tmplir:1tion of Cad!J, R oberts.
17 Bu~. L:m, a:m. 94!i (1!lG2).

t
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minority stockholders." S7Jeed Y. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808. 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 833 (CA2 Hl68), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "[tlhe party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Ftmd, Inc., 524
F. 2cl 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal ma.terial facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968). cert. denied,
393 U. 8. 1026 (1969). 11
This Court follow0el tho same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of
Amr:·irnn Indians formed a rorporntion to manage joint as:::ds
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stork
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. !d.,
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was trndrd in two sPparate markets--a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale
11 8rG :1!:-o SEC v. Grrat Amnir·mt Indus .. Int .. 407 F. 2d 4 .~8 , ·100
(C ,\2 19G8). crrt. clenird, 89.'5 TT. 8. 920 (1960): Kohler v. Kohler Co ..
:i10 F. 2cl G:3.t, 6:~7-688 (C ·\7 19ftl): ~\olr, wpm n. 10. 42 NYH L. Rr,·.
:1t M-1-: ;\o te . Thr Regulation of Corpor:1tr Trndcr Offer Under Feden1l
Rrcuritics Law: A Nrw Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966).
SrP gPn r rally Notr. Ci,·il LiahiliiY undC'r Rule X-10b-5, 42 Va. L. Rr,·.

537, 554-561 (1956).
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. India11 sellers
charged that the assistant n1anagers had violated ~ 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
no duty of disclosure \YOuld exist if the bank merely lwei acted
as a transfer agent. But Lhe bank also had assumed a duty to
act on behalf of thr shareholclrrf'. ancl the Indian sellers had
relied upon it'5 prrsonnel when thev sold their stock. ! d., at
LS2. Because the:o0 offirrrs of the bank were chnrgecl with n
responsibility to the Rhar0holdrrs. tlwv could 11ot act a" mnrh't
m.ak0rs inducin;r thr Inclinns to sell their stock without clis·closing the existcnc0 of thr mor<' fnYorn.blr non-Indian mnrkrt.
ld .. nt 1.~2-153.
Thus, ndminiPtrRtivc ancl .iuclicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may oprrate as a fraud actionable undrr ~ 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislatiYe history specifically addressing thr legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premisrcl upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidrnce between parties to a
transaction. Application of a dut~' to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate jnsiclrrs, \Yho have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before thcjr own. will
not benefit persona11y through fraudulrnt usc of materjal
nonpublic information.'"
"Tippers" of rorporatr in~idrr~ han' lwrn held liable undN § 10 (b)
they have a dut~· not to profit from t.hr u~r of in~idc informnti011
that they knmy i:1 eonfidl'ntinl nnd kiJow or Nhould know cnmr !'rom n
rorporatc insider, Shapiro v. 1\Ji'rril/ Lynch. Piercl'. Fenner & Smith. 495
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 Hl7-~). The tippre's obligation hns hrt'n Yie\\'rd
:1'' :lrif'ing from hi,; role as :1 11articipnnt nftcr the fact in thr insidrr's
hrrnch of a fiducinry dut~·. Rubrommittres of American Bnr A~Nocia t ion
flection of Corporation, Banking, .~ncl T3u~iness Lmv, Comment. Let lrr on
l\Tntrrinl, Non-Public Informntion (Oet. 15, 197:'l) reprinted in BNA,
Rc'rnrities Rrgulntion & Lrm Report. No. 233. nt. D-1, D-2 (,Jan. 2, 1974).
12
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III
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
110 confidential information
from the target company.
Moreover. the "market information" upon which he relied
clicl not concern the earning power or operations of the' target
company. but only the plans of the acquiring company.l:l
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disdose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failC'd to specify any such duty. In effect. the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people
trafling in the securities market did not have access to the
sam.e information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "[alrzyone--corporate insickr or not- who regnlarly receives material nonp11blic information may not usc that information to trndP in secnritiC's without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 13.58, 1~65 (C/1.2 1978) (emphasis
in orig:ino l). Althongh the ronrt RBicl that its test would include
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic information, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
1

~

See Fleischer, Mnndheim & Murphy, An Inilial Inquiry into the Rcto DiHdo~e J\Inrkct Information, 121 U. Pn. L. Rrv. 70S, 709

Apon~ibilit~·

(107::!).
11
The Court of Apprals Raid that its "regular access to mnrket information" te,.;;t would create a workablr rule emhrncing "thrse who
orcupy ... strntegic pbres in the market mechanism." United States
Y. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 13G5 (CA2 197 ) . These consicleration8
arc insuiftcient to support a duty to di~close. A duty arises from the
relationRhip betwcrn partieR, ~cc nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying
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Appeals, like the trial court. failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belie£ that the
federal securities l::ms have "created a system providing rqun.l
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decision s.'' 588 F. 2cl, at 1:i62. The usc by :myone of material information not generally available is frn tldulent, this theory suggests. because' such information givrs
certain buyers or sellers an nnfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.
This rea~oni nv, snffers from two defects. First. not rn•ry
instancr> of financial unfairness ronstitutes fraudulent acti,·ih·
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
mako silence fraudulent-a duty to diPclosc-i~ absent in this
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sc11ers of the target con1pany's serurities. for petitioner had
no 11rior dealings with them. He vvas not their agent. he ITns
not a fiduciary. he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact. a comtrxt, and not mrrrl~· from onr\ ahilit~· to :'rquirr information hrr:111~r of
his position in tlw market.
Thr. Comt of Apprals al,:o suggr.,trd thnt tlw nr(jniring rorpor:dion
itsrlf would not hr n "mnrkrt insidrr" brr:m ~P a trncler off"ror rrrntr~,
rathf'r than rPr ri1 rR, information :~nd !:1 kr~ a ~ubstantial rronomir ri~k
tint it~ offrr will he unsurerPRfnl. !d .. at 1~66-13G7. Again, thr Comt
of Apprals drpart rd from the nnal~·j,;is nppropriate to rceogniti0n of a
clutr. Thr Court of A ppc:1l~ for t hr Srroll(l C'ir;·uit pre'. ious]y hrlcl. in
:t mannrr ronPi~tent with om nn:~l~·~is hrrr. that a trnder offrror dor~ not
1·iolatr § 10 (b) whrn it mnkrs preannonnrrmrnt purrhRsrs prrri~rly
hrean~r thrrr i~ no relation~hip hrt wrrn thr offpror and the srllrr:
" We know of no rulr of la'\\· ... that n purchaser of stock, who wa R not
an 'insiclrr' nnd h:1d no fiduri:tr~· relat ion to a prosprrtive sclkr, had :1n~·
obligation to re1 raJ eirrumstanrrs that might. mi>·c a seller's drmnnds nncl
thus abort. thr snlr." General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 400 F. 2d
159, 164 (CA2 HH'iR), eert. drnird, 393 U. R. 1026 (1069).
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
\V'e cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which
cleparts r::~rlically from thP established doctrine that duty ari!'cs
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
rongressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. 1nstcad the problems caused by misuse of market infonnation have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.
C'onpTe:-s' carcfulartion in thif' ::md other areas 1 " contrasts. and
1 "15 U.S. C. §7,m (d)(l) ]Wrmif~ n. frndrr offeror to 11urrhase 5%
of the target compan~·',; stork prior to discloH1rc of its phmf' for
n rqn i~ition.
1 " ::::rction 11 of the Hl34 Ad grnrrnll~· forbids n member 0f a national
securities e'\ch:mg:c from effecting nnY frnnsnrtion on thr rxchnnge for if~
own ncconnt. 15 U.S. C. A. §7Rk(n)(l) (Hl72-197R 8upp). But
Congress hns specificnllv exempted specinlif'ts from this prohibit ion-brokrrdenlers who rxecute orders for customers trnding in a specific corporation's
stork. while at the snme time bu~·ing and selling that corporntion's stork
on their own behalf.
§ 11 (a )(l) ( L\.), 15 U. S. C. A. § 7Rk (n) (l) (A)
( J072-l07R 8npp.); see S. Rep. No. 04-75, 94th Cong., 1st 8es~., 99
(107.'i): 2 SecnritieR anrl Exchrmge Commi~sion, RPport of the Special
8tndv of Securities Markets, H. R. Dor. No. 95, 88th Cong .. 1st. Sess.,
!'i7-.'iR. 7(\ (Hlfi3). See gcnen1lly R. Robbins, The Securities MnrketR
Hll-Hl::l (1966). The exception iR bnsed upon Congress' recognition
that specialists contribute to a fnir nne! order]~, marketplace at the same
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is in some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arc
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was c01wictccl
is at odds with the Commission's view of ~ 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "\:Varehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
t0nder offer to institutional investors who then arc able to
p11cha~e ~<to ck in the target company before the tcnd0r offer is
mack public and the price of shares ri8eS.17 Tn this case, a~ in
"·ar0housing, a buyer of s0curitic's purchases stock in a targ0t
corporation on the ba sis of marke t information which is
1111knom1 to the scllrr. In hotll of th ese sitnntions. the seller's
b r hr vi or pref:umnhly wou ld he altered if he had the nonpuhlic
infonnation . Significantly, however , tlw C'ommi ssion ku;
acted to bar "·arehonsin~ under its authoritv to r0p:ulate t011dcr
offf'rR" after rccogni:;.ing that acti on under ~ 10 (b) \Yould
r0st on a " somewhat different throry" than thnt previou~ly
11 SC'rl to rC')'~nhte in"icler trading os fraudulent ncti,·ity. 1 n
We s0e no basis for applying sncl1 a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasi7.ed before. the
1084 "\,..t rannot he r0ad "'mor0 broarllv than it s lan_znap;0 and
the statutory srheme reasonably permit.'" Tourhe Ross &
iimr ihrY C''(ploit ihr inform:1tionnl ndY[Ill!:qrr thnt romr' from ihrir po~
of lmy :mel >'Pll orriN ..-. 2 8r•;·mili•'' and Fwbu·gr Comm:,, irm,
R r pol"l of t l1 r Rprr i:d Stud~· of P.••c·mil iP>' :\hrkrt'. IT. H . noc. '\o. flfi.
f::Si h C'nn;::., 1 ~t sr~.- al 7fl-SO. f-imililr ('()11('(' 1"11~ with thC' function in g of
ih r m:'l·krt promptrcl C'onr;•w' lo rw mpt m:ukrt m:t krrs, blor-k po,il ioiJN>',
rrgi >trrrd odd-lot dr:li<'r', ho•1:1 fid r :n hilr;tgr u r~, :1nd ri~k nrhit r:1r-;rm"
from~ 11 '~ grnrr: tl prohihitioll n1. mrmhr r trading . 1!i 1'. 8. C .. \.§ 7Sk
( :1 ) (1) (A 1-(D) (1072-197S ~ ll] lJl.): ~pr· 8. Hrp. :.ro. 0-1-i!i. :1 1 PO . Sri'
:d>'o Rrruritir~ Exrh:1111!r \C"I Hr•];•:t'r '\o . :3-!- P9.'i0, ~~ FC'd. Hrg. :l!10:!..
8!)1S (l !173) .
17
Flci ~rhrr , Mundhrim & Murphv, SU]J1'a n. 16, at 811-812.
1
" SEC Proposed Rulr ~ 240.14r-2. 44 Frd. Rrg. 9!1R7-99R8 (Hl70).
10
1 m:<:C Tn~ t iluiionnl Tnvr~ lor Stud~· Hc'Jlmt, H. H . Do r . Xo . 02- o-1 ,
92d Cong ., 1st Srs~., xxxii (1971).
Rr~~ioll

I
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Co. v. Redington, 47 F. S. L. \Y. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly dPscribecl as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure. there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under ~ 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with
the carefnl plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markd~. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,
480 r . S .. at 470. 2 "

IV
Tn its brief to this Court. the United States offers an alternative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
lw acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a.
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule 10b-5 . that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, schrme or
artifice to defrau d or ( ii) engaged in an act. practice , or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. R ecord, at 681. The trial judge
The Court of Appeals ~ta tcd tha t § 10 (b) should not be construed
more narrowl y in criminal action8 than in civil enforcement actions.
5SS F. 2d, at 1:368, n. Hl. Yet it i::; wo rth not ing llmt this is ap]Jarcn tly
the first case in which criminal liability ba s been imposed ur1on a purchaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to a year
in prison , suspended except for one m onth, and a five-~·ea r term of
probation. !d., at 1373, 1378 (lVIc~kill, J., di ~~enting) .
20
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stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money
by trick or deceit and that "a failnre by Chiarella to disclose
mat0rial. non-public information in connection with his purchase of i"tock would constitute deceit." !d., at 683. Accordingly, the jury '':as instructed that the petition<'r employ0d a
scheme to derraucl if he "clicl 11ot disclose . . . material nonpublic information in connection with the pmchases of the
stock." !d. , at 685-686.
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having rmrehased securities without clisclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated tlwt
fraud "embraces all the means which human inge1wity can
devise and which are re!"orted to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation. suggestions or by suppression of tho truth." !d., at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to m1yone
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on thr basis of a theory not presented to the jury,
Rewis v. [!nited States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607. 4609 (June 4. HJ79), we will
not specnlatr upon whether such a duty exists, \Yhether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a
violation of ~ 10 (b) .21
The rom·ir1 ion would h:wc 1o hr rrvrr~rd C'\'C'll if 1he .i u r~· hnd brrn
thnt it could com·ict petitioner either (1) becau~r of hi,; fniluro to disclo~c mnterinl, nonpublic inform:1.iion to ~rller or (2) brrnnsr of
the breach of n clnty to tlw ncquiring corporntion. We mn~' not uphold
a rriminnl eonyir1 ion if it is impos,;iblr to asrrrtain whet her thr clrfcndUnited States Y. Galnnt hns been puni~hrd for nonrriminnl conduct.
21
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

lagher, 576 F. 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); see Leary v. N ew York, 395
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370
(1931).

~u:p:rttttt

<lfottri ~f tlrt ~b ~hdts

JfasJringf.ott, ~. <If. 2ll&t'!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 4, 1980

Re:

78-1202- Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I am glad to join your opinion for the
Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

j5u.p:rtmt <!fltltri of tqt ~h j5tatts
Jfasftinghtn, !8. "f. 2llgt.J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CH I EF .J U S TI CE

January 4, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
As you may recall from Conference, I was prepared to
affirm the conviction and file a dissent along the lines
of Dean Keeton's observation that "any time information is
acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should
be a duty to disclose the information." Keeton, Fraud, 15
Tex. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1936). Here, Chiarella, literally in
the shadow of the warning signs in the print shop,
acquired private information by illegal means -misappropriating nonpublic information entrusted in him in
the utmost confidence by the acquiring company. I
strongly believe this illegal conduct imposed upon him a
duty to disclose or to abstain from trading on the
information; his failure to abide by the
disclose-or-abstain rule violated Rule 10-b-5.
Your t houghtful opinion now shifts the emphasis and
basis of reversal. Since (1) the mere possession of
non-public information is not sufficient to create a duty
to disclose, and (2) the "Keeton theory" was not submitted
to the jury, you have made a good case for reversal.
Nonetheless, I am unable to join your opinion as now
drafted. At page 7, the opinion suggests that liability
for nondisclosure must be "predicated upon a . . . duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between the parties to a transaction."
Similarly, at page 9, the opinion speaks of "a
relationship between petitioner and the sellers that could
give rise to a duty." My concern obviously is that this
language can be read to undermine the notion that an
absolute duty to disclose-or-abstain arises from the very
act of misappropriating nonpublic information. Your
language gives me pause. Possibly we can work out an
accommodation.
Your focus on what was not submitted to the jury was
not -- at least in my recall -- explored in any depth in
Conference. I will try to put together some specific
language that would clear this up for me.

-2-

I could not accept any idea that '"blue collar" fraud
is less culpable than a "white collar" variety. I do not
read you as suggesting anything like that but it should be
affirmatively negated if possible.
More later.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

S1tpmm ~lltttt llf tire 'JMittb: :§tilts
~aglfinghm. ~.

<It·
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CHAMBERS OF

January 7, 1980

,JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

No. 78-1202 - Chiarella v. U. S.

Dear Lewis,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
erne

~ttprtlttt <!J~url ~f tlrt ,-mtth ~tattg

;

-a:sfringhm. ~. <!J. 2llpJ!~
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

January 7, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~upr.tntt

(!fomt o-f f:lrt ~tro ~hdt.tr
....Jritt:ghtn. ~. <!f. 2.llgi'l$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 7, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
You have written what I regard as an unanswerable
opinion which I will be happy to join.
I am considering
filing a separate concurrence along the lines of the
enclosed draft but will not make a definite decision
until after I see what the dissenters have to say.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Powell
Enclosure

;%u.prtmt (!fau.rt ttf tqt ~ttb ;%tatts
~asfringron. ~.

<If.

2o~,~~

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 8, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I will be circulating a dissent in due course.

tf/tO)__
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~JtVUUtt <!Jltttrl 4lf tlr~ ~nitt~ ·~hd~,g
Jl•lfhtgton. ~. <!J. 2llgi~$
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 9, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
opinion.

I may add a brief concurring

Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

78-J202 - Chiarella v. United States

MR. ,JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring.

~~

Before liabi 1 i ty, civn or

~,

; s imposed, i t ; s

necessary to identify
the duty that the defenoant has
_.....,..___
breached.

Arguably when this petitioner bought securities in

the open market, he violated (a) a duty to disclose anc fb) a
duty of silence.

I agree with the Court's explanation of why

this petitioner owed no duty of disclosure to the sellers from
whom he purchased target company stock, that his conviction
rests on the erroneous premise that he did owe them such a
duty, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must
therefore be reversed.

In short, I join the Court's opinion.

The Court correctly does not address the question whether
the petitioner's breach of his duty of silence--a outy he
unquestionably owed to his empJoyer and to his employer's
customers--could give rise to liability, either civil or
criminal, under Rule 10 (b) (5).

--

If we assume he breached that

duty when he purchased target company securities, a strong
argument can be made that his action constituted "a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security."

Two persons victimized by the frau(! on that

theory are those to whom he owed the duty of silence, name1y,
the

~panies

his employers.

who entrusted

confid~ntial

informa!:i-on to

NevertheJess--and contrary to views I expressed

as a circuit judge--~/ those persons would not be ab1e to
recover damages from petitioner for vio1ating Ru1e 10 (b)

f5)

because they were neither purchasers nor se11ers of target
company securities.
421

u.s. 723.

See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,

However, neither that case nor this definitive 1 v

answers the question whether this petitioner's breach of his
duty of silence in connection with his purchases of securities
constituted a v i olation of Rule 10 (b) (5) .~ 1

I think the

Court wisely leaves that question for another day.

I write

merely to emphasize the fact that we have not necessarily
placed any stamp of approval on what this petitioner did; we
have merely held that his cr i minal convict i on cannot rest on
the theory that he breached a duty he did not owe.

1/ See Eason v. General Motors Acceptance ~or.p., 4q0 F.2d nS4
1973), a case c1tea with approval 4n MR. JUSTICE
BLACKMUN'S dissent :i.n Blu~_fhip StamE_~ v. Manor Drug StoE_~.!.
421 u.s. 723, 77J.
(~A7

2/ The limitation on the right to recover pecuniary damages in
a-private action identified in Blue Chip, supra, is not
necessarily coextensive with the-rTmits-of the rule itself.
See, e.9_., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 u.s. , , 42 n.
28, 4~n~ 3~7, n. 33.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE

January 31, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Lewis:
I will add the following at an appropriate place
in my dissent.
Chiarella's counsel in closing argument said:
"Let me say right up front, too, Mr. Chiarella
got on the stand and he conceded, he said
candidly, 'I used clues I got while I was at
work.
I looked at these various documents and
I deciphered them and I decoded them and I
used that informatioR as a basis for purchasing
stock. I
There is no question about that. We
don't have to go through a hullabaloo about that.
It is something he concedes. There is no
mystery about that."

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~

·.1~~
~~.
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Feb~uary
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Chiarella v. United States

Dear John:

Now th8t we have SPen th2 ChiPf 1 S oiss~nt, I
certainly havP no obiection to your co1'1curdnq noinjon.
I have a slight prefer~nce for not emphasizing that
the result may have been different if liability had been
premised on a duty to the acquiring comp<my , t=IS I .'!m by no
mean s sure that 10(b) should be extendPd this far beyond its
clear purposes at the time of its enactment in 1934.
As we
are talking ahout criminal liability, I am inclined to think
we should leave it to Conqress to draft ~ more refin~d and
specific criminal statute .
To be sure, you leave the
ques tion for another day.
But with a five to four vote by
the Court, I would prefer - I think - not to invite a
judicial rather th~n a legislative consideration of the
quest. ion.
NevPrthel0ss , thes2 are rethPr Personal thoughts ,
and I do not in any sens~ interpose them as an objection to
your concurr1ng opinion .
I repeat my indebtedness to you for making me
focus, at ~n earl.y ooint in timP , on thP rel~tively n arrow
way in which this case was submi tted to the jury.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens

LFP/lab

February 4, 1980

No.

78-1202

Chiarella v. United States

Dear Chi e f:
Thank you for you~ note of January 31st ~~vising me
of the addition you will make to your dissent. Inci~~ntally,
I am remind~d that I failed - inadvertently - to rPsoond to
your letter of J~nuary 4.
You may re~all that w~ had a bri~f discussion of
this case in your C~?mb~rs, at which tima it bnc~me cleer
that wo w~rn too far apart to "bridqe thP gan". If I wer _ in
Congr~~s, I proh~bly would suopor~ a carPfully dr~wn criminal
st a ~utP th~t would makP it a crimP for one to do what
Chi~rella did.
But it is clPar (at least tom~) that
Congress nevpr h~~ the slightest intention - back in 1933 and
1914 - to extend the s~curitiPS Acts to this typp of
situation.
~ftPr ~11, th~ qovprnment seeks to imoosP criminal
liAbility un~cr thP extr3nrdin~rily vnque lnnquage of on0
section of ~ statute th,t w9s en~cted to protect the Public
from manipulation of thP securities markets by insidors.
Before crimin~l liability is imposed by th~ courts, T think
the ConqrPss should face UP to this question, and ~raft a
pron~r criminal statute that puts people on notic~.

I add that I do not
than you do.

a~mire

Mr. Chiarella any more

Sincerely,

· The

C~ief

LFP/lab

Justice

7L -.a.--to k "- ~.J .a;f / ial-JILl
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MEMORANDUM

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States

I

discussed

this

case

with

Jeff

Rosen,

one

of

the

Brennan clerks, on Friday. The Brennan position is likely to be
that we are correct in our reading of the jury instructions and
the result, and we are correct that mere possession of material
non-public information does not make out a 10(b) violation, but
that

our emphasis on

buyer and seller

the

~ps

existence of

a

relationship

between

farther than we need to go in this case.

Thus, Justice Brennan is likely to state that he agree with the
Chief's

formulation

of

the

scope

of

10(b).

Justice Brennan will circulate a memorandum to

I

believe
the

that

Conference

L..

expressing these views.
is

enough

distance

Justice Brennan may believe that there

between

our

position

and

Justice

Stevens'

that we can be persuaded to adopt some language changes.
I

explained to Jeff

that

you were

changes because we already had a Court.

reluctant

to make

I did not suggest that

we had already seen the Stevens concurrence.
I think the best course at this point is to consult the
Stevens chambers about changes that should be made to respond to
the Chief's dissent, and, once those are made, then sit still to
await the effect of the Brennan memo. Unless Justice Stevens is
moved,

I

suspect that the result will be that Justice Brennan

will write a short opinion concurring in the result.
Justice Blackmun apparently is writing a dissent which
will argue that 10(b)
with

limited

incorporates a parity-of-information rule

exceptions

for

bona

fide

business

activities.

I

believe that we will be able to fend off such an attack simply
by noting that there is no evidence that Congress intended such
a result in 1934.

,jnpuntt C!fcnrl cf tfrt ~b .§taft~
~lp:ttgLrn. ~.a}. 2!l&fJl.~
CHAMBERS OF'

JUSTICE

w .. .

J . BRENNAN , JR.

February 5, 1980
I

I·
I.

Memorandum to:

The Chief Justice
I

Mr. Justice Powell

RE:

I

iI'

No. 78-1202 Chiarella v. United States

At conference I indicated that I would be with the
dissent in the above, but I now find myself halfway between
the positions set forth in your two opinions. On the
securities law issue, while I agree with Lewis that the
mere use in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities of material nonpublic information does not
violate Section 10 (b) or Rule 10 (b) (5), I am unable to
subscribe to those portions of his opinion wfi1ch ·suggest
that - 'b violation of these provisions rna be made out .
absent a bre c
o s . 1p etween the
de en
e
o I a ree that a dut to
disclose or abstain from trading may s em on y rom some
sor o re at1ons 1p. Rather, it seems to me that the
Chief is correct to suggest that whenever someone
improperly obtains information, or converts to his own use
information to which he has access under limited conditions
which do not permit such conversion, use of that
information in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities violates Section lO(b).
In consequence, I am of
the view that on the facts of this case Chiarella probably
could have been convicted of violating the securities laws.
The problem, as Lewis suggests, is that the theory
under which Chiarella was convicted is not the one sketched
out above and in the Chief's opinion. Nowhere in the
instructions was the jury told it would have to find that

.-- -·.

i

I.

Chiarella had misappropriated information or wrongfully
converted it to his own use. And suggestions {often
ambiguous ones at that) in the indictment and the
prosecutor's remarks are not, for me, an adequate
substitute. Like all of us, I am privately confident that
a jury that was properly instructed would not have dallied
on the wrongfulness point.
But that confidence does not
permit us in effect to direct a verdict of guilty on one
element of a criminal offense. And neither reference to
the harmless error doctrine nor some theory of constructive
stipulation cures the defect. Accordingly, I can only vote
to reverse the conviction.

\.

I.

I . ·,
i·

I·.
\

Ir

I

I·

Were Lewis' opinion more narrowly cast, I might be able
to agree in substance as well as result.
But I believe the
present draft will be widely read as rejecting the theory
of liability set forth by the Chief {I refer particularly
to language on page 6, the second sentence of the full
paragraph on page 7 and much of page 9). Therefore, unless
the present opinions change, I intend to circulate a brief
statement concurring in the Court's result on
jury-instruction grounds but expressing my disagreement
with all language in the opinion that appears inconsistent
with the Chief's statement of the law.

cc:

The Conference

I.

! I
I

•

February 6, 1980

Dear
Thank you for your memorandum of February 5
addressed to the Chief and me.
Althouqh I welcome your concurrence in mv view as
to what was submitted to the iurv, I am afraid we remain in
disagreement - as we were at Conference - as to the necessity
for breach of some duty arising from an identifiable
relationship. No one has suqqested, not even the SEC, that
any evidence exists of a conqressional intent to extend
liabiity under SlO(b) of the '34 Act to the universe of
people who buv and sell securities. The common
understanding, until fairly recent years, was to the
contrary.
But before imposinq a criminal liability that
apparently was never considered hy Congress - and
particularly before imposinq it under lanquaqe as imprecise
as §10(b) - I would think it desirable to have congressional
hearings and a carefully drafted statute that would afford
reasonable notice to criminal defendants.
I nevertheless am happy to have you
concurring in the judgment.
Sincerely,

lfp/ss

~

r-

To: 'l'r1 e Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Brenna.D

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

IJ 5) --tr JJ
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No. 78-1202
Vincent F. Chiarella Petitioner On Writ of Certiorari to the
·
·
v. '
'
United States Court of
't d St t
Appeals for the Second
U me
a es.
c·
't
lrCUl •
[January -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.
I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room
of Pan dick Press, a financial printer located in We'' ¥6tk Ciby.
Among documents that petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate takeover bids. When these documents
were delivered to the printer, the identities of the acquiring
and target corporations were concealed by blank spaces or
false names. The true names were sent to the printer on the
night of the final printing.
- The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target:~.:~
parries and sold the shares immediately after the tak/

I

/
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attempts were mack public.' By this method, petitioner
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the coursr of
14 months. Rubsequcntly, the Securities and Exchange Com.misswn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the ~<'l1ers of the shares. 2 On the same
day, he "·as dischargecl by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner >ms indicted on 17 counts of
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and S:P;C Rule 10b-5.'1 After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment. 1 he v-·as brought
to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted
certiorari, 441 U. S. (1979), and we now reverse.
II

Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U. S. C'. ~ 78j, prohibits
the nse "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [ofl any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulntions as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursnant to this section,
the SEC promulgated Rnle 10b-5 which provides in pertinrnt part 5 that
"It shall be unlawfnl for any person, directly or indi1

Of the fiye

n merger.

transaction~,

four invol\·ed tender offers and

OIJP

concerned

United States v. C'hiarrlla. 5RR F. 2d 1358, 1063, n. 2 (CA2

1978).

8RC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2504 (CLG) (SDNY Mn)' 24, Hl77).
"Section 32 (a) of the 1034 Art. ~rtnct ions rrimimtl penalties ngnin~t an)'
pe··~on who willfully viola! e;; the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 7~ff (H) (Hl72107R Supp.). Petitioner was charged with 17 counls of violating the Act
heran~e he had received 17 Irttprs confirming purchasP of sharPs.
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Snpp. 95 (SDNY 1978).
5
OnlY Rules 10b-5 (n) and (c) nrc nt issne here. Rule lOb-5 (b)
2
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rectly, by the usc of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, [or]
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or comse of business which opNates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purcha~c
or sale of any E"ecmit?." 17 CF·R ~240.10b-5 (1979).
This case concerns the lrgal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
valtlable. 6 In order to decide whether silence in such circumstances violates ~ 10 (b). it is necessary to review the language and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statute. Ernst & Ernst. Y. Tlo chfelder, 425 U. 8. 185, 107
(1976), § 10 (b) doC's n ol state whC'thcr silence may constitute' n manipu b ti ve or ckcC'ptiYc de,·icC'. Section lO (b) wns
designer! as a catch-nll ebll"<' to nrC'vcnt fra udul ent practiees.
!d., at 202, 206. But 11either the legislative history nor thC'
statute itself affords spC'cific guiclanco for the resoluti on of
this case. When Rule 10b- 5 was promulgated in 1942. the
provides that it sha ll br unbwful "ftlo make nny untrnr s!ntPmrn! of n
matrrial fact or to omit to Rtntr a ma!rrial fact nrcrss:n~· in ordrr to
rna kc the statements mndr, in 1hr light of l hr circum~tnncrs undrr whir·h
the~· were made, 110t mi~lr:Hling." 17 CFH §240.10b-5 (b) (1970). The
portion of the indictmrnt h~Krrl on this provision was di~mi~srd hrcam:e
thP petitioner made no Rl:1trmrnt~ nt nll in comwction with lhr purf'hnilr
of Rtock.
6
Record, at 682-683, 68G.
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of~ 10 (b). 7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
~ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was alf'o a registered representa.tive of the
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
(1061), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abf':tain from trading in the shares of his corporation un l0ss
he has first clisclosc>cl all material inside information know1J to
him. T~w obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[Bl n affirmative duty to disclose material information
which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal a.nd which. if
known, would affect their investment judgment." l d.,
at 911.

r

The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
(i) The existence of a relationship affording acce:::s to inside
information in tended to be available only for a corporate
purnose, and ( ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure. !d. , at 912, and n. 15. 8

~.....
/

7 Sec SEC Rclea~r No . 3230 (May 21, 1942).
' In Cad!/. Robt rts. ihr hrokrr-dc:•lrr w1~ liablr under§ 10 (l>) beeau~e
it. rrreived nonpublic information from n corporate insider of the issuer.
Siner the insider could not usc ihr information, nrithrr could the partnrrR
in ihr brokerage firm with whirh he was associated. Cady, Roberts cC·
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cady, Roberts involved
f'nlr of stock to persons who previous]~' rna~· not have been shareholders
in the corporation. !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced
thr n•asoning of .Tudfir Lcanwd Hand that, ''ihc director or offic·cr a~~umrcl/
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That the relationship brtwren a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraurlulent. But one who falls to
disclose material infonnation prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to clo
so. Ancl th<' dut:v to dic:wln ~<' Brisrs ll"ltc'lJ one party has information "that the oth<'r rpmt\' l is cniitlrd to know becan:::e
of a fidnriar:v or Rimilar rrlation of trust and confirlr1wc
beh,·e<'n thrm.''" Tn its Crrdy. Rol>erls drrision, the Commit:sion rcf'o;rnized [1 rrln t iom:hip of trust and cot1fidencc
h<'hH'Pn tlw ~·harc>holcl crc:; of n corpora ti on and tho:'lr in:::idPrs
who hav<' obtainC'd connclcntinl informntion bv reason of thrir
position with that corporat ion .' 0 This r<'lntion ship givf'" ri~'C'
to n rlut~" to di sf'losc' bncnusc of tlw "nrc<'ssitv of prcv:'nti'l<?; a
corp0ratP insidrr fr01n inkringl ndvantf'ge of the nninfornwd /

~

:1 Aducinr.v rclntion io thr hu~·rr lJ,- ihr vrr~· ~n lr; for ii would br n
!"nrn· distinrti011 i o allow him to u~r thr ndYnnt np:r of hi~ po.~ition to
indurp tlw lmyrr into thr pn~ition of n hrnrfirinr~· nlthough hr \\·n~ forbiddrn tn ro ~n flltr•(' 1Jw h11Y>T li.,d hrCOP1" 0'1" " fr{, :11 DU 1!. :~:1 .
(Jnoiing Gmtz Y. Claughton. 1~7 F. 2d 40,40 (C'•\2 lDfil), rrrt. drnicd,
~.n U. ::::. 020 (Hl51).
0
nr,·t tt( mrnt nl" +!tr T.n\Y ~?d, Torts ~ !)!")] (~) (:t) (1D70)' RP(' .T:mw~ r\:
Om~', Misrrprc.<rntation-Pnrt TT, ~7 Md. L. Hr'' · 4~~ . 523-.'i27 (Hl78).
11~ rrr~rd~ ~ermiiir:< tr:•n-ar' i(JI'~, t hr Am""ic:tn T ·tw h~titute rrcou:nir.r~
thnt "~ilenre whrn ihere is n dut~· to "pcnk mn~· be n fr:wdulcnt net."
.<\ TI, F ederal Rrrmitirs Cock § 202 (b) (Prf>JlO"rd Offici:-~1 Drnft 1978).
10 Scr 3 W. Fletcher, C~·rloprdin of thr Lnw of Privnte Corpor!ltion"
§ 838 (1975) (hrreinnfter Flrtrhrr); 3A Fleirhcr, §§ 1168.2, 1171. 1174:
3 L. Lo ~~. S"r uritir~ Regulniion 14.16- 144~ (2d rd. Hl51); 0 L. Loss. nt
35.57-3558 (1969 Rupp.). Rrr nlRo Strong v. Rrride. 213 U. R. 419, 431.:t:H (1000): Rroph11 v. Cities 8rrrir·r r'o., :n nt·l. Ch. 211, 70 <\. 2d fi
n.
8rr grnrra ll:,· Kotr, Hulr 10 -.'i: l·~lc·m"nt< of n Pri1:•tr Hiv.ht of
Artion. 4?. 1\'YTT L. Hrv . .'i~l. .'1fi2-!i!i3, nnd JJ. 71 (190~); 75 TTnrv. L. Rev.
144\l, 14.'i0 (Hl02): Dnum & ]'hillipR, Thr TmpliPnti(111 nf ('nd7J, Robrrls.
./
17 Tins. I.:w, f\~0, 045 (106:.?).
./
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minority :-tockholclers." Speed Y. Transamerica Corp., 99 :F.
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of ~ 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 830 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have en1phasizcd, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to disclose n1arket information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Ji'vnd, Tnc., 524
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal rnateria.l facts. Sec General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2cl 159, 164 (CA2 1968), ccrt. denied,
~93U.R. 1026 (1969). 11
This Court follo,ved the same approach in Affil·i ated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 ( 1972). A gronp of
.'\'nrriC'nn Tnrlian<: formrd a cornoration to manage joint as:-rts
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and tho difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders tho importance of retaining the stock. I d.,
at 146. T"·o of the bank's assistant managers aided the
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was trarl r fl in t"·o ~cparato markets-a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through th0 bank and a resale
Sr" ~~~ -o SEC ,.. Grral AmNiNm Indus., flu·., 407 F. 2d ~5:1 , .)(\()
(C'A2 HlOR ) . Cf' l'1. denied, ~!).~ n. R. !)20 (196!1); Kohler v. Kohle1' C'o ..
:)1!1 F. 2d fi;}.+. o:H-fl~ R (C'A7 HlG~): );o1P, sunra n. 10. 42 ~YU L. HrY.
nt 55-t: "\'nt.•. The Regulation of Corpornlr Trndcr OfTN 1Tndrr Frdrral
Rrruritirs Lnw: A Nrw Chnllrngo for Rule lOb-5 ~59, sn-374 (1956).
Rrr grzwr:tll y Notr, Civil I.inhilit~· undrr Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Vn. L. Hrv.
587, 554-561 (1956).
11
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated ~ 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
110 duty of dif:closnre ,,·oulcl exist if the ban!· merely had acted
as a transfrr agent. Bnt the bank also had nssumecl a duty to
art on behalf of tlte shnrrholclers. Hnrl tlw Tndian sellers had
rrlied 11pon it<; personnel \\'hen they sold their stock. !d., at
152. Dccausr- these officers of the bank were charged "·ith a
resnonsibility to the shareholcl f'r!", thry ronld not art as mnrkd
Plakers inrlucing th(' Tnclinm; to S~'ll their stoek "·ithont disc1,~ing the rxistcnre of lhe more fnyorDhk non-1ncli8n market.
I rl .. at 152-153.
Thus. administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities rnay operate as a fraurl actionable under ~ 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the leg-ality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to clisclosr arising from
a relationship of trust and ronficlrncc between parties to a
transaction. Application of a du tv to disclose prior to trading g;uarantecs that corporate insiders, who hnve an obli~a
tion to place the sharr'holdcr's welfare before their own. w1ll
not benefit personally through fra.uclulcn t 11Se of materin 1
nonpublic information.'~
of rorporntr in~ idrr~ h:tY<' lwen held linblc nuclrr § 10 (b)
they haYc :1 duty not to profit from thP u ~r of inside' inform:-~tion
that thry know i ~ roJifld('lttial and know or ,,·!wuld know r·amP l'rm11 a
eorporate insider. Shapiro v. Merrill J..,ynrh. Pierce, Fenner & Smith. 495
F. 2d 228, 237<!3~ (CA2 HlH). Tlw tippee's oblif;:lt ion hn s lm'n Yir\\'rd
;,~ ar i~ ing from hi~ role ns a participant aftrr tlw fnrt in thr in s ider'~
hrr:-~ch of a fiduci:-tr)' dut)'. Subcommiitrrs of American Bar Association
Rrrtion of Corporation, Banking, and Businc~s LmY, Commrnt Lcttrr on
1\Ltterial, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 19n) rcprintrd in BNA,
RrcuritiC'H Rcgubtion & Law Rrport. No. 233, at. D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974).
12
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III
In this case, the petitioner \\'aS convicted of violating ~ 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential information from the target company.
1\!foreover, the "market information" upon which he relied
dict not concern the earning power or operations of the target
romrany, but only the plans of the acquiring company.' 3
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
~ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to clisclo~e it before trading.
In this case, the jury instructions
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury
simply \\'aS told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other peo11le
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "[(llnyone-corpomte insider or not- who reg1larly reccivPs mntr!·ial nonpublic information may not use that information to tradP in scruritif'"l without incurring an affirmatiYc
dut.v to disclose." 588 F. 2d 13fi8, 1365 (CA2 1078) (emphasis
in original). A lthour;h tlw rourt said that it::: test would include
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic information. 1·d .. at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
See Flei,:cher, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry int{) the Rrto DiHrloHP Market Informntion, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 7!10
(1073).
14 The Court of AppPals said that itR "regular access to market information" test. would create n worknblr rule embracing "thosP who
occupy ... ~tratPg i c placeR in the markrt merhani~m." United Statl's
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1:358, 13G5 (CA2 1978). Thrse eonsiderationH
are insufficirnt to support a duty to diRclose. A duty arises from 1hr
relationship bet\reen partieR, ~re nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying
13
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationsllip
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solcly upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intR11igent
investment clrcisions." 588 F. 2cl, nt 1:~62. The usc by nnyone of materinl information not p;en0rally nvailahlc is fra 1 Jclnlcnt, this theory suggrsts, becaus0 such information gives
c0rtain b11ycrs or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buycrs and sellers.
This rNtmn ing suff~'rs from two ddc~"'ts. Firr:t. not c'vrry
instancr of financial unfairness ctmc::t;tutr's frauclnlcnt activity
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Ind1.Jstries Inc . v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second. the clement required to
make silrncc framlulent-n duty to discloi?r-is ahsf'nt 1n this
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the scllcrs of the target company's securities. for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. lie was not their agent, he '"as
not a fiduci ary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
])laced their tmst and confidence. ITe was. in fact. n, comtf'xt, and not mere!~· from one'~ nhilitY to :lr(]nire information hcr:J 11-'C' of
his position in thf' market.
The Court of Appeals nl"o Flil!g(·.-drd that thr ar(]11i rinr.; corporaiiclJl
it~rlf would not bn n "mnrkl' i in~ickr" hr r•: 111~r ~ trndcr offeror Cl'":ltr~,
rathrr thnn rc rri ,·c;;;, infNmnti on nnd i:lkr~ :1 ~nbstnnii::tl cconomir ri~k
thnt. its offer IYill be un su ccr,:~ful. !d .. :~1 l~(iri-13G7. A~nin, thr Comt
of AppcnlR depnrtrd from the nn:dY~iR npproprinte to recog nition of a
dut .1'. The Comt of Appenl" for th(' Pcrond Circuit preYimnly h('ld . in
a mamF'r cr>m'i~tcnt with our :mn l~·~i~ here, that a tender offeror doc~ not
,·iolnte § 10 (h) when it mnkcq prcnnn Punrcment. pnrcha~cR pr('ri. cl~·
because there i~ no relation ~ hip het\Y('f'n the offeror nnd the Rcllrr:
"\Ve know of no rule of lnw ... ihnt n pnrcha~cr of stock, who wa ~ not
an 'insider' and hnrl no fidu r· i ,\J'~· rclnt ion to n prosprctive Reller, lwd <illY
ohligntion to rc1rnl circum~tanccR thnt might rni ~ e n Reller's demnnd ~ and
thus nhort thf' Rn lc." Genfral Tirnf Corp. v. Talley Tndustries, 40.1 F. :ld
Jfi9, 104 (CA2 1068), cert. denied , 30~ U. R. 1026 (1069).
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
\Ve cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
tram:actions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information. Formulation of such a broad duty. "·hich
drparts radically from tre cstahlishrd doctrine that duty :>rises
from a specific relationship bet\Yren two parties, seen. 9. supro,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neithrr
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Instead the problems caused by misuse of market information have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.
C'r111p:n'"S' careful action in this nnd other arras 1 " contrasts. and
'" 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permit~ n tender offeror to purrh::tse fi%
of tho tnm:et comp:m,·'~ ~fork prior to di~cloPme of its plnn~ for
nc(]niPition .
JG Section 11 of the 1934 Art generally forbids n member of n nntionnl
srcurit irs rxchnnge from effrrting nm· trnnsnrt ion on the rxchnngr for it;:;
own ncconnt. 15 U. S. C. A. §7Rk (n)(l) (1972-197S Snpp.). Bnt
Congress has specificnll~r rxempted sprrialists from this prohibition-brokrrdrnlrrs who Pxecute orders for rustomrrs trnding in fL specific corporation's
st0ck. while at the ~amc time bn~·ing and selling that corpor11tion's stork
on their own behalf .
§11 (n)(l)(A), 15 U.S. C. A. §7Rk(n)(J)(A)
(Hl72-J97R Supp.): sre S. Rrp. No. !14-75, 94th Cong .. 1st Ses8., 99
(1075): 2 SecmitirR and Exrhangr Commission, RPport of tl1c Special
Rtuclv of 8ecurities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
fi7-5S. 76 (1963). Set' generally S. Robbins, The Srcurities Markets
1!11-193 (1966). The excrption is based upon CongresR' rrcognition
thnt specialists contribute to a fnir and orderly marketplace at the same
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is in some tension, with the broad rule of liability we arc
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of ~ 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "\Varehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to
puchase stock in tl•C' targot company bdorc the tenclor offer is
mflcle pvblic and the price of shares riscs. 17 Tn tl1is case. ns in
\Yarchousing, a buyor of SC'curitiPs purchases stock in a targC't
corporation on the basis of rn!lrkrt information which is
1'1llmown to tlw snllrr. In hotlt of these sitnations. the SPllC'r's
brh~vior nres11mablv wm:lcl be altered if he hacl tlw nonpuhlic
jpformation. Rignificflntlv, however. tlw Commission hm;
acted to bar " ·c.rrhousinp.: undrr its authority to regulate t<'mkr
offPrs 18 after rccognizin.g that nrtion tmdC'r ~ 10 (b) \Yonld
rC'st on a "sonle,Yhat differ~'T1t theor~'" than that prPviom;ly
l"::cr1 t.o rf'.q;'JJntP inl"idrr trading as frnuclulcnt activity. 11 '
We SPeno basis for applying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, tho
1084 Act rnm1ot be rrfHl "'more brnrdlv than its langnnr.·o nnd
the statutory scheme reasonably 11crmit.'" Tourhe Ross &
timr tbcy e.;-·ploit thr informaiionnl nch·nntn~r th:\1 come~ from ihrir posof bur ;1]1(] ,:•·ll ordi' f•'· 2 Scr·mit i·''' nnd Exck1 ngr Commi:-,,irm,
Tirport of thr Swci:il 81 tid\" of S r ~miti r f· :\f:trk<•l:'. Tf. n. nne. ~(). 0:i,
RSth Con~ .. bt Se''", nt· 7.<: ; - SO. ~imilnr rc JH'rrns wiih il:r f1nJdi o ni1'g of
i hr Plnrket prrnnn1 rd CfJll.~:rr~" to r·;rmpt m~uk c t rna kers hhrk po,ii ion"r".
rcgi,irrerl. orld--lnt drnlrr". ho' ''' firlr <~rhil r:lgC'\Jr,, ~llld ri>'k ;;rhit r:1grm;;
from § 11',, gen;' r:d ]Jrohihi1 ion on mrmhrr trnrlin~. 15 LT. S. C . /1. § 7Sk
(n)(l)!A)-(D) (1972-Fl7'i 8npp): "rr 8. TIPp. No. !l·l - 7.'i, n1 09. Srr
nl>'o 8rruritiP" Ex rh:1ngr .c\:·1 T\r]P;i'C' No. 81--0950, 3.'i Frd. Hcp:. ;)!)0:?,
80] , (1973).
17
Fleischer, Mundhrim & Murph)·. s1.1pm n. lG, nt 811-812.
1 "8EC Proposed Rnlr §240.1-k-2. 44 Frd. Rr~. 99f\7-90f\R (1!17!1).
10
1 SEC Institutional Im·e:-tnr Siud)' Tiepnrl , H. n. Dor. 1'\n. !12- G~,
92d Con g., 1st Srss., xxxii ( 1971).
sr~.,ion
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Co. v. Redinoton, 47 F. S. L. \Y. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 43G U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches m11st be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under ~ 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that C'ongrrss has enacted for regulation of
the E=ecuritics markets. C'f. Snnta Fe Industries Inc. Y. Green,
430 P. 8 .. at 470. 2 "

IV
In its brief to this Court, the rnitecl States offers an alternative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that
JICtitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule 10b-5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) cmployrd a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial juclgP ~
~o The Court of Appeals stated that § 10 (b) should not be con~trucd
more narrowly in criminal action;; than in civil enforcement action~.
5S'> F. 2d, at 1:368, n. lG. Yet it iH wo r th noting that this is appnrrnily
the first case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon a purchaRcr for § 10 (b) nondisclo~urc. Pctitionrr was sentenced to a yrar
in priRon, susprnclcd except for one month, and a five-year trrm of
probation. !d., al 1373, 1378 (Me~ kill, J., di~~rnting).
/ /
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stated that a "scheme to defraud'' is a plan to obtain money
by trick or clrccit and that "a failure by Chimella to disclose
material. non-public information in ronneetion \Yith his purchase of stock would constitutr clecrit." !d., at 683. Arronlin~ly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner f'mployrcl a
scheme to defraud if he "clicl not disclose . . . materinl nonpublic infonrw tion in con tlf'Ciion with the purchasrs of the
stock." !d., at 685-686.
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchaRf'd Sf'curities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a frnucl
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The jucl11:e earlier had stated that
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingrnuity ran
ck'vise and whirh are resortrcl to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation. snggestions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than tlH' sellers. Because \\'C' cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury,
Rewis v. Unil('d States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971). Sf'C Dunn
v. United States , 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4. 1979), \VC' will
not. speculatr upon wlwtlwr such a cl uty exists. whether it
has been breached, or 'YhPtlH'r such a breach constitutrs a
violation of ~ 10 (b). 21
The r
· 'on \\'ould h:n·r lo hr rr,··rr,.:Nl rwn if thr jttr~· h·td
inHI rurted thnl it rii\11~.0J1'·irl JWI il ionrr cilhrr ( 1) bccaw;'
failnrc to disrloBe mntrrinl, non.pin'JH{' jJ.lfonn:-ttion t ~
r (2) brrnusr of
thr brrnrh of a duty to the arr]ltiri!~_!inn. We ma~· not. uphold
a rriminnl ron\'irtion i~o~iblr to nc;rr1·t:1'1'ri"-"'~.llH'r the drfrnclant, has ~·•m'!\'fl'ectfor noncriminal conduct.
United~
21

21. The dissent of the CHIEF JUSTICE relies upon a
single phrase from the jury instructions, which states that
the petitioner held a "confidential position" at Pandick
Press, to argue that the jury was properly instructed on the
theory "that a person who has misappropriated material
nonpublic information has an abSolute duty to disclose that
information or refrain from trading." Post at 2. The few
words upon which this thesis {is based do not e~lain to the
jury the nature and scope of the petitioner's ~ uty to his
employer, the nature and scope of petitioner'sf duty, if any,
to the acquiring corporation, or the elemen~ ~of the tort of
misappropriation. Nor do the jury instructions suggest that a
"confidential postition" is a necessary element of the
offense for which petitioner was charged. Thus, we do not
believe that a "misappropriation" theory was included in the
jury instructions.
The conviction woud have to be reversed even if the
jury had been instructed that it could convict the petitioner
either (1) because of his failure to disclose material,
nonpublic information to sellers or (2) because of a breach
of a duty to the acquiring corporation. We may not uphold a
criminal conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether
the defendant has been punished for noncriminal conduct.
United States v. Gallagher, 576 F.2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978);
see Leary v. New York, 395 u.s. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberq v.
Californ1a-,-2~u:s:-3s9, 369-370 (1931).
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.

I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room
of Pandick Press. a financial printer. Among documents that
petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the
printer, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations
were coucealed by blank spaces or false 11ames. The true
names \Verr sent to the printer ou the night of the final
printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover

fiEB._7__19_80
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attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
14 months. Subsequently. the Securities and Exchange ComImsswn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the sellers of the shares. 2 On the same
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 ·counts of
violatiug § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. 3 After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment,·1 he was brought
·to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted
(1979), and we now reverse.
certiorari, 441 U.S. -

II
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 ·u. S. C. §·78j, prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se. curity . .. [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this sectiol},.
the SEC promulgated ·Rule 'IOb-5 which provides in pertinent part 5 that.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 1ndi1

Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned
a merger. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2
1978).
2 SEC v. Chiarella, No.-77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977).
3
Section 32 (a.) of the 1934 Act ~anctions criminal penalties against any
person who willfully violates the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (19721978 Supp.) . Petitioner wall rharged with 17 counts of violating· the Act
beeause he had received 17 letters confirming purchase of shares.
4
United States v. Chiarella, 450 F Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978).
5. Only Rulel:l IOb-5 (a) and (c) are at i&>ue here.
Rule IOb-5 (b)!.
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rectly, by the use of auy means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice .to
defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi..
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979).
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitioner if It found that he willfully failed to inform
se11ers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
valuable.u In order to decide whether silence in such cit:·
cumstances violates § 10 (b). it is necessary to review the hnguage and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal co~rts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statute, Ernst & Brnst v. H ochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 197
( 1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may constitu te a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.
!d., at '202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of
this case. When Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the
Jlrovides that it shall be tmhtwful " [t]o mnko any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the ~tatement~ made, in the light of thf' circumstances under which
they were madE>, not mi:sleading.',. 17 CFR §':.!40.10b-5 (b) (1979). The
1Jortion of the indictment based on this provi~ion was di;;mi~ed becau~&
the petitioner made no statement;; at all h\ COlltlection with the purchase~f stock.
lk Record, ~t 682'-6&~, 003;.
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SEC did 11ot discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of § 10 (b).7
'l'he SEC took an important step in the development of
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and _his firm viol~ted that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was also a registered representative of the
brokerage firm. Xn Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
( 1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from trading. in the spares of his corporation unless
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. ·we, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
. known, would affect their investment judgment." !d.,
at 911.
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
(i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside
information intended· t<> be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (li) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure. ld., at 912, and n. 15.8
See SEC Relea:;e No . 3230 (May 21, 1942) .
In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer wJs liable under § 10 (b) because
it received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer.
Sinee the in~:;ider could not use the information, neither could the partners
in the brokerage finn with which he wa:; as:;ociated. Cady, Roberts &
('o., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The tran~>aetion in Cady, Roberts involved
sale of stock to perHOlll:l who previously may not have been shareholders
in the corporation . Id., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced"
Lhe rea~;oning of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer assumed.
7

8
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.,That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
'Stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence
between them. " n In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their
position with that corporation. 1 n This relationship gives rise
to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed
a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale ; for it would be a
sorry distmction to allow him to use the advantage of hi~ position to
induce the buyer into the po:>ition of a beneficiary although he wa.s forbidden to do :so once the buyer had become one." !d., at 914, n. 23,
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 920 (1951) .
9 Restatement of the Law 2d, Tort::;§ 551 (2) (a) (1976).
See James &
Ora.y, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978).
A::; regards securities transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes
that "silence when there is a duty to :speak may be a fraudulent act."
ALI, Federal Securities CodP § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter FletchPr); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174;
3 L. Lo~, Securitie:; Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at
3557-3558 (1969 Supp.) . See also Stmng Y. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 4314:~4 (1909) ; Bmphy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5
(1949) . SP(~ genPrally Not(>, Hulr lO!.r-5 : Elements of a Private Right of"
Action , 42 NYU L. Rev. 541, 552-553, and n. 71 (1968); 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillips, The Implication of Cady, Roberts,.
l7 Bn::,. Law, 939, 945 (1962).
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minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used .. undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur 'Co., 401
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "Tt]he party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA21975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969). 11
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. Id.,
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale
11

See abo SEC v. Gr·eat American Indus .. Inc ., 407 F. 2d 453, 460
(CA2 1968), ccrt . denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F . 2d 634, 637-6:38 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev.
at 554 ; ote, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federaf
Securities Law: A NPw Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966) .
See generally NotP, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-50 42 Va. L. Rev_
:!:37.~ 554-561 ( 1956).
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. !d., at
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market
makers iuducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market.
I d., at 152-153.
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material
nonpublic information. 1 2
"Tippee~" of corporate in~ider~ have been held liable under § 10 (b)
becatuse they have a duty not to profit. from the use of inside information
that they know i:> confidential and know m· should know came from a
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Merrill Lyuch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F. 2d 228, 2:37-238 (CA2 1974-) . The tippee's obligation ha~ been viewed
as ari~ing from hi:s role a · a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA,
'Securities Rrgulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974).
12
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III
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential informatioll from the target company.
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.1.a
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner O\ved a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to tmde in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis
in original). Although the court said that its test would include
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic information, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrelated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
'ls See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initinl Inquiry into the Reto Di~close Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799
(1973) .
14 The Court of Aweals said that. its "regular access to market in..:
formation" test would create a workable rule embracing "those who
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations
are in~uffirient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the
relationship between parties, see nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying::
spon~ibility
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by anyone of material information not generally available is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such information gives
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sellePs of the target company's securities, for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trul;lt and confidence. He was, in fact, a comtext, and not mPrely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation
itself would not be a "market insider" because a tender offeror creates,
rathrr than recPivt>~, information and takes a substantial economic risk
that its offer will be unsucce::;sful. !d., at 1366-1367. Again, the Court
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in
a manner con~istent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not
violate § 10 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller:
"We know of no rule of law ... that a purchaser of stock, who was not
an 'insider' and had no fid1,lciary relation to a prospective seller, had any
obligation to reveal circu~tances that might raise a seller's demands and
thus abort the sale." General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F . 2<!
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969).
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market trans~ctions.
· We cannot affirr~ petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all ·participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information. .Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically froln the established doctrine that duty arises
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of '§ 10 (b). Moreover, ·neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Instead the problems caused by misuse of market informatioh 'have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of mal'ket information may not harm operation of the securities·markets. For example, the Willialns Act 1 ~ limits· but does not
completely prohibit a Mnder offeror's purchases of target
·corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.
·Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and
u 15 · U. S. C. § 78m (d)(1) permits a tetider offeror to purchase· 5%
of the target company's stock prior to 'disclosure of its · plans for
acquisition.
16 Section 11 of the 1034 Act generally fo'rbids a member of a national
securities exchange fro!ii effecting any transaction on the exchange for its
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But
· Congress has specifically exemt)tecl specialists from t.his prohibition-brokerdealers who execute orders for mistomers trading in a specific corporation's
stock, while at the snl.'ri.e time buying nnd selling that corporation's stock
on their own behalf. · § 11 (a) (1) (A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A)
· (1972-19~8 Supp.); see S. Rep.· No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 99
(1975); 2 Securities nnd Exchange Commission, Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
57-58, 76 (1963) . See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets
191-193 (1966). The exception is bused upon Congress' recognition
·that specialists con tribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same
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m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is
made public and the price of shares rises. 17 In this case, as in
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target
corporation on the basis of market information which is
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity. 19
We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross &
IS

time they rxploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and ~;ell orde!'!i. 2 Securiti':!s and Exchange Commission,
Report of tlw Speeial Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners,
registrred odd-lot dealers, bonn fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs
from § ll 's gencrnl prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k
(a) (1) (A) - (D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See
also Securities Exchange Act Relea!:le No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902,
3018 (1973).
17 Flcii;cher, Mundhcim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812.
18 SEC Proposrd Rule § 240.14e- 2, 44 Feel. Rf'g. 9987-9988 (1979).
10 1 SEC Inxtitutional Investor Study Report, R R. Doc. No. 92-64,..
fJ2d Cong , l ilt Sf's:::., xxxii (1971).
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Co. v. R edington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When all allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b)
does not arise fro1n the mere possession of nonpublic market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of §· 10 (h) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,
430 U. S., at 479. 20

IV
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alternative theory to support petitionerrs conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule 100-5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employro a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or- (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 68L · The trial judge
w The Court of Appeal,; stated t.hat § 10 (b) should not be constmed
lnore narrowly in crimil1al actions than in civil enforcement actions.
588 F . 2d, at 1368, n. 16. Yet it is worth noting that this is apparently
the .fir.;t case in which criminal liability has been imposed upon a purchaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to ·a year
in prison, suspended except for oue month, and a · five-year term of ·
:probation. ' i d., at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, J ., dissenting).
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statPcl that. a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose
material , nott-public information in connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." Id. , at 683. Accordingly, thP jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a
scheme to dPfraud if he "did not disclose ... material nonpublic information in connection with the purchases of the
stock." I d., at 685-686.
Altemativcly. the jury was instructed that it could convict if "C'hiart>lla's allegt>d conduct of having pur~hased securities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud
upon a seller." ld., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that
fmud "embmces all thP means which human ingent1ity can
devise and which are resorted to by oue individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, suggestions ot· by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683.
1~hc jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convic!Rd merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target coq)Orations. The j1.1ry was not instructed on the
nature or clements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the seller·s. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
eonviction on the basis of a theory 110t presPnted to the jury,
Rewis v. Un·ited States, 401 U. R. 808, 814 (1971) , see Dunn
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979) , we will
not spPculate upon whether such a duty exists. whether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a
violation of § 10 (b) .21
The di:s;;(•nt of THE CHIEF JusncE reli<'s upon a. Ringle phrase from
tho jury instruction,;, whid1 !ltate:s thnt t.he pf'titiOIIPI' held a, "confidf'ntiaJ
position" at. Pandick Prf'~, lo argue that the jury wn::; properly instruct ed
on the thPor~· " that a JX'rson who hal'! mis<tppropriated material nonpubli c i11formntion has an ah,.;o]utc duty to di,.;clo~<c tha.t infornmtion or
refrain from trading." Pust, at 2. The few wordi;> npon which this th~:,.;j:;
21
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

is based do not rxplain to the jury the nature and srope of the petitioner's
duty to hi,; PmployN, the nature and scope of 1)('titioner's duty, if any,
to the acquiring corporation, or the t>lements of the tort of misapproprifLtion. Nor do the jury instructions suggest that a "confidential position"
is a n ccr~~ary element of the offense for which petitioner was charged.
Thufl, we do not. believe that a " mi~appropria.tion" theory wru; includl'CI in
the jury im;tructions.
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been
in::;truC'ted that. it could convict the petitioner either (1) because of his
failure to diowlose material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) becau,;e of a breach of a duty to the a,cquiring corporation. We may not
uphold a criminal convietion if it is impossible t<> ascertain wheth<'r the
defendant hw; lwcn puni ~hed for noncriminal conduct,. United States v ..
Gallagher, 576 F . 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); ;;ee Leary v. New York, 395
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370,
(1931) .
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Dear Harry:
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Thank you for vour note.

T am in no hurrv.
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Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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February 11, 1980

..JUS TI CE H A R RY A . BLACKM U N

/

Re: No. 78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States
Dear Lewis:
I am trying my hand at a brief dissent which is not entirely in line with the material the Chief has circulated.
I shall get this to you as soon as possible, but it is
fairly apparent that it will not reach you before Friday's
conference.
Sincerely,

Ifill.

-

I

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 27, 1980

Re:

78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Attached is a second draft of my dissent in this
case.

I have moved a paragraph from the end of Part I

to the end of Part II to accommodate Bill Brennan's
desire to join Part I.

I also have taken the

opportunity to "beef up" Part II to make clearer my
view that the jury instructions in this case did not
impair Chiarella's

trial.

~
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Mr. Justice Stevens
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATJ8c1rculated: - - - -
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No. 78-1202
Vincent F Chiarella Petitioner On Writ of Certiorari to the
·
v. '
' United States Court of
Appeals for the Second
U 111'ted St t
a es.
Circuit.
![March -, 1980]
Mn. JusTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the judgment.
The Court holds, correctly in my view, that "a duty to
disclose under § 10 (b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information." Ante, at 12. Prior
to so holding, however, it suggests that no violation of
§ 10 (b) could be made out absent a breach of some duty
arising out of a fiduciary relationship between buyer and seller.
I cannot subscribe to that suggestion. On the contrary, it
seems to me that Part I of THE CHIEF JusTICE's dissent, post,
a t - - - , correctly states the applicable substantive lawa person violates § 10 (b) whenever he improperly obtains or
converts to his own benefit nonpublic information which he
then uses in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.
While I agree with Part I of THE CHIEF JusTICE's dissent,
I am unable to agree with Part II. Rather, I concur in the
judgment of the majority because I think it clear that the
legal theory sketched by THE CHIEF JusTICE is not the one
presented to the jury. As I read them, the instructions in
effect permitted the jurors to return a verdict of guilty
merely upon a finding of failure to disclose material nonpublic
information in connection with the purchase of stock. I can
find no instruction suggesting that one element of the offense
was the improper conversion or misappropriation of that
nonpublic information. Ambiguous suggestions in the indictment and the prosecutor's opening and closing remarks are no
substitute for the propor instructions. And neither reference
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to the harmless error doctrine nor some post hoc theory of
constructive stipulation can cure the defect. The simple
fact is that to affirm the conviction without an adequate
instruction would be tantamount to directing a verdict of
guilty, and that we plainly may not do.
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CHAMBERS OF
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March 10, 1980

Re:

No. 78-1202 - Chiarella v. United States

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

/.;n.
T .H • .

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc:

The Conference

'

.To: The Chief Justic'"'
Mr. Justice Brennar•
Mr. Ju9tlce Stn''~·J.rt

Mr.
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From : Mr. Justice Powell
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-1202
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, / On Writ of Certiorari to the
v
United States Court of
Appeals for the Second
't d ·St te
Ume
a s.
c·IrCUl't•
[January -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the targeL company's securities.

I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man'' in the New York composing room
of Pandick Press. a financial printer. Among documents that
pe1litioner handled were five announcements of corporate
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the
printet·, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations
were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The true
names were sent to the printer 011 the night of the final
printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target c~.:; /
panies and sold the shares immediately after the take/

1980
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attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange CommiSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the sellers of the shares. 2 On the same
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 ·counts of
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. 3 After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought
to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted
certiorari, 441 U. S. (1979) , and we now reverse.

II
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 ·u. S. C. §-78j, prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any se. curity . . . Lof] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section,.
the SEC promulgated Rule '10b-5 which provides in pertinent part" that
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or 1ndi1

Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned
a merger. United" States v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2
1918).
~SEC v. Chiarella, No.-77" Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977) .
3 Section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act ~anctions rriminal penalties against any
per~on who willfully violates the Act. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (19721978 Supp.) . Petitioner wa.~ charged with 17 eounts of violating the Act
be<'ause he had received 11· letters confirming purchase of shares.
4 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) .
ll.Qnly Rulel:l lOb-5 (a) and (c) are at jl:)l:)ue here. Rule 10b-5 (b)o
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rectly, by the use of auy means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of busi..
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979).
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitioner if tt found that he willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
valuable. 0 In order to decide whether silence in such ·cit:·
cumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the "language and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statute, Ernst & "Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.
Id~, at ·202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of
this case. When Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942, the
provides that it :-;hall be unhtwfttl "[t]o mak(~ any untme statement of a
matrrial fact or to omit to slate a material fact necessary in order to
make the statement:; made, in thr light of the circumstances under which
they were madr, not mtsleading."" l'i CFR §'240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The
1JOI'tion Of the indiCtment based 011 this provi:;ion WU.':! di:;mi:;:;ed becaUS&
the petitiOner made no statement;:, at all in COllnection with the purchase-of :stock.
a Record, a:t 682-6&~, 600i.
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of § 10 (b).7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was also a registered representative of the
brokerage firm. ln Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from -trading. in the shares of his corporation unless
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[a]n affirmative duty to disclose material information
[which] has been traditioually imposed on corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known , would affect their investment judgment." !d.,
at 911.
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
(i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside
illf'ormation intended· t<> be available only for a corporate
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of . that information by trading
~
8
without disclosure. ld., at 912, and n. 15.
~
7

See SEC Relea:;.e No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer WclS liable under § 10 (b) because
iL received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer.
Sin('e the insider could not use the information, neither could the partners
in the brokerage firm with which he was a~;;ocinted. Cady, Roberts &
C'o., 40 S. E . C 907· (1961). The tran;;action in Cady, Roberts involved
sale of stock to pcr,;on:; who previously may not have been shareholders
in the corporation . !d., at 913, and n. 21. The Commission embraced"
the rea;;onmg of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer assumed.
8

..,./

/
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
'Stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because
of a fiuuciary or similar relation of trust and confidence
between them." 0 In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders
who have obtai11ed co11fidential information by reason of their
position with that corporation. 10 This relationship gives rise~
to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed
3 fiduciary relaLion to the:> buyer by the very ~ale; for it would be a
sorry distmct10n to allow him to use the advantage of his position to
induce thE' buyl'r into the po1>ition of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so oncE' thE' buyer had become one." ld., at 914, n. 23,
quoting Gratz v. Cla'Ughto-n, 187 .F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cerL. denied,
341 U. S. 920 (1951} .
0 RP:;tatpment of the Law 2d, Torl8 § 551 (2) (a) (1976).
See James &
Gray, Misrepres!'ntation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978).
As regards securiti!'s transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes
that "silence when there is a duty to :;peak may be a fraudulent act."
ALI, Federal Securities Cod!' § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 838 (1975) (h!'reinafter Fletchl'r); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174;
3 L. Lo8S, Securities Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at
3557-3558 (1969 Supp.) . 'See also 8t10ng 1. Rtpide, 213 U. S. 419";"'431. , Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5
(1949) . Sr(\ grHPrally Not(•, RulP lOlr-5: Elements of a Priva.te Right of'
Action, 42 ~YU L. Rev . 541, 552-553, and n. 71 (1968); 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillips, Th!> Implication of Cady, Roberts,.
17 Bn.s. Law, 939, 945 (1962) .

1b IYl.s urt- olft a

INSERT ONE

No. 7 8-120 2

Add to n. 1 0.

The dissent of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMON
suggests that the "special facts" doctrine may be
applied to find that silence constitutes fraud
where one party has superior information to
another. Post, at 3. This Court has never so held.
In

Strong~

Repide, 213

u.s.

419, 431-434 (1909),

this Court applied the special facts doctrine to
conclude that a coporate insider had a duty to
disclose to a shareholder. In that case, the
maiority shareholder of a corporation secretly
purchased the stock of another shareholder without
revealing that the corporation, under the insider's
direction, was about to sell corporate assets at a
price that would greatly

enhanc~

the value of the

stock. The decision in Strong v. Repide was
premised upon the fiduciary duty between the
corporate insider and the shareholder. See Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307 n.15 (1939).

1
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minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. (J., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968). cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA21975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).11
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of
America11 Il1dians formed a corporation to manage joint assets
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Imlian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
~
transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of t h e /
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. ld.,
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale
tJ Sre ul~o SEC v. Great Ame1ican Indus., Inc ., 407 F. 2d 453, 460
(CA2 1968) , ccrt. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F. 2d 13:34, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev.
at 554; Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federal
Securities Law : A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 :359, 373-374 (1966) .
See generally Notr, Civil Liability under Hule X-lOb-50 42 Va. L. Rev _
3:37.', 554-561 ( 1956).
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market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. !d., at
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market
makers iuducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market.
I d., at 152-153.
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will. /
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material
nonpublic information.12
12 "Tippee:>" oJ corporate in~ider~ have been held liable under § 10 (b)
~
because they have a duty not to profit from the use ·of inside information/
that they know i:s confidential and know or ~hould know came from a
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974) . The tippee's obligation has been viewed
as ari~ing from hb role as a participant after the fact in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA,
Securities Rf'gulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (.Jan . 2, 1974).
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III
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential informati011 from the target company.
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company. 18
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "[a] nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis
in original). Although the court said that its test would include
only persous who regularly receive material nonpublic infor------mation, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unre-,.,.......-lated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court ot
18 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to DiHcloHe Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799
~
(1973) .
~
14 The Court of Appeals said that its "regular access to market in~
formation '' te:;t would create a. workable rule embracing "those who
occupy . .. strategic places in the market mechanism." United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) . These considerations
are immffirient to support a duty to di~close. A duty arises from the
reTationship between parties, :;ee nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying~
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Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by anyone of material information not generally available is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such information gives
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less infonned buyers and sellers.
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
~
make silence fraudulent--a duty to disclose-is absent in this/
case. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sellePs of the target company's securities, for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their tru~;~t and confidence. He was, in fact, a comtext, :md not mPrely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation
itself would not be a "market insider" because a tender offeror creates,
rathrr than receive~, information and takes a substantial economic risk
that its offer will be unsuccessful. Jd., at 1366-1367. Again, th~ Court
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in
a mannrr consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not
viola tr § J0 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller:
"We know of no rul~ of law . .. that a purchaser of stock, who was not
an 'insider' and had no fid\tciary relation to a prospective seller, had any
obligation to reveal circu~tances that might raise a seller's demands a / n d
thus abort the sale." Ge~ral Time Corp. v. Talley lndust1'ies, 4{)3 F. 2d:
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969).
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plete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through imp~rspnal market trans~ctions.
· We cannot affirm ~petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all ' participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information. . }~ormulation of such a broad. duty, ·which
departs radically froln the established doctrine that duty arises
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9, supra,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislativ~ history of '§ 10 (b). Moreover, neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Instead the problems caused by misuse of market infohnatioh 'have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits ·but does not
complet~ly prohibit a Mnder. offeror's purchases of target_______
·corporatiOn stock before public announcement of the offer.
·Congress' careful action in this and other areasVcontrasts, and
15 · U. S. C. § 78tn (d) (1) permits a terider offeror to purchase · 5%
of the target company's stock prior to 'disclosure of its · plans for
acquisition.
Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally fo.rbids a member of a national
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on 'the exchange for its
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But
· Congress has specifically exeml_:>ted st)ecialists ftom 'this prohibition-brokerdealers who execute orders fot ctistomers trading in a specific corporation's
stock, while at the saffie time btiying and selling that corporation's stock
on their own behalf. · § 1I (a)(l)(A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A)
' (1972-19~8 Supp.); see S. Rep.· No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 99
(1975) ; 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. N_o. '95, 88th Co~~·· 1st. Sess.,___..--57-58, 76 (1963) . See generally S. Robbms, The Secuntles Markets
191-193 (1966) . The exception is based upon Congress' recognition
:that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly mark~tplace at the . same

'x7
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m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is
made public and the price of shares rises. 17 In this case, as in
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target
corporation on the basis of market information which is
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's
behavior presuma.bly would be altered if he had the nonpublic
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity. 19
/
We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.' " Touche Ross &:
IS

time they ell:ploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and ~ell orders. 2 SecuritiPs and Exchange Commission,
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Se;;s., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners,
regi~tercd odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k
(a) (1) (A)- (D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See
all-'o Securities Exchange Act Relea~e No. 34-9950, 38 Fed. Reg. 3902,
3018 (1973)
1 7 Fleisc}Jer, Munclheim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812.
:1 8 SEC Propo~ed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979).
19 1 SEC ln;;titutional Investor Study Report, H: R. Doe. No. 92-64,..
!l'ld Cong., lotS...., xx>H (1971),
/
0

~
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Co. v. Red'ington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When a11 allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of non public market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of §· 10 (h) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markejl.' Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, ~
430 U. S., at 479\V/
~

IV
In its brief to this Court. the United States offers an alternative theory to support p(•titionerrs conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a
conviction under ~ 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiril1g corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule 10b- 5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or- (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. · The trial judge

._I_n__.s_J_J-4-1-......:2():.:::1·The

Cottrb of llt}}'lettle Att+ecl th8i § 19 (b) slumld nat he Qenfli! tted
.ntere tlfd'P8'h ly in c. I itnihc:tl actioftd than in civil enfereelfteHtJ ttetieHs.
~88 F , 9tl, s.t }gfig, B. 1'8:- Yst it is worth noting that this is apparently
the fir~t case in which criminWliability has been imposed upon a purchaser for § 10 (b) nondisclosure. Petitioner was sentenced to a year
in pri~ on, suspended except for one month, and a five-year term of'
:proba.t ion. ' I d., at 1373, 1378 (Meskill, .J., dissenting).

--

INSERT TWO
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Add to note 20

~ MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissent would establish the
following standard for imposing criminal and civil
liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5:

ij~ P]ersons

having access to confidential
material information that is not legally
available to others generally are
prohibited from engaging in schemes to
exploit their structural information
advantage through trading in affected
securti ties-~~ 1 d ~.

U This view is not substantially different from the
Court of Appeals theory that anyone "who regularly
receives material nonpublic information may not use
that information to trade in securities without
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose," supra

J
at 8, quoting 588 F.2d} at 1365, and must be
rejected for the reasons stated in Part III.
Additionally, a judicial holding that certain
undefined activities "generally are prohibiteB" by
§

10(b) would raise questions whether either

criminal or civil defendants would be given fair
notice that they have engaged in illegal activity.
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statfKl that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money

by trick or· deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose
matRrial , non-public information in connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." Id., at 683. Accordingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a
scheme to tlefraud if he "did not disclose ... material nonpublic information in connection with the purchases of the
stock." ld., at 685- 686.
Altemati vely, the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's alleged couduct of having purchased securities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud
upon a seller·.'' !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an
advantagp over another by false misl'epreseutation, suggestions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was con/
victed merely because of his failure to disclose material, non:_/'"
public information to sellers from whom he bought the stocK
of target corporations. The j~ry was not instructed on the
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the seller·s. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
eonviction on the basis of a theory 11ot presented to the jury,
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists. whether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a
violation of § 10 (b). 21
The dis,;ent of THE CHIEF JusTrCE reli~ npon a single phrase from
the jury in"truetiou;;, which statl:';; that the I)('titionl:'r held a "coniidl:'ntiaJ
position" at Pandick Prrss, to nrgur. that thr j111'y was properly inrstructed
on t.ho lhPor~· "that n pN:son who has mif'a,ppr·opriiLted mnterial nonpublic information has !Ill ah~olut(' duty to di~clo~e that informa.tion or
refmin frOJil trading." Post, at 2. The few word:;; upon which thi::; the::;js
21
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

is bused do not rxplain to the jury tl1e nature and srope of the petitioner's
duty to hi, emplo~·er , the nature and scope of petitioner's duty, if any,
to the acquiring rorporation, or the elements of the tort of misappropriation. Nor do the jury instructions suggest tha.t a "confidential position"
is a nccr:,:,;ary elrment of the offense for which petitioner was charged
Tlmfl, we do not believe that a "mii:ia.ppropria.tion" theory was included i
the jury instructions.
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been
iustn1cted that. it could convict the rwtitioner either (1) because of his
failure to dis<'lo,;e material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) because of a breach of a duty to the <~cquiring corporation. We ma.y not
uphold a criminal conviction if it is impossible to ascertain whether the
deft•ndant has lx>en punished for noncriminal conduct.. United States v ..
Gallagher, 576 F . 2d 102H, 1046 (CA2 1978); see Leary v. New York, 395
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369--370,
(1931) .
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Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidt>ntial documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to ecure control of a second corporation violates §' 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.

I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room
of Pandick Press, a financial printer. Among documents that
petitioner handled ·were five announcements of corporate
takeover bids. When these documents \VCre delivered to the
printer, tlw identities of the acquiring and target corporations
were conceakd by blank spaces or false namf's. The true
names were sent to the printer on the night of the final
printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target companies and sold the shares immediately after the takeover

..
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attempts \vere made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
realized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
14 months. Subsequently. the Securities and Exchange CommiSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner 0ntcred into a
consent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the sellers of the shares. 2 · On the same
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule lOb-5. 3 After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought
to trial and convicted on a11 counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. 2d 1358 (1978). We granted
certiorari, 441 U. S. - (1979) , and we now reverse.

II
Section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section,
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb- 5 which provides in pertinent part fi that
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indiOf the five transactiOllb , four involved tender offers aud one con cerned
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F . 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2
1978).
2 SRC v. Chiarella, No . 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY Ma y 24, 1977) .
3 Section 32 (a) of the 1934 AcL sanction ~; criminal penaltie:; again:st any
p erson who willfully violate:> the Act. 1'5 U . S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (1972Hl78 Supp ,) . PetitionPr wa,: charged with 17 counts of violating the Act
berauRe he had received 17 letters confirming purchase of :;hares .
4 Unit ed States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) .
1 Only lhi,les lOb-5 (a) a.nd (c) are ~~t i~sue here.
Rule !Ob-5 (b)
1

a merger.
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rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, [or]
" (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979).
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
valuable. 6 In order to decide whether silence in such circumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the language and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.
Id., at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of
this case. When Rule lOb-5 was promulgated in 1942, the
provides that it shall be unlawful "[t]o make any untrue ~tatemeuL of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
makE- the :statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The
portion of the indictment based on this provi:sion wa::; di:smissed because
the petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchase·
of stock.
8 Record, at 682-683 686.
1
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of § 10 (b) .7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was also a registered representative of the
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[a] n affirmative duty to disclose material information
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders.' particularly officers, directors, or con trolling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their positiou but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgme11t.'' !d.,
at 911.
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
( i) The existence of a relationship affording access to inside
information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose, allCI ( ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure. I d., at 912, and n. 15.8
See SEC HeleMc No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) .
In Cady, Roberts. thr broker-dealer wc~s liablr under § 10 (b) bPcause
it rrreived nonpublic information from <L corporate insider of the issuer.
Since the insid0r could not use the information, neith0r could the partners
in the brokerage firm with which he wa:; a~~ociated . C'ady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S. B. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cadu, Roberts involved
sale of stock to per:;ons who previously may not have been shareholder:;
in the corporation. !d .. at 913, and n. 21. The Commission emhraeed
the reasoning of ,l udge Learned Hand that "the director or otticer ;t.~~umecl
7

8
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obli~
gation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has infor~
mation "that the other [party] is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confide11ce
between them." u In its Cady, Roberts decision. the Com~
mission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their
position with that corporation. 10 This relationship gives rise
a fiduciary relation tD the buyf'T' by the very sa le; for it would bf' tt
sorry distinction to aJlow him to use the advantage of hi:; poAition to
induce the buyer inio the poHition of a. bPneficiary although he was for~
bidden to do :;o once the buyer had become one." /d., at 914, n. 23,
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. dPnied,
341 U.S. 920 (1951) .
0 Resiatcm!'nt of the Law 2d, Tort:; § 551 (2) (a) (1976).
Se!' .Tame:; &
Gra.y, MisrPprf'Hentation-Part II, 37 Md. L . Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978).
A:; rpgards securitie;; tram;action:;, the Am~rican Law In:;titut!' recognizPs
that "silence when there is a duty to speak may be a fraudulent act."
ALI, FE>deral Securities Code § 262 (b) (Proposed 01Jicial Draft 1978).
10 Sec 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter Fletcher); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174;
3 L. Loss, Securities Hegulation 1446--1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at
3557-:~558 (19fi\l Supp.). S<'<' abo I:Jruphy v. ('ities Sel"uice Co .. :ll DPl.
C'h . 2-U , 70 A. 2d 5 (Hl4D). S<'<' g<'llPrally Notr, Hul<' lOb-5: El<·m<'nt,.;
of a PrivafP Hight of Aeiiou, 42 :XY(T L. Hcv. 5-!1. 552-.55:~. mtd n. 71
(J9t)k); 75 Han·. L. Hrv. 1-149, H50 (1962); Daum & Phillip~, The
Implieation of ('ady . Roberts. 17 Bu~. Law, 9:39, H45 (HH)2) .
Thn di~>~ent. of ·: \fH . .Ju,.;TICB HLACKMUJ\" ~ugge~t:-< that thr "s]Wtial fa!'!:-"
dortrinr ma~· lw applird to find that. sil<·urc eou~titut('~ fraud whpn· Oil<'
party has ~u]wrior information to anoth<·r. f>o8t. at :~. Thi~ Court ha,.;
llf'n•r ~o lwld. ln ,'-'.t1'011Q '· Rcpidl'. 21~ (T. S. 4HJ, -!:H-·t{-! (190\l), thi;;
Court. applie(l the "'Jlecial fact;; doctrine to eouclud<> that a eorporatc

I
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to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventiug a
corporate insider from tak[ing] advantage of the uninformed
minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Ji'rigitemp Corp. v. Ji'inancial Dynamics Ji'und, Inc., 524
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. 'l'alley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969). 11
This Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
in,-idt•r had n. clut~· to cli:-<clo:-<P ton. shareholder. In that ea"P, 1hr majority
:::ha rrhol<lrr of a c·orpora t e "PC' ret ly pu rcha"rd thP "toC" k of anotlwr
~harrholder without rPvPaling that till' corpora.tiou, under tlw ill~idc•r's
direction , wa:-; nbuut. to ::<Pil corporate aS:>l't" at a. prirl' that would grPatl~ ·
enhancr. t.lw value· of tlw ::;toek. Tlw ckci:-;iull in Stmny v. ltepide wa;.:
prrmi,..rd upon tlw fiduf'iar~· duty lwt.wrcn 1hr eurporatr in"idN and the
8h:trchuldPr. S<·t· Pepper v. Litton, :308 U. 8. 2\:15, ;{07, 11. 15 (HI:{~l).
11 See also SEC v . G-reat American Indus., luc., 407 F. 2d 453, 460
(CA2 1968), cert. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co .,
319 F. 2cl 6:34, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Hev.
at 554; Note, Thr Regulation of Corporate Tender Offer Under Federal
Securi tit's Law: A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373- 374 ( 1966) .
See generally Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Va. L . Hev,
537, 554-561 (1956) .
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transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. I d.,
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the
shareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale
market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. I d., at
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market
makers inducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market.
!d., at 152-153.
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own, will
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material
nonpublic information. 12
12

"Tippces" of corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10 (b)
they have a duty not to profit from the use of inside inf01mation:

l~ccause
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III
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential information from the target company.
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company. 13
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
§ 10 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed. to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
same information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that " [a] nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that informatiou to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis
in original). Although the court said that its test would include
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic information, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrethat they know il' confidential and know OJ" ~hould know rame from a.
corporate in:;ider, Shapim v. Men·ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974). The tippee's obligation has been viewed
as mi;;ing from hi>< role a:s a participant. after the fact in the insider's
brc•arh of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar As:sociation
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Busine:;H Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Informn.t.ion (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA,
Securities Regulation & L'tw Report No. 2;33 , at D-1, D-2 (.Tan. 2, 1974) .
1 3 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry intQ the Responsibility to Disclose Market, Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev . 798, 799.
(1973).
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lated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by anyone of material information not generally available is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such information gives
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this
The Court of Appeab said that its "regular acce~s to market information" test would create a. workable rule embracing "these who
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations
are insufficient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the
relationship between parties, see nn . 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying
text, and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market.
The Court of Appeals abo suggested that the acquiring corporation
it::;elf would not be a "market insider" becau;;e a tender offeror creates,
rather than receives, information and fnkefi a subsfautial economic risk
that its offer will be unsuccessful. !d .. at 1366-1367. Again, the Court
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pre viou ~ ly held, in
a manner consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not
violate § 10 (b) when it makes prcannouncemcnt purchase, precisely
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller:
"We know of no rule of law ... that a purchaser of stock, who was not
an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any
obligation to reveal circum tances that might raise a seller's demands and
thus abort the sale." General 'l'ime Co1·p. v. 'l'alley Industries, 403 F. 2d
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
14
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ease. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material , non public
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises
from a specific relationship between two parties, seen. 9. supra.,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the language or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Iustead the problems caused by misuse of market information have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 15 limits but does not
completely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
corporation stock before public auuouncement of the offer.
Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and
15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permits a tender offt!ror to purc ha~e 5%
of t he target company's stock prior to disclosure of its plans for
acquisition.
16 Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally forbids a member of a national
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on the exchange for its
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (I) (1972-1978 Supp .). But
Congre;;s has Rpecifically exempted specialist" from this prohibition-brokerdealers who execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's
stock, while at the same time buying m1d selling that corpora tion 's ~ to c k
on their own behalf. § 11 (a ) (1) (A), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A)
(1972- 1978 Supp.) ; see S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., l ::;t Ses~., 991
15

7
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1s m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is
made public and the price of shares rises. 17 In this case, as in
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target
corporation on the basis of market information which is
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender
offers 1 8 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity. 1 0
(1975) ; 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, R eport of the Special
Study of Securities Market ,;, H . R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
57-58, 76 (196:3). See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets
191-193 (1966). The exception is based upon Congn'ss' recognition
that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell orders. 2 Securiti~s and Exchange Commi~~ion,
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H . R. Doc. No. 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of
the market prompted Congress to exempt market makers, block po;;itioners,
registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k
(a) (1) (A)-(D} (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No . 94-75, at 99. See
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902,
3918 (1973) .
17 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, s·upra n. 16, aL 811-812.
18 SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979).
10
1 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H . R Doc. No. 92-64,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., xxxii (1971) .
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We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the
1934 Act cannot be read " 'more broadly than its language and
. the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" Touche Ross &
'Co. v. Redington, 47 U. S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103,· 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it
catches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of non public market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,
430 U. S., at 479. 20
2
~ 1\fn. .TusnrE BLACKMUN':-: dis:':rnt would <'~tnbli~h thr following ~tand
ard for impo:-:ing criminal and civil liberty under § 10 (b) and Rule

lOb-5:
"rl'Jrr~on:::

haYing arrrss to ronfitlrntinl mnterial informntion thnt. i;;: not
rwailahlc to othrr~ grnerall~· arr. prohibited from t'ngaging in
!!ChE>mr;;; to rxploit. thrir l!'lructnral information ad\'antagc through trading,
in affPdrcl ~eruri tir:-:." Post, at. 7.
This vi<·w i:-: not. sub"'hmtjflll~· differf'nt from the Comt of Appral,.: throry
that an~·o11r "who re-gular]~· re<·rivrs mate-rial nonpublir information may
11ot llt<(1 thnt. information to t.radc ·in :;:prurit.irs without ineurring an
ftffinnati\'e dut~· to di::wlo,.:r," supra. nt 8, quot·ing 5~F: F. 2d. at, I:~!i5. and
mn::;t. br rejrrted for t.h r n'ilo"'OIIf; ,;tated in Pa.rt III. Additionally, :t
judicial holding that certniu undrfiued a.rt.ivitif's "gPnrrall~· are prohibited"
by § 10 (b) woul<l rili:-:c Cjll<'stion~ whE>thf'r cithrr· criminal or rivil defendants wo11ld he giv<'n fnir noiir0 that. Owy Ira\'<' <'ngagPd ir1 ili<·gal
activity. Cf. Gmyned v. City of Bocl.:ford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1072).
It. is worth noting t.hn.t thi~ i;; n.ppnrrnt.ly th0 fir::;t. rnsr i11 wltieb rriminnl
liiibility hii:s hem impo:-:Pcl upo11 n, IJUn·hii:-:Pr for § 10 (h) nondi,;clo~ure .
PP!.itiorwr wa,; ~Pntrnrrd to n, y<•ar in prison, ~u"pmd<·<l rxerpt for one
month, and a fi1·c-yca.r term of probation. ld., at 13/J, 1378 (l\Ic;;kil! 1
J. 1 di s~entiug) .
lcgall~r
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IV
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alternative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and thE> sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule lOb-5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge
stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose
material, non-public information in connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." !d., at 683. Accordingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a
scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose . . . material nonpublic information in connection with the purchases of the
stock." !d. , at 685-686.
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchased securities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud
upon a seller." !d., at 686. The judge earlier had stated that
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, suggestions or by suppression of the truth." !d., at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
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public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the
nature or elements of n. duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury,
Rewis v. Un·ited States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971). see Dunn
v. United Sta.tes, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will
not speculate upon whetht>r such a duty t>xists, whether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a
violation of § 10 (b). 21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

of THB C1-11E~' JusTICE relit'S upon a ~inglr phrMr from
instructions, which ~<tntrs that t.lw petitionrr held a, "confidrntial
po~itiou" at Pandick Prri'.', to ar~tue tha.t. the jur~· was proper!~· in~t ructed
on the throry "that a person who has misappropriatl'd material nonpublic information hns an ab~olutc duty to disrlo:;e thnt information or
refrain from tmding." Post, at 2. The few words upon which thi~ theflis
i::; ba.• rd do not rxplaiu to the jury t.he nature and scope of tlw pPtitioner's
duty to his ('mplo~·er, the nnturP and scoJW of petitionrr',.- duty, if any,
to the n.f'qniring corporation, or the rlrnwnts of tJw tort of mi:;a.ppropriation. N'or do t.lw jur~· instruction.~ sugge;;t that n. "confidPntin.l po;;itiun''
is a necP~>'ary PlPllH'n( of the otTrnse for whic·h petitioner wa>' ehargPd .
Tim;:, we do not. belieYe tha l a. "mi~appropria tiou" thPory wa.s included in
the jmy in><truchom;.
The ('Onviction would h:wc to hr. revcr~rcl rven il' thr jury had been
instrurted that. it could convict. the pPtitiorwr ('ither (1) bPcau;;p of hi:s
failure to clisrlo~c mn.tPrial, nonpubli·c informntion to srllrrs or (2) because of n breach of a duty to t.hc acquiring corpor<~tion. Wr may not
uphold a criminal com·ic>tion if it. i, impo,;,.-ible to a. •cNtain whrtlwr the
dcl'endnnt has !wen pnni,.;hrcl for norwriminal concllrct.. Cnited States v.
Gallagher. 576 F . 2d 10:!~ , 1046 (CA2 1978); ~<'e J.eary v. NPw 1'urk, 395
U. S. 6, 31-32 (HJ69); Stromberg v. Califomia., :283 U. S. 359, 369-370;
(1931) .
21
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78- 1202
Vincent F. Chiarella, Petitioner, ) On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.
United States Court of
. t d St te
Appeals for the econd
U me
a s.
c·IrCUl't•
[January -, 1980]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question in this case is whether a person who learns
from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is
planning an attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates §· 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
if he fails to disclose the impending takeover before trading
in the target company's securities.

I
Petitioner is a printer by trade. In 1975 and 1976, he
worked as a "markup man" in the New York composing room
of Pandick Press, a financial printer. Among documents that
petitioner handled were five announcements of corporate
takeover bids. When these documents were delivered to the
printer, the identities of the acquiring and target corporations
were concealed by blank spaces or false names. The true
names were sent to the printer on the night of the final
printing.
The petitioner, however, was able to deduce the names of
the target companies before the final printing from other
information contained in the documents. Without disclosing
his knowledge, petitioner purchased stock in the target companie~ and sold the shares immediately after the takeover
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attempts were made public. 1 By this method, petitioner
11ealized a gain of slightly more than $30,000 in the course of
14 months. Subsequently, the Securities and Exchange CommiSSIOn (Commission or SEC) began an investigation of his
trading activities. In May 1977, petitioner entered into a
eonsent decree with the Commission in which he agreed to
return his profits to the sellers of the shares. 2 • On the same
day, he was discharged by Pandick Press.
In January 1978, petitioner was indicted on 17 counts of
violating § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5. 3 After petitioner unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment/ he was brought
to trial and convicted on all counts.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed petitioner's conviction. 588 F. ·2d 1358 (1978). We granted
certio~•ri, 441 U.S. (1979), and we now reverse.

II
Section 10 (b) of the ·1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78j, prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe." Pursuant to this section,
the SEC promulgated Rule lOb-5 which provides in pertinent Jllart fi that
"lt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi1

Of the five transactions, four involved tender offers and one concerned

a mergrr. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1363, n. 2 (CA2
Hl78).
2

SEC v. Chiarella, No . 77 Civ. 2534 (GLG) (SDNY May 24, 1977) .

Section 32 (a) of the 1934 Act sanctions criminal penaltie;s again:;t any
per:;on who willfully violates the Act. r5 U. S. C. A. § 78ff (a) (19721978 Supp.). Petitioner wa:-: charged with 17 counts of violating the Act
because he hnd received 17 letters confinning purchase of share~
4 United States v. Chia1'ella, 450 F . Supp. 95 (SDNY 1978) .
1 OX1l~ llu.les lOb-5 (a) ~nd (c) are at i:ssue here.
Rule lOb-5 (b)
3
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rectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
" (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or a
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1979) .
This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's silence.
The District Court's charge permitted the jury to convict
the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to inform
sellers of target company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more
valuable. 6 In order to decide whether silence in such circumstances violates § 10 (b), it is necessary to review the language and legislative history of that statute as well as its
interpretation by the Commission and the federal courts.
Although the starting point of our inquiry is the language
of the statute, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197
(1976), § 10 (b) does not state whether silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device. Section 10 (b) was
designed as a catch-all clause to prevent fraudulent practices.
ld., at 202, 206. But neither the legislative history nor the
statute itself affords specific guidance for the resolution of
this case. When Rule 10b-5 was promulgated in 1942, the·
provides that it. shall be unlawful "rtJo make any untrue ;;tatement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the ;;tatements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not mi;;Jeading." 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (b) (1979) . The
portion of the indictment based on this provision was dismissed because
the petitioner made no statements at all in connection with the purchat:~e·
of stock.
• Record, at 682-683t 686.
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SEC did not discuss the possibility that failure to provide
information might run afoul of§ 10 (b). 7
The SEC took an important step in the development of
§ 10 (b) when it held that a broker-dealer and his firm violated that section by selling securities on the basis of undisclosed information obtained from a director of the issuer
corporation who was also a registered representa.tive of the
brokerage firm. In Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S. E. C. 907
(1961), the Commission decided that a corporate insider must
abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless
he has first disclosed all material inside information known to
him. The obligation to disclose or abstain derives from
"[a] n affirmative duty to disclose material information
[which] has been traditionally imposed on corporate
'insiders,' particularly officers, directors, or controlling
stockholders. We, and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known
to them by virtue of their position but which are not
known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment." Id.,
at 911.
The Commission emphasized that the duty arose from
(i) The existence of a rela.tionship affording access to inside
information intended to be available only · for a corporate
purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading
without disclosure. I d., at 912, and n. 15.8
Sec SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) .
In Cady, Roberts, the broker-dealer w:.1s liable under § 10 (b) because
it received nonpublic information from a corporate insider of the issuer.
Since the insider could not use the information, neither could the partners
in the brokerage firm with which he was associated. Cady, Roberts &
Co., 40 S. E. C. 907 (1961). The transaction in Cady, Roberts involved
sale of stock to persons who previously may not have been shareholdertl
in the corporation. · Icl., at 913, and n . 21. The Commission embraced
the reasoning of Judge Learned Hand that "the director or officer <lS~umed
1

8
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That the relationship between a corporate insider and the
stockholders of his corporation gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist of the law. At common law,
misrepresentation made for the purpose of inducing reliance
upon the false statement is fraudulent. But one who fails to
disclose material information prior to the consummation of a
transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do
so. And the duty to disclose arises when one party has information "that the other [party] is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence
between them." u In its Cady, Roberts decision, the Commission recognized a relationship of trust and confidence
between the shareholders of a corporation and those insiders
who have obtained confidential information by reason of their
position with that corporation. 10 This relationship gives rise
a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would be a
sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to
induce the buyer into the position of a beneficiary although he was forbidden to do so once the buyer had become one." /d. , at 914, n. 23,
quoting Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F. 2d 46, 49 (CA2 1951), cert. denied,
341 U. S. 920 (1951).
9 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts § 551 (2) (a) (1976) . See James &
Gray, Misrepresentation-Part II, 37 Md. L. Rev. 488, 523-527 (1978).
As regards securitie::; transactions, the American Law Institute recognizes
that "silence when there is a duty to speak may be a fraudulent act."
ALI, Federal Securities Code § 262 (b) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
10 See 3 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
§ 838 (1975) (hereinafter Fletcher); 3A Fletcher, §§ 1168.2, 1171, 1174;
3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1446-1448 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss, at \
3557-:3558 ( 1969 Supp.). St>r also B1·ophy v. ('ities Service Co .. 31 Dd.
Ch. 241, 70 A. 2d 5 (1949). See g<'nerally Note, Rule lOb-5 : Elrments
of a Privatr Hight, of Action, 42 NYU L. Hcv. 5-!1, 552-55:3, and n. 71
(1968); 15 Harv. L. Rev. 1449, 1450 (1962); Daum & Phillip~, Thr
Implication of Cady, Roberts. 17 Bu~. Law, 9:~9, 945 (1962).
The di~srnt. of MR . .Jm.;TICE BLACKMUN suggr:st~ that. thr ":sprcial fact""
doctrine may be applied to find that. :silmre con::;titutp:-; fraud wlwrc one
party has superior information to !tnot her. Post. at 3. This Court hm.:
never w held. In St1 1ong v. RC'pide. 21il U.S. 419, 4:H-4:H (1909), this
Court applied the ::;pecial facts doctrine to conclude that a corpomtc
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to a duty to disclose because of the "necessity of preventing a
corporate insider from tak [ing] advantage of the uninformed
minority stockholders." Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (Del. 1951).
The Federal courts have found violations of § 10 (b)
where corporate insiders used undisclosed information for
their own benefit. E. g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d 833 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 1005 (1972).
The cases also have emphasized, in accordance with the common-law rule, that "[t]he party charged with failing to disclose market information must be under a duty to disclose
it." Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F. 2d 275, 282 (CA2 1975). Accordingly, a purchaser of stock
who has no duty to a prospective seller because he is neither
an insider nor a fiduciary has been held to have no obligation
to reveal material facts. See General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F. 2d 159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied,
393 u. s. 1026 (1969) .11
'fhis Court followed the same approach in Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128 (1972). A group of
American Indians formed a corporation to manage joint assets
derived from tribal holdings. The corporation issued stock
to its Indian shareholders and designated a local bank as its
in;;ider hall n, duty to disrlo~e to n, shareholder. In that case, the majority
~;lmrrholder of a corJJOra t e ~ecretly purchased thP stoek of anothPr
~;hnreholder without. rrvealing that the corporation , under the in:,;ider's
direction, wa;; abouL to ;;ell rorporate as;;et::; at a. price that would greall~·
enhance the value of the ~-;to<~k. The deci~-;ion in Stmng v. Repide wa~
premi~ed upon the fiduciary dut~· Lwtween thE' corporate in:<ider and the
t;harehold('r. Sec• Pepper v. Litton, :308 U. S. 295, ;{07, n. 15 (HJ;l~J) .
11 See also SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc. , 407 F . 2d 453, 460
(CA2 1968) , cert. denied, 395 U. S. 920 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co .,
319 F . 2d 634, 637-638 (CA7 1963); Note, supra n. 10, 42 NYU L. Rev.
at 554; Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Qffpr Under Federal
Securities Law : A New Challenge for Rule lOb-5 359, 373-374 (1966) .
See generally Note, Civil Liability under Rule X-lOb-5, 42 Va. L , Eev,
537, 554-561 (1956) .
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transfer agent. Because of the speculative nature of the
corporate assets and the difficulty of ascertaining the true
value of a share, the corporation requested the bank to stress to
its stockholders the importance of retaining the stock. I d.,
at 146. Two of the bank's assistant managers aided the
a;hareholders in disposing of stock which the managers knew
was traded in two separate markets-a primary market of
Indians selling to non-Indians through the bank and a resale
market consisting entirely of non-Indians. Indian sellers
charged that the assistant managers had violated § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 by failing to inform them of the higher prices
prevailing in the resale market. The Court recognized that
no duty of disclosure would exist if the bank merely had acted
as a transfer agent. But the bank also had assumed a duty to
act on behalf of the shareholders, and the Indian sellers had
relied upon its personnel when they sold their stock. Id., at
152. Because these officers of the bank were charged with a
responsibility to the shareholders, they could not act as market
makers inducing the Indians to sell their stock without disclosing the existence of the more favorable non-Indian market.
Jd., at 152-153.
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations have establis~ed that silence in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b)
despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But
such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. Application of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's welfare before their own , will
not benefit personally through fraudulent use of material
nonpublic information.12
12

"Tippees" uf corporate insiders have been held liable under § 10 (b)
have a duty not to protit from the use of inside information

~ecause ~h ey
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III
In this case, the petitioner was convicted of violating § 10
(b) although he was not a corporate insider and he received
no confidential information from the target company.
Moreover, the "market information" upon which he relied
did not concern the earning power or operations of the target
company, but only the plans of the acquiring company.13
Petitioner's use of that information was not a fraud under
110 (b) unless he was subject to an affirmative duty to disdose it before trading. In this case, the jury instructions
failed to specify any such duty. In effect, the trial court
instructed the jury that petitioner owed a duty to everyone;
to all sellers, indeed, to the market as a whole. The jury
simply was told to decide whether petitioner used material,
nonpublic information at a time when "he knew other people
trading in the securities market did not have access to the
eame information." Record, at 677.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction by holding
that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives materialnonpublic information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative
duty to disclose." 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978) (emphasis
in original). Although the court said that its test would include
only persons who regularly receive material nonpublic information, id., at 1366, its rationale for that limitation is unrethat they know is confidential and know or should know came from a
corporate insider, Shapiro v. Mm·1'ill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495
F. 2d 228, 237-238 (CA2 1974) . The tippee's obligation has been viewed
as arising from his role as a participant after the Ja,ct in the insider's
breach of a fiduciary duty. Subcommittees of American Bar Association
Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law, Comment Letter on
Material, Non-Public Information (Oct. 15, 1973) reprinted in BNA,
Securities Regulation & Law Report No. 233, at D-1, D-2 (Jan. 2, 1974).
13 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the ReEponsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 798, 799.
(1973).
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lated to the existence of a duty to disclose. 14 The Court of
Appeals, like the trial court, failed to identify a relationship
between petitioner and the sellers that could give rise to a
duty. Its decision thus rested solely upon its belief that the
federal securities laws have "created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decisions." 588 F. 2d, at 1362. The use by anyone of material information not generally available is fraudulent, this theory suggests, because such information gives
certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over less informed buyers and sellers.
This reasoning suffers from two defects. First, not every
instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10 (b). See Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green, 430
U. S. 462, 474-477 (1977). Second, the element required to
make silence fraudulent-a duty to disclose-is absent in this
14 The Court of Appeal~ said that its "regular access to market information" test would create a workable rule embracing "these who
occupy ... strategic places in the market mechanism." United States
v. Chiarella, 588 F. 2d 1358, 1365 (CA2 1978). These considerations
are insufficient to support a duty to disclose. A duty arises from the
relationship between parties, see nn. 9 and 10, supra, and accompanying
text, and not merely from one's ability to acquire information because of
his position in the market.
The Court of Appeals also suggested that the acquiring corporation
itself would not be a "market insider" becau;;e a tender offeror creates,
rather than receives, information and takes a substantial economic risk
that its offer will be unsuccessful. !d., at 1366-1367. Again, the Court
of Appeals departed from the analysis appropriate to recognition of a
duty. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit previously held, in
a manner consistent with our analysis here, that a tender offeror does not
violate § 10 (b) when it makes preannouncement purchases precisely
because there is no relationship between the offeror and the seller:
"We know of no rule of law . . . that a purchaser of stock, who was not
an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any
obligatiqn to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and
thus abort the sale." General 'l'ime Corp. v. Talley Industries, 403 F. 2d
159, 164 (CA2 1968), cert. denied, 393 U. S. 1026 (1969).

"18-1202-0PINION
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tase. No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with
the sellers of the target company's securities, for petitioner had
no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was
not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had
placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions.
We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between all participants in market
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises
from a specific rela.tionship between two parties, seen. 9, supra,
should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of
eongressional intent.
As we have seen, no such evidence emerges from the lanr;uage or legislative history of § 10 (b). Moreover, neither
the Congress nor the Commission ever has adopted a parityof-information rule. Instead the problems caused by misuse of market information have been addressed by detailed
and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when use of market information may not harm operation of the securities markets. For example, the Williams Act 1 5 limits but does not
eompletely prohibit a tender offeror's purchases of target
eorporation stock before public announcement of the offer.
Congress' careful action in this and other areas 16 contrasts, and
u 15 U. S. C. § 78m (d) (1) permits a tender offeror to purchase 5%
of the target company's stock prior to disclosure of its plans for
acquisition .
16 Section 11 of the 1934 Act generally forbids a member of a national
securities exchange from effecting any transaction on the exchange for its
own account. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (1972-1978 Supp.). But
Congress has specifically exempted specialists from this prohibition-brokerdealers who execute orders for customers trading in a specific corporation's
stock, while at the same time buying and selling that corporation 's stock
on their own behalf.
§ 11 (a) (1) (A) , 15 U . S. C. A. § 78k (a) (1) (A)
' (1972- 1978 Supp.) ; see S. Rep. No. 94-75, 94th Cong., 1st Se:ss., 99J
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m some tension, with the broad rule of liability we are
asked to adopt in this case.
Indeed, the theory upon which the petitioner was convicted
is at odds with the Commission's view of § 10 (b) as applied
to activity that has the same effect on sellers as the petitioner's purchases. "Warehousing" takes place when a corporation gives advance notice of its intention to launch a
tender offer to institutional investors who then are able to
puchase stock in the target company before the tender offer is
made public and the price of shares rises. 17 In this case, as in
warehousing, a buyer of securities purchases stock in a target
corporation on the basis of market information which is
unknown to the seller. In both of these situations, the seller's
behavior presumably would be altered if he had the nonpublic
information. Significantly, however, the Commission has
acted to bar warehousing under its authority to regulate tender
offers 18 after recognizing that action under § 10 (b) would
rest on a "somewhat different theory" than that previously
used to regulate insider trading as fraudulent activity. 1 0
IS

(1975); 2 Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special
Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st. Sess.,
57-58, 76 (1963). See generally S. Robbins, The Securities Markets
191-193 (1966). The exception is based upon Congress' recognition
that specialists contribute to a fair and orderly marketplace at the same
time they exploit the informational advantage that comes from their possession of buy and sell orders. 2 Securiti'=!s and Exchange Commission,
Report of the Special Study of Securities Markets, H. R. Doc. No . 95,
88th Cong., 1st Sess., at 78-80. Similar concerns with the functioning of
the market promptPd Congress to exempt market makers, block positioners,
registered odd-lot dealers, bona fide arbitrageurs, and risk arbitrageurs
from § ll's general prohibition on member trading. 15 U. S. C. A. § 78k
(a) (1) (A)-(D) (1972-1978 Supp.); see S. Rep. No. 94-75, at 99. See
also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9950, 38 Fed . Reg. 3902,
3918 (1973) .
17 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra n. 16, at 811-812.
18 SEC Proposed Rule § 240.14e-2, 44 Fed. Reg. 9987-9988 (1979).
19 1 SEC Institutional Investor Study Report, H . R. Doc. No . 92-64,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., xxxii (1971) .
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We see no basis for applying such a new and different theory
of liability in this case. As we have emphasized before, the
1934 Act cannot be read" 'more broadly than its language and
the statutory scheme reasonably permit.'" · Touche Ross &:
··co. v. Redington, 47 U.S. L. W. 4732, 4735 (June 18, 1979),
quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U. S. 103,' 116 (1978). Section
10 (b) is aptly described as a catch-all provision, but what it
eatches must be fraud. When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty
to speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10 (b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information. The contrary result is without support in the
legislative history of § 10 (b) and would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress has enacted for regulation of
the securities markets. Cf. Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,
430 U. 8., at 479. 20
~ Ma. JusTICE BLA'C KMUN'fi dissent would establish the following standard for imposing criminal nnd civil liberty under § 10 (b) and Rule
lOb-5:
"[P]ersons h:wing accrss to confidential material informntion that. is not
legally a.vajlnblo t() others generally nrc prohibited from rngaging in
11ehemes to <>xploit their structural information advantHgc through trading
in affert<'d secnriti('::;," Post, at 7.
This view i;:; not. subst-antjaJJ~· different from the Court. of Appeals th('OI'Y
thnt anyone "who regularly rer('ives mn,t<>rinl nonpublic information may
not use thnt information t() trade 'in s<'Curit.iPS without incurring an
affirmative duty to disrloi><'," supra, at 8, quot-ing 5R8 F. 2d, at, 1365 , and
must be l'('j!'ct<>d for t·he reasons stated in Pa.rt III. Additionally, a
juilicial holding tlwt ccrt;tin undefined act.ivities "general!~· arc prohibited"
by § 10 (b) would raise qu<>~tions wheth<>r either criminHI or civil defendantfl would be given fnir notice thflt, they have engflged in ill<>gal
acfivity. Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104, 108-109
(1972).
It is worth noting that this i;; n.ppnrent.ly the fir~t case in which criminal
liability has hrm impo:<ed upon n. purehn~er for § 10 (b) nondisclosure.
Prtitioner was sentenced to a yrnr in prison, su~pendecl exrrpt for one
month, and a five-year tenn of probation. Id., at 1373, 1378 (J.Ieskill,
J., di..--sentjng) .
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IV
In its brief to this Court, the United States offers an alternative theory to support petitioner's conviction. It argues that
petitioner breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when
he acted upon information that he obtained by virtue of
his position as an employee of a printer employed by the
corporation. The breach of this duty is said to support a
conviction under § 10 (b) for fraud perpetrated upon both
the acquiring corporation and the sellers.
We need not decide whether this theory has merit for it was
not submitted to the jury. The jury was told, in the language of Rule lOb-5, that it could convict the petitioner if
it concluded that he either (i) employed a device, scheme or
artifice to defraud or (ii) engaged in an act, practice, or course
of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or
deceit upon any person. Record, at 681. The trial judge
stated that a "scheme to defraud" is a plan to obtain money
by trick or deceit and that "a failure by Chiarella to disclose
material, non-public information in connection with his purchase of stock would constitute deceit." I d., at 683. Accordingly, the jury was instructed that the petitioner employed a
scheme to defraud if he "did not disclose . .. material nonpublic information in connection with the purchases of the
stock." ld., at 685- 686.
Alternatively, the jury was instructed that it could convict if "Chiarella's alleged conduct of having purchased seflurities without disclosing material, non-public information
would have or did have the effect of operating as a fraud
upon a seller." Id. , at 686. The judge earlier had stated that
fraud "embraces all the means which human ingenuity can
devise and which are resorted to by one individual to gain an
advantage over another by false misrepresentation, suggestions or by suppression of the truth." Id. , at 683.
The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-
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public information to sellers from whom he bought the stock
of target corporations. The jury was not instructed on the
nature or elements of a duty owed by petitioner to anyone
other than the sellers. Because we cannot affirm a criminal
conviction on the basis of a theory not presented to the jury,
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 814 (1971), see Dunn
v. United States, 47 USLW 4607, 4609 (June 4, 1979), we will
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it
has been breached, or whether such a breach constitutes a
violation of § 10 (b). 21
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

11 The dissent of THE CHIEF' JusTICE relies upon a single phrase from
the jury inst.ructions, which states that the petitioner held n. "confidential
position" at Pandick Press, to argue that the jury was properly in~tructed
on the theory "that a person who has misa.ppropria.ted ma.terial nonpublic inform~tt.ion has an absolute duty to disclose t.ha.t information or
refrain from trading." Post, at 2. The few words upon which this thesis
is based do not l'xplain to the jury the nature and scope of the petitioner's
duty to his employer, the na.t ure and scope of petitioner's duty, if any,
to the acquiring corporation, or the eleml'nts of the tort of misappropriation. Nor do the jur~· instructions suggest t.lmt. a "confidential po;;ition"
is a necessrtry l:'lement of the offpnse for which petitioner was charged.
Thus, we do not believe that a "misappropriation" theory was included in
the jury instructions.
The conviction would have to be reversed even if the jury had been
instructed that it could convict the petitioner either (1) because of his
failure to disclose material, nonpublic information to sellers or (2) because of a breach of a duty to the a.cquiring corporation. We may not
uphold a criminal convi'ction if it is impo,.;..,ible to a..;certain whethl'r the
defendant has been punished for noncriminal conduct.. United States v.
Gallagher, 576 F. 2d 1028, 1046 (CA2 1978); :see Leary v. Netv York, 395
U. S. 6, 31-32 (1969); Stromberg v. Califomia, 283 U. S. 359, 369-370,'
(1931).
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Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of -1934 (Act) prohibits
the use "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... [of]
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention
of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commis!'ion may prescribe." Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), promulgated thereunder, makes it unlawful for
any person to "employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," or
to "engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or a deceit .upon any per' on, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." Petitioner, who was employed by
a financia l printer that had been engaged · by certain corporations to
print corporate takeover ·bids, deduced the names of the target companies from information contained in documents delivered to the printer
by the acquiring companies and, without disclosing his· knowledge, purchased stock in the target companies and sold the hares· immediately
after the takeover attempts were made public. After the SEC began
an investigation of his trading activities, petitioner entered into a consent decree with the SEC in which he agreed to return his profits to the
sellers of the shares. Thereafter, petitioner was indicted and convicted
for violating § 10 (b) of the Act and SEC Rule lOb-5. The District
Court's charge permitted the jury to convict the petitioner if it found
that he willfully failed to inform sellers of target rompany securities
that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that would make their
shares more valuable. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.
Held : Petitioner's conduct elid not constitute a violation of § 10 (b ) , and
hence his conviction was improper. Pp. 2-12.
(a) Administrative and judicial interpretations have established that
silence in connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate
I

HENRY C. LIND
Reporter of Decisions.

II

CHIARELLA v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus

as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) despite the absence of statutory
language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of
nondisclosure. However, such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose (such as that of a corporate insider to hareholders of his corporation) arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction. Pp. 2-7.
(b) Here, petitioner had no affirmative duty to disclose the in fonnation as to the plans of the acquiring companies. He was not a corporate
insider, and he received no confidential information from the target
companies. Nor could any duty arise from petitioner's relation hip
with the sellers of the target companies' securities, for he had no prior
·dealings with them, was not their agent, was not a fiduciary, and was
not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.
A duty to disclose under § 10 (b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. Pp. 8-12.
(c) This Court need not decide whether petitioner's conviction can
be supported on the alternative theory that he breached a duty to the
acquiring corporation, since such theory was not submitted to the
jury. The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted
merely because of his failure to disclose material, nonpublic information
to sellers from whom he bought the stock of target corporations. The
conviction cannot be affirmed on the basis of a theory not presented
to the jury. Pp. 12-14.
588 F. 2d 1358, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opm10n of the Court., in which STEWART,
WHITE, REITNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. S'fEVENs, J., filed a concurring opinion. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. BURGER, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion. BLACKMUN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined.
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decide whether or not such a duty exists.
Section 10 (b) of the SQgwri ti-es
drawn in quite general terms.
prosecution,f

This is a criminal

nd nothing in the legislative history suqqests

a congressional inten;lto create
criminal
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-;land consequent

upon persons such as

petitione ~who

are

not corporate insiders / not fid:'ciaries, j and not persons in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.
Accordingly, we reverse the judqment of the Court
of Appeals.
Mr. Justice Stevens has filed a concurring opinion.
Mr. Justice Brennan concurs in the judgment.
The Chief Justice has filed a dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whon Mr. Justice
Marshall joins, also has filed a dissenting opinion.

No. 78-1202, Chiarella v. United States

No.

78-1202,

Chiarella

v.

United

States

comes to this Court on a writ of ceritorari to the
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Circuit. The petitioner used nonpublic information
that he acquired during the course of employment as
a financial printer to purchase stock in companies
that

were

soon

to

become

targets

of

corporate

takeover attempts. When the takeover attempts were
made public, petitioner sold his stock at a profit.
The

petitioner

was

subsequently

convicted

of

violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, and Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule

10b-5.

His

conviction

was

affirmed

by

the

Second Circuit.
We reverse. This case turns on whether the
petitioner's

failure

to
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of

the

target company stock that their holdings would soon
become

more

valuable
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actionable under Section 10(b).
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS has filed a concurring
opinion.
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judgment. THE CHIEF JUSTICE has filed a dissenting
opinion.
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Rejects Finding
Of Sto·ck Fraud
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
Special to Tbe New YOit: T1Da

WASHINGTON, March 18- The ·supreme Court today reversed the securities fraud conviction of a · financial
printer who profited from his advance
knowledge of corporate takeover bids.
In an important legal test of the
scope of the antifraud provisions of the
Federal securities laws, the Court absolved the printer of wrongdoing when
he purchased stock in companies that
were takeover targets.
By a S.to-3 vote, the Court ruled that
trading on the basis of "inside," or nonpublic, information violates the antifraud provisions only if the trader
breaches a pre-existing relationship of
trust with the other party to the transaction.
Ruling a Blow to the S.E.C.
I
The printer in this case, employed by
Pandick Press in New York, . had . no
such relationship with those who sold
their shares in the target companies on
the open market, Associate Justice .
Lewis F. Powell wrote for the majority.
"He was not their agent, he was not a
fiduciary, he was not a person in whom
the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence," Justice Powell said. "He
was, in fact, a complete stranger who
dealt with the sellers only through im·
personal market transactions."
Thz t-pinion, Chiarella v. U.S., No. 781 ~02, was a blow to the Securities and
E>:cha:,3e Commission, which in some
recent enforc~ment actions had main- ·
tained that anyone with access to nonpublic mar};et information must either
disclose the information or refrain
from trading on the basis of it.
The United States Coun of Appeals
for the Second Circuit endorsed this interpretation when it affirmed the printer's criminal conviction, ruling that
"anyone - corporate insider or not who regularly receives material non-_·
public information may not use that information to trade in securities without
incurring an affirmative duty to disclose."
.
\\-rule today's opinion rejected the
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1 'market insider"

category established
by the Second ,Circuit's opinion, the
Court appeared to leave the S.E.C. and
Federal prosecutors considerable
maneuvering room in future cases.
, Justice Powell left open the question
of whether the printer breached a fiducia,ry duty to the companies making
the tender offers, which hired his employer to print the prospectuses. Under

prohibitions. The provisions have long
been held to apply to "corporate insiders" -officers, directors and majority
ibis theory, the printer misapproprisharefJIIiders who, Justice Powell said
ated privileged information for his own
today. "have an obligation to place the .
use and committed a fraud on the acshare!lalder's welfare before their
quiring companies.
own!"
The six-member majority said it was
By a:mtrast, Justiee Powell said, ,
barred from reaching this issue bethere was no claim that Mr. Chiarella
cause the prosecution had not pre. was a -c:Orporate insider." Rather, he
sented that theory to the jury. Three
said, "the trial court instructed the
Justices disagreed, writing that the
·jury tiDat petitioner owed a duty to
"misappropriation" theory was in fact
everyaae; to all sellers, indeed, to the
·before the jury. Chief Justice Warren
market as a whole."
E. Burger said be would affirm the conJustice Powell continued: "Foi:muviction on that theory. The two other
latioo of such a broad duty, which dedissenters, Associate Justices Harry A:
parts Ddically from the established
Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall,
doctrine that duty arises ·from a speagreed with the Chief Justice but said
cific Rlationship between two parties,
they also believed the printer's conduct
should. JM>t be undertaken absent some
would have constituted fraud "even if
he had obtained the blessing of his em- - explicit. evidence of Congressional intent."
.
ployer's principals before embarking
Evidalce of Congressional . intent,
on his profiteering scheme."
Justice Powell .said, in fact cuts the
Government lawyers indicated today
other way, against a notion of an a~
that, following the Court's implicit invilute cA1ty to insure that all parties have
tation, future prosecutions would be
equal access to market information.
based on the misappropriation theory. '
For example, under the Williams Act, ·
Printer Made $30,000 From Trades
which regulates tender offers, the acquiring party is allowed to buy up to 5
The victor in today's case was Yin·
percent of the target company's stock
cent F. Chiarella. Over a 14-month
before revealing the takeover plans.
period, he handled announcements of
·~we hold that a duty to disclose
four tender offers and one merger and
undeFSection lO(b) does not arise from
made $30,000 by buYing stock in the tarthe mere possession of nonpublic marget companies and then selling the
ket information," Justice Powell conshares as soon as the takeover bids
cluded. The majority ruling was joined.
were made public.
by Associate Justices Potter Stewart,
The S.E.C., alerted by the New York
Byron R. White, William H. Rehnquist,
Stock Exchange to the unusual trading
John Paul Stevens and William J. \
activity, brought a civil enforcement
Brennan Jr.
proceeding against Mr. Chiarella. He
entered a consent decree and returned 1
his profits. He was then criminally
prosecuted and convicted of violating
the antifraud provisions, Section lO(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and S.E.C. Rule lOb-5.
Those provisions, which prohibit
fraud or deceit in connection with securities transactions, do not mention
the word "insider," much less define
the categories of traders ~d b}: the
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The reason the ruling may have on.ly 11m·
\ !ted impact is because of the loophole, ad·
dressed by several Justices wbo wrote sepa·
rate dissents or concurring views. The
court's majority said it wouldn't address
any duty Mr. Chiarella might owe. to 'the
: print · shop or its customer-comparues, ~
1 cause.,-the trial judge in New York didn t
present that issue to the jury.
But the majority left open the possibility .
that if the issue had been before the jury,
Mr.' Chiarella's conviction might have been
upheld. JustiCe William Brennan said as
much in an opinion concurring with the rna·
jority ..,.,Justiee John ·sterens, ·also conc~r
ririg, :s&d that possibility .was ~pen to deDate . .
-...... :·· :-·!- ........ ; ;
I ~d three dissenters-ehiefJustice War·
ren Burger and Justices Harry Blackrnun
: and Thurgood Marshall-all said the duty to
i the employer was · a part of the' case ·and
. could serve as the basis for .a. conviction.:
I, Some analysts said the case reflected a
1 trend on the part of the Supreme Court.
Harvey Pitt, former SEC general counsel
currently in private law practice, noted that
the particulars of the case were unusual.
But Mr. Pitt said the case is " another effort
by the court to restrict the broadest possible
readings of the federal securities laws." Mr.
Pitt said the Justices want to "confine the
application of the securities laws to what ·the 1
court perceives as the more traditional mores
of the marketplace." : ·
. : .. , •
I
The Supreme Court decision reversed a
ruling by the federal appeals court in New
York, which had upheld Mr. Chiarella's con·
viction. That appeals court ruling had ·sent
tremors through the securities industry,
which feared that it was so broad that nor·
mal trading activities would be affected.
Although the high court ruling limits fed·
! era! officials' ability to act against insider
trading on the basis of any duty to sellers of
: stock, some federal officials were heartened
by other aspects of the case.
·
The opinion, officials said, included the
first official Supreme Court recognition of a
landmark 1968 appeals court ruling that up·
holds federal enforcement efforts against
corporate officers who use secret inf?rma:
tion for their own benefit. A footnote m the
opinion also says the Justices weren't alt.er·
ing the usual view that persons who rece1:ve
tips from corporate insiders can be held ha·
ble under federal securities laws.
.
Officials in the U.S. Attorney's office in
New York said they would study the ·opinion
to see if it might be possible to prosecute
Mr. Chiarella again under the theory that he
owes a duty to his employer and its custom·
ers.

i

Bta!J R~

·WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court took
a narrow view ·of what constitute( ~'insider
trading" P,rohibited by anti~a\ld,P~vi~ons
of federal securities law.
.
.
By a six-to-three vote, the Justices re_buffed the federal ·government aDd . over·
turned the criminal conviction of a financial
printer who bought stock in _companies after
! learning at the print shop that they were to
1 be the targets of mergers or attempted take; overs.
,
,
··
The Justices said the printer,' Vincent
Chiarella, could be charged with securities
i fraud only if he had a duty to disclose his
knowledge of impending transactions to per·
sons selling him stock. In an opinion by Jus·
tice Lewis Powell, the high court said Mr.
Chiarella didn't have a duty to disclose his
information because he didn't have· "prior
dealings" with the stock sellers.
But if the Justices found that Mr. Chi·
arella didn't have an obligation to those sell·
ing him stock, they expressly didn't decide
the separate question .of whether he had a
duty to his employer and to the print shop's
customers to refrain from using information
obtained on the job.
The reaction from federal regulators and
securities lawyers yesterday suggested that
the ruling may have only limited impact on
the .Securities and Exchange Commission's
efforts to crack ·down on insider trading. The
SEC brought a dozen civil suits charging in·
sider trading last year and has already
brought five this year. And in.New York, the
1 U.S. Attorney' s office, which filed the crimi·
nal charges against Mr. Chiarella, said it is
"committed to bringing further insider-in·
formation prosecutions. ''
Paul Gonson, associate general counsel
at the SEC, said the decision ·• really seems
to reinforce quite strongly" the " traditional
insider " theories of the commission .
Insider cases usually involve attempts by
corporate officials trading in stock to profit
on secret corporate information they have
obtained because of their positions.
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volving information that emanated
from outside the corporation to
which the information relates-even
casual sc rutiny of the majority opinion reflects a decision of far broader
scope and ·impact.
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vant. "' Vincent Chiarella, a printer.
deciphered the id entity of five public
companies that were to be the targets
Mr. Pill. a former Securities and
of acquisition efforts by other comExchange Commission general collnpanies. This information was gleaned
sel. is a partner at Fried. Frank. Harfrom confidential financial documents
ris. Shriver & Kampelman. H e filed
entrusted to Chiarella's employer for
Printer Gleans Info
an amicus curiae brief on behalf of
printing.
the Securities lnd11strv Association in
"The facts of the case were rather
As' a result of hi s sleuthing, Chiarthe case discussed in. this article.
simple and. in contrast to other re- ella entered into 17 pre-announcecent securities law decisions ernanat- · ment stock transactions, on various
To seasoned observers of the Su- ing from the Court, largely irrele- stock exchanges. and he made a
preme Court. it should come as no
surprise that the Court in Chiarella v.
U.S., 1 its 23rd securities-law-related
decision since 1975, continued an unmistakable trend of restricting the • - - - - - - - - - - - - - - scope and coverage of the federal sebeing held illegal is inherent in the
Continued from page II
curities Jaws . 2 But, what surely must
case-by-case development of antibe viewed as a major surprise is the
First, although most business prac- trust Jaw. The benefits of case-byfact that the Burger Court (the Chief tices are designed to maximize prof- case adjudication include making no
Justice dissenting), long viewed as a its , firms usually exclude from their new Jaw until a need has been demso-called
"Jaw-and-order"
court, options those practices which appear onstrated, basing decision on a full
overturned the criminal conviction of to be illegal under current Jaw, even factual record, and fitting relief to the
a "blue collar" worker, albeit a con- though they might be more profitable peculiar facts of each case. The
viction predicated upon a "white col- than the others. Hence to say, as Mr. downside of these benefits is that as
lar" crime.
Sims does. that an enforcement agen- antitrust Jaw evolves, the inevitable
In many respects, the Chiarella de- cy should not challenge business de- changes cause uncertainty until
cision reflects the most substantive cisions which are a logical or rational enough cases have been decided to
incursion by the Court (as currently response to the firm's competitive sit- settle most of the new issues.
For example, in White Motor ," the
constituted) into the meaning and ap- uation is circular. 13 Literally, it
plication of the antifraud provisions would limit antitrust to rare irrational Supreme Court concluded that it did
. not have enough experience with verof the federal securities Jaws general- behavior.
The critical issue in most cases, tical restraints to establish a per se
ly, and Securities Exchange Act Rule
JOb-5 particularly. Heretofore , most, therefore, usually is not whether the rule. Several years later, the Antialthough surely not all," of the practice was rational profit maximi- trust Division argued in Schwinn 15
Court's post- 1975 securities decisions zation but rather whether it unrea- for a rule of presumptive illegality,
have been confined to such procedur- sonably interfered with the competi- but the Court went further ahd adopt.al issues as standing to sue,' the exis- tive process. Resolution of this iss ue ed a per se rule. At that point, ma ny
tence (or, more properly , the non-ex- may well result in aggressive behav- firms mu st have felt that they had
istence) of implied remedies.' stan- ior being held anticompetitive. There- been second guessed. for various
dards
of proof."
venue, 7
the after, of course, the practice involved business deci sions designed to maxidefinition of the term "security,"' will be excluded from the set of op- mize profits were suddenly deemed
tions from which firms make profit per se illegal restraints .
and collateral estoppel."
In Sylvania.'" based on the experiWhile it may be tempting to view maximi zi ng choices.
Second, the uncertainty which may ence of ten years. much more extenChiarella as a so-called "market information" case-that is, a case in- result in a rational business decision sive ecqnomic analysis than had previously been available , and substantial criticism of Sclno'inn. the cou rt
reversed itself and rein stituted a rule
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larly appropriate role for the Federal
By Harvey L. Pitt

healthy profit of $30,000 for his efforts . Chiarella did not induce any
trades, make any affirmative statements (false or otherwise}, or have
any contact with the target company
shareholders whose stock Chiarella
purchased.
The Court did focus on three additional facts that may have influenced
its judgment in favor of Chiarella: (I)
As a result of an SEC consent decree, Chiarella had already disgorged
the entire $30.000 profit from his
trades long before he was indicted for
criminal prosecution ; (2} as a result
of his creativity, Chiarella was fired
from his job; and (3) the Court found
it "worth noting" that this was "apparently the first case in which crimi-

Continued on page 21

'A Simplistic Approach to Recent FTC Cases'
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Trade Commission since, unlike
Sherman Act violations, no penalty is
associated with violation of the FTC
Act.
The practices challenged in these
recent FTC cases raise important antitrust issues which can be resolved
under a rule of reason approach only
after considerable enforcement experience. Rhetoric about second guessing and "Catch 22" is far too simplistic a reaction to them.
1
£./. du Pon t d~ Nemours & Co., Docket
9108.3 CCH Trade Reg. Rep . ~2t.613 (1979).
appl'al pendittg .
'Ethyl Corp .. Docket 9128. 1976-79 CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. 21.579 (complain! issued
1978).
'Borden, In c . . Docket 8978. 1976-79 CCH
Trade Reg. Rep. '21.490 (1980).
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~Unit ed Slates r. Philadelphia Nat'/ B£mf....
374 u.s. 321 (1963).
11
United Stall'S v. Container Corp., 393
u.s. 333 (1969).
1
United Stall'S v. United Statn Gypsum
Co .. 438 U.S. 422 (1~78).
8 Scherer. Indu strial MarJ..et Structure turd
Economic Performance, Ch. 5-8 ( 1980).
11

Williamson. "Economics as an Antitrust

Defense: The ll'dfare Tradeorrs," 68 Am.
Eeon. Rev. 18 (t968).
'
111

Posner. Antitrust Law: An Economic

Perspective ( t976).
11 J
:.'.g. Ill Areeda and Thrner. Antitrust
Law. Ch. 7C ( 1978).
·
12 l Areeda and n.r~cr, AntilfUS( Law 31
(1978).
13

E.g., United States v. Trenton Batteries

Co .. 273 U.S. 392 (1927); FTC •·. Motion l'ic.
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u.s. 253 (1963).
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388 u.s. 365 (1967).
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Inc., 433 U.S. 36(t977).
11 United
SlattS v. Philadelphia
Bank. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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United Starn v. Conwinn Corp. of
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Unitd Statts v. flu ck Mfg . Co., 227 F.
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Impact of Chiarella Dramatic in Private Actions ·
Continued from page 12
nal liability has been imposed upon a
purchaser for § IO(b) nondisclosurc."11

The Court's recitation of these
facts, which evidences its hostility toward novel a nd possibly draconian
applications of the federal securities
laws, seems consistent with two important precepts articulated several
times within the majority opinionthat it is troublesome to impose Rule
JOb-5 li abi lity on the basis of a theory
that can be charactcrizeu as a "novel
twist" of the common law , 12 and that
many of the market · problems to
which Rule JOb-5 conceivably might
be applied are bes.t "addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation."'"

As the Court concluued, "a judicial
holuing that certain undefined activities 'generally are prohibited' by
§ JO(b) would rai se question s whether
either criminal or civil defendants
would be given fair notice that they
have engaged in illegal activity.""
This view-that novel or atypical
applications of Rule JOb-5 unknown
at common law may no longer be actionable' "--d raws sustenance not
only from the Court's repeated references to, and reliance upon, common

cept that finds some support in the
general legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act."
Nevertheless. the Court's observation offers defendants and respondents in SEC investigation s and enforcement proceedings far greater
latitude for argumentation than heretofore may have been thought to exist. Careful scrutiny of common law
principles may well persuade the
commission or an independe nt tribunal to modify or reject an im<igina-

In maizy respects, the Chiarella decision reflects the
most substantive incursion by the Court into the
meaning and application of the antifraud provisions
of the federal securities laws.

Two Choices
While "glib generalizations" are an
occupational hazard to be avoided
where Rule IOb-5 cases a re in- law , 17 but also from the Court's
volved," the Chiarella decision rather quotable admonition that
thus broadly suggests the need for "Section JO(b) is aptly described as a
the SEC, in the future, either to rec- catch-all provision , but what it
oncile its proposed applications of catches must be fraud.""
This latter observation rejects a
Rule IOb-5 with the pre-existing substantive common law of fraud and de- number of previous appellate deciceit, or to adopt "detailed and sophis- sions,•• as well as some pre-1975 Suticated regulation[s]'' that will fairly preme Court decisions;• that had
apprise proposed defendants or re- held that Section JO(b) and Rule !Obspondents of the activities sought to 5 were intended to pick up from
where the common law-ended, a conbe proscribed .

tive, but novel , theory of Rule JOb-5
liability .
Moreover, the impact of this facet
of the Chiarella decision will be felt
even more dramatically in private
damage actions, in which Rule JOb-5
has always been invoked to attempt
to bring unusual theories of law into
the federal courts. 22
Of course, the commission has an
ample arsenal of specific rules and
broad rulemaking authority at its dis-

posal. The Chiarella decision may
encourage the SEC to channel its ingenuity into new rulemaking ventures , and to invoke other statutes
and rules to sustain the agencY's theories of law .
Little "M:trket Information"
Although Chiarella was widely
viewed as a "market information"
case. both by the lower courts" and
by some commentators, 24 the Supreme Court's conclusions in Chiarella have relatively scant connection
with "market information ," and a
much greater connection with general
federal securities fraud under Rule
!Ob-5. To be sure, the Court did discuss "market information," a term
the Court never deigned to define,
and seemingly concluded that
-false statements about at
least some forms of nonpublic, matelial, market information may be actionable under
Rule !Ob-5;" and
-a failure to disclose certain forms of material , nonpublic, market information
may be actionable, 26 if the
person failing to disclose
such market information was
either a fiduciary of the buyers or sellers, an agent of the
buyers or the sellers, or was
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Chiarella Requires Basis in Common Law Liability
Continued from page 21
otherwise a person in whom
the buyers or sellers had appropriately been induced to
place their trust and confidence."
But, the ultimate significance of
the Chiarella decision will derive
from its broad holdings about Rule
IOb-5 generally.
At the outset, the Court noted that
subparagraph (b) of Rule IOb-5which proscribes the omission of material facts necessary to make any
statements made not misleadingcould have no application where the
defendant "made no statements at all
in connection with the purchase of
stock ." 28 While this hardly seems
controversial, it does suggest a greater need for precision in analyzing
whether Rule IOb-5 has been violated
at all, and in determining which, if
any, of the Rule's provisions have
been violated. Moreover, this passing
observation by the Court confirms
existing doubts whether a defendant's
actions or implied representations, as
opposed to actual speech, can be
deemed to constitute "statements"
·within the meaning of Rule 10b-5(b).
In addition, throughout most of the
majority opinion the Court's discussion focused on applicability of Rule
!Ob-5 to nondisclosure cases, whether or not the nondisclosures involve

"market information," starting with
the passing observation that neither
the language nor the history of Section IO(b) and Rule !Ob-5 indicates
that "silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive device ." 29
While gratuitous comments of this
kind might ordinarily presage restrictions on the applicability of Rule IOb5 likely to be articulated in future
cases, this particular observation
seems of little moment: The Court
acknowledged the fact that, both at
common law and in early SEC enforcement actions, insiders who

established that an ,independent duty
to disclose exists in any nondisclosure case. And, the Court held that
such a duty could arise only if the defendant is an · insider, or a fiduciary,
or a person having "a relationship of
trust and confidence" with the other
parties to the transaction. 31
In this context, the Court noted
that a noninsider who buys stock
without disclosing material, nonpublic, information could only be held to
have a relationship of trust and confidence with shareholders if the noninsider is an agent of, or somehow un-
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"by reason of their inside position
with that corporation."'"
Strict Test
Nevertheless , the Court laid down
a rather stringent test, restricting the
imposition of Rule IOb-5 liability for
mere silence , unless it could first be
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dertakes to act on behalf of, the sellers.
Of significance here is the implicit
view of the Court that, at least in silence cases, both privity and reliance
are essential elements of a Rule IOb-5
cause of action. 32 Thus, the Court
took pains to note that Rule 1Qb,5 "liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence beflveen parties

to a transaction ."'"

the
relationship
between
parties ... " 3 5
In part, this aspect of the· Court's
opinion will make it difficult , if not
(as a practical matter) virtually impossible, for ttie SEC or private litigants to apply Rule IOb-5 to most
noninsider cases involving mere silence or inaction. Conceivably, the
failure of non insiders to disclose certain kinds of market information in a
face-to-face transaction might be actionable,>• but the Court certainly
did not offer would-be plaintiffs any
encouragement in that regard.
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duct by the primary tortfeasor; and
(3) the alleged rendition, by the aider
and abettor, of "substantial assis'
tance" to the primary tortfeasor." 8
Of course, as recent cases make
clear, the standards for imposing liability on aiders and abettors may
surely not be less stringent than the
standards for imposing liability upon
a primary tortfeasor in comparable
circumstances?• Thus, Chiarella
certainly suggests that, in the absence of some affirmative and pre-existing relationship between an alleged,
aider and abettor and those who were

allegedly injured by the aider and
abettor's silence or inaction, Rule
lOb-5 liability simply may not exist.••
This conclusion may also apply to
the potential liability of corporate attorneys who offer securities Jaw advice to their corporate clients. Where
false opinion letters have been given,
and investors are made aware of
those opinions, liability under Rule
lOb-5 has not been deemed inappropriate, and may still not be inappropriate even after the Chiarella decision ."•
But, a different result may obtain
where a corprate lawyer does not
take what the SEC may view as appropriate steps to require his or her
corporate clients to make full disclosure or to redress past disclosure violations. Assuming that the lawyer's
specific presence on the corporate
scene and the lawyer's advice to the
client are unknown to investors, as is
often the case, the imposition of Rule
lOb-5 liability after Chiarella seems
doubtful. Of such lawyers it surely
could be said, as the Court said of
Mr. Chiarella: they "had no prior
dealings with" investors who might
sell stock; they are not persons "in
whom the sellers [have] placed their
trust and confidence;" and they are,
"in fact, ... complete stranger[s) to
the tran saction" with no relationship
to investors ."
Presumably, in such a situation,
the SEC might argue that, if a primary tortfeasor' s violation has been established, the concept of aiding and
abetting should not require the government to establish a pre-existing relationship between a corporate attorney and the. corporation's shareholders . And, the SEC might urge that
corporate shareholders are also the
corporate attorney's clients.
Whatever moral appeal this line of
argument has had for the SEC, however, it cannot be gainsaid that the
Chiarella decision requires a major
reevaluation of that theory's underpinnings. An attorney who is inactive
or silent after a client rejects the attorney' s advice arguably has in no
way induced any securities transaction or caused any party to a particular securities transaction to take action in reliance upon the attorney's
silence. And, it is doubtful whether
common law would have held such

'

,

an attorney
fraud."

liable

for

securities

Equal Access
The Chiarella case is significant
also because of its rejection of a theory often relied upon by the SEC"that Rule IOb-5 is designed to preserve the integrity of the securities
"market as a whole" by fostering "a
system providing equal access" to
material. nonpublic, information•• In
a sweeping passage of its opinion, the
Court refused to endorse the imposition of a generic duty under Rul!! IOb5 to the securities marketplace , and
refused, further, to conclude that all
instances of unequal ·access to, or all
unfair or undisclosed uses of, material, nonpublic, information, are necessarily unlawful.
In the absence of the existence of a
clear duty between a buyer and seller
that "arises from a specific relationship between two parties," 46 the
Court refused to formulate "such a
broad duty, which departs radically
from ... established [common law]
doctrine ... ," and for which there is
no supporting "evidence [that]
emerges from the language or legislative history of§ IO(b).""
Despite its obviOus and inevitable
negative impact on the SEC's future
enforcement program, though, the
Chiarella decision is not completely
adverse to the government. The decision certainly does suggest (although
it does not precisely so hold)' 8 the
Court's approval of the application of
Rule IOb-5 to insiders who do not disclose material facts they have learned
as a result of their inside positions, as
had been in the Cady, Roberts'" and
Texas Gulf Sulphur•• cases.
And, the Court also seems to accept (although, again, it does not expressly so hold) that "tippees" of corporate insiders may be held liable,
under Rule IOb-5, for a failure to disclose nonpublic, material , inside information , but only where the tippees
(I) receive a profit (2) from the use of
inside information (3) that the tippee
knows is confidential and (4) that the

The impact Chiarella is
expected to have on aiding
and abetting cases is even
more significant.
tippee knows or should have known
came from a corporate insider ' '
Although the Court did not, in so
many words, embrace these holdings , it seems to have accepted them ,
removing any lingering doubts about
the SEC's authority to pursue traditional insider securities fraud. Moreover, as noted earlier, the Court encouraged the SEC to utilize its broad
rulemaking authority to proscribe
other market-related conduct the
agency believes is detrimental to the
integrity and proper functioning of
the securities market s."
It is difficult, if not impossible , to
avoid reading current Supreme Court
securities law decisions either too
broadly or too narrowly, depending
on the reader's affiliation, perspective and institutional biases . But .
surely no one could disagree that the
Chiarella decision is both substantively significant and materially ad-

verse to the SEC's expansive use and
reliance upon Rule IOb-5 to cope with
securities-related activities it finds
objectionable.
Although the Supreme court continues to refer to Rule IOb-5 as a
"catchall,"" such references seem
now to be artificial and inaccurate .
And, in light of the result in Chiarella, it must be wondered whether the
SEC's decision to support the grant
of a writ of certiorari in the Aaron
case was a strategic error."
As between Rule IOb-5 and the
commission, the former seems these
days to be catching very lillie, and
the latter seems to be a "catch-all"
for the brunt of the Supreme Court's
antagonism toward broad readings of
the general antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws. After
twenty-three decisions in less than
five years, it does not seem to be a
process that is likely to abate anytime
soon, in the absence of congressional
action.
1

48 U.S.L.W. 4250 (U.S., Mar. 18, 1980) .
In add ition to the Chiarelfa decision, the
Court has rendered the following twenty·two
securities·related decisions: Boeing Co. v.
Van Gemert, 48 U.S.L.W. 4127 (U.S .. Feb.
19, 1980); Transamerica Morlgage Advisors,
Inc . v. Lewis, 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S .. Nov.
13, 1979); Leroy v. Great Weslem Uniled
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Touche Ro,-s &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 ( 1979) ; Unit·
ed States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979);
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U .S. 471 (1979);/nterna·
Iiana/ Brotherhood of Teamsler.s v. Daniel,
439 U.S. 551 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co ..
In c. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); S.curities
and Exchange Commission v. Sloan. 436
U.S. 103 (1978); £.1. DuPont deNemours and
Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977); Santa Fe
lndustrit-s. In c. v. Gr~en, 430 U.S. 462
(1977) ; Piper v. Chris-Craft lnduslries, Inc .,
430 U.S. I (1977); TSC Industries. In c. v.
Northway, In<·., 425 U.S. 438 ( 1976); Radwn·
ower v. Touche Ross & Co .. 426 U.S. 148
(1976); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 ( 1976); Foremosi-McKennsnn, Inc . v.
Provident Securities Co., 423 U.S. 232 ( 1976) ;
United States v. Na1ional Association of Securities Dealers, In c .. 422 U.S . 694 (1975);
Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc .,
422 U.S. 659 (1975); Rondeau v. Mosinee Pa·
per Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); United Hous·
ing Foundation In c. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837
( 1975): Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Securities Investor Proteclion Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975).
.
2 See, e.g., Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the

Williams A ct A/ler Chris-Craft: A Leaky Ship
on Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. Law. 117, 120.
162 , 162 (1978); cited with approval in Can·
non v. University of Chicago. 441 U.S. 677,
47 U.S.L.W. 4549, 4554 n. 24 1979).
3

See Santa Fe Indus., In c. v. Green, 430

U.S. 462 ( 1977) (to be actionable under Rul e
IOb-5. an alleged fraudulent transaction must
invol ve either deception or manipulation; the
mere breach of a fiduciary duty is simp ly insufficient); United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 76R (1979) (the antifraud provisions of
Securities Act § 17(a) are lobe applied broad·
ly to protect any class of victims, and not just
investors).
4

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor DrttK Stores,

421 U.S. 723 (1975) (only an actual purcha<er
or <Jeller of securities ha s s tanding to maintain
an implied damage ac tion under Rule 10b·5):
Piper v. Chri.f-Craftlndustries, In c .. 430 U.S.
I ( 1977); (a defeated lender offeror lack s
standing to maintain an implied damage ac~
tion under Securith:s Exchange Act 14(e)) .
5 Trnn.wmrrica MortRORt' Advisors, In c. v.
Lewis, 48 U.S.L.W. 4001 (U.S .. Nov. 13 .
1979) (no damage remedy may be impli ed for
violations of the antifraud provisions of the
Inve stme nt Advisers Act of 1940); 1fJuche
Ross & Co. v. RediiiRtOII, 442 U.S. 560 ( 1979)
(no private damage action may be implied for
violation'i of Securities Exchange Act Section
17(a)) .
"Ernst & Ern>·t v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976) (Scienter is a necessary element of
the plaintiff s affirmative case in an implied
damage action under Rule 10b·5); TSC Indus·
trie.f, In c. v. Nortlrwlly, In c: .. 426 U.S. 438
( 1978) (defining the co ncep t of "materiality"
for purposes of an implied damage action un-

(venue for purposes of securities antifraud
suits against nation!:tl banks).

8 United /lousing Foundation In c. v. Formun, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shares of "stock"
in a cooperative housing project are not secu~
rities); lnlernatimwl Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Du11il'l, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (involun·

21 H.R. Rep . No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess . 5 (1934); S. Rep. No . 792. 73d Cong.,
2d Ses.. 6 (1934) . Of course. there is no
meaningful legislative history of Section tO(b)
at all. and there exists somewhat negative administrative hi story surrounding the adoption
of Rule 10b·5, suggesting thai Rule IOb-5 was
intended lo fulfill only limited purposes. Su
Securities Exchange Acl Release No. 3230
(May 21, 1942) , 13 Fed. 1/eg. 8t83 (Dec. 22,
1948) .
22 See, t.g., Pitt, An SEC Insider's View of

tary. noncontributory, pension plan interests
are not securities).

the UJility of Privale Litigation Undtr the
Federal Securities Laws, 5 Sec. Reg. L. J. l

Securitie.~

der
7

Exchange Act Rule 14a-9) .

Lnoy v. Great Western UniJed Corp.,

443 U.S. 173 (1979) (venue for purposes of
challenging state takeover law s); Radzanown
v. Touche fl oss & Co .. 426 U.S. 148 (1976)

Despite its obvious negative
impact on the SEC's future
enforcement, the decision is
not completely adverse.

Mountuin States Securilies Corp., 282 F.2d
195, 201 (C.A. 5, 1960), certiorari denied, 365
U.S. 814 (1961). But see Frigitemp Corp. v.
Financial Dynamic::r Fund, In c., 524 F. 2d
275, 282 (C.A . 2, 1975).
20.

Superintendent of lnsuraru:e v. Ban/..ers

Life & Casualty Co .. 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971);
Affilialed U1e Ci1iuns v. Uniled Slates, 406
U.S. 128. 151 (1972); cf. United States v.
Na(talill, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979).

1

29

30
31

32

where the Court set forth the facts and back- ·
ground of lhe case in 21 pages, 430 U.S. at 121.
11
48 U.S .L.W. al 4253 n. 20 (emphasis
suprlied).
!d., al 4251.
13
!d., al 4253.

453. 465 ( 1969) .
" 48 U .S.L. W. al 4253 n . 20 (emphasis
supr,lied).
' This conclusion, which focuses on due
process and fair notice , thus does not upset ,
but appropriately circumscribes, the vener·
able notion that the choice between atl hoc
adjudication and rulem'aking is a choice that
lies primarily within the inrormed discretion
of the agency. See Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
209 ( 1947) . Compare Securities and Exchange
Commission, Final Report of Jhe SEC Major
Issues Conference l-3 (Jan. 15, 1977) (SEC
should rely more on rulemaking and interpretive guidance and less on ad hoc enforcement
activities).
17
48 U.S.L.W. al 4251, 4252 & n . 14 ,
4253.
•• !d., al 4253.
19 See, e.!(., A .T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow,
375 F.2d 393. 397 (C.A. 2, 1967); Myze l v.
Fields. 386 F.2d 718,739 (C.A. 8, 1967), cer·
1iorari dtnil'd, 390 U.S. 951 (1%8); flo optr v.

Civil Liabilities under the Fedeml Securities
Laws at 308-341 (Univ. of Calif. Outline, Jan.

28

Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., supra,

See Securities and Exchangt Commission v. Na1ional Securities, Inc ., 393 U.S.

J

16·18 , 1980) .
2
' 48 U.S.L.W. al 4252.
28 The Court seemingly holds that no cause
of action can ever be predicated upon market
information that does ''not concern the earning power or operations of the target com·
par:rld: ." 48 U.S.L.W. at 4252.

"Park/an• liosi"y Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979) (contested adjudication of factual
matters against a defendant in SEC litigation
collaterally estops the same defendant from
contesting the samt facts in subsequent private litigation) .
10 In Chiarella, the Court summarized the
operative facts in three paragraphs . Compare

14

(1977).
23
United Swtes v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp.
95 (S.D. N.Y.), affirmed. 588 F.2d 1358 (C.A.
2, 1978) .
24
See, e.g., Pitt, Judicial Developments in

;

!d., at 4251 n . 5.
ld .. at 4251.
!d. (emphasis supplied).
!d., al 4252.
· ·

The Court seemingly ruled out the same
requirements in affirmative misrepresentation
cases . Su 48 U.S.L.W. al 4251.
33
!d., al 4252 (emphasis supplied).
34

35
36
37

!d.
!d. , al 4252 n. 14.
See n. 26, supra.
See Ernst & Ernst v. flochfelder, 425

U.S. 185 , 191 n. 7 (1976).
38

See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth , Eastma11 Dillon

& Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38, 44·46 (C.A. 2), c"tiorari denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
39
See, t.g., Edwards & Hanly v. Wells
Fargo Securities Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d
478, 484 (C.A. 2, 1979). certiorari denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3463 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84,
95

'\,c.;:·u\.'t~: at 4252.

,

41
See, e.g. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535

(C.A. 2, 1973) .
2
'
48 U .S.L. W. al 4252.
43
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts
§876 (1979).
"48 U.S . L.W. al 4252.

"Id.
6
' Td., at 4252-4253.
"!d., al 4253.

\

8

48 U.S.L.W. at 4251.
9
' Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961) .
'

$O Securities and Exchangt Commission v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (C.A.
2, 1968) (en bam.:), certiorari denied, sub
nom., Coates v. Securities and Exchange
CummiS>·ion, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
~ 1 lei., at 4252 n. 12. See also, Securities
ami Exchange Commission v. Monarch
Fund, 608 F.2d 938 (C. A. 2, 1979).
"48 U.S.L.W. al 4253 & nn. 15- 18.
.a Td .. al 4253.
54
Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Aaron. 605 F.2d 612 (2nd Cir.) certiorari
granted 48 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S., Ocl. 15,

1979) .
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After an appropriate gestation period, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has given birth to Rule
J4e-3, 1 which is both the latest in the
SEC's efforts to regulate tender offers
and the commission's .resp'o nse to the
Supreme Court's. decision in the
Chiarella case. 2
Rule 14e-3 . has four principal provisions:
..,.. It imposes a duty ·to "disclose or
refrain" from trading, or causing oth' ers to trade, in securities which may
be subject to a tender offer, on any
person who has material, non-public
. information about the offer or proposed offer if the person knows or has
reason to know that the information
has been obtained directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target, or their
respective insiders. (Rule 14e-3(a).)
,. The rule provides an exemption
from its .broad reach for multi-service
financial institutions, such as brokerdealer firms and banks, which are organized so that the institution's buy/
sell decisions are made by employees
who arc msulatcd trom mtormat1on
held by other parts of the firm which,
as :\l.lv\set"s to t c o cror or the target

or otherwise, acquire material, nonpublic information about a tender offer.
To take. advantage of this exemption, the institution must carry the
burden of showing both that the investment decision-makers had no actual knowledge of the non-public information and that the institution has
implemented procedures which are
"reasonable
under the circumstances" to prevent seepage of material information between departments. (Rule 14e-3(b).)
Jll> Rule 14e-3 also exempts from its
reach sales made to the· offeror or its
agents, although existing restrictions

· of Rtlle 14e-3, the commission makes the Court quite properly recognized, stinging
no bones about the fact that it is in- as numerous commentators have access r
tended as a direct response to the Su- done, the much greater conceptual· Circuit t
preme Court's decision in Chiarella. and public policy difficulties which mission
Nine pages of the 42-page release are are inherent in imposing liability for to engra
directed to an analysis-some would non-disclosure of market information tion the<
. say a revision-of the majority opin- which docs not originate with the is- been en<
suer or an insider who has fiduciary ly being
ion in Chiarella.
duties
to the issuer and its .sharehold- aged in;
In that case, Mr. Chiarella, a finanrules su<
cial printer's employee who had de- ers.
The emphasized language in the
No do
ciphered the identity of five tender offer targets on the basis of his own ' commission's footnote is an attempt plicit inc:;
sleuthing in the print shop, purchased to square the SEC's position with the al autho
shares of the targets to his profit. The (:ourt's holding by assuming away the ·rule in t
Supreme Court held that he could not most C:ifficult question 'in market in- provisio
sion ha!
§IO(b) b
rulemak
rers unc

In its characteiistically 1-/uberesqtte release announcing
. adoption of Rule 14e-3, the commission makes no
bones about thefact that it is inte,nded as a direct
response to· the Supreme Court's decision in 'Chiarella'.
.
'

be sent to jail for criminal violation
of §lOb of the Securitie.s and --Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule tOb-5.
The Court held that Mr. Chiarella
owed no duty · to the sellers of the
shares, who were strangers to him, to
break h1s Silence as to tne reasons for
his purchases.
In the words of Jn sti ce Powell, the
author of the majority op1:1!on,
"When an allegation of fraud is based
upon nondisclosure. there can be no
fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold
that a duty to disclose under §lO(b)
does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic me!rket information."4 (Emphasis supplied.)
Although the Court itself indicated
that its holding was not intended to
undercut true insider trading or insider tippee cases such as Cady, Rob- ·
erts 5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur 6 and the
Court preserved the reach of § IOb-5
in cases involving fiduciaries who
trade with their beneficiaries ,7 the
SEC apparently is not satisfied with

ments. 1 ~

Thus,
disclose
as to "n
[a] tend
mation'
reason t
,;::m:l
01~ indin
formation cases-is there a duty to get, or s
one of tl
disclose?
These
short of
· Flirtation with Equal Access
even in
It is clear from the · footnote just ample,
quoted and another 1ootnote the re- . not rca
leasc 0 that the commission, or at least custo
th e members of the staff ·.vho wrote an issu
the rel ease, have not given up on their fi>r a tc
flirtation with a general rule requiring ysis of
equal access to all kinds of material tion. N
. information, whether true inside the tra
("corporate") information or market tender
information.
Undeterred by the Supreme Court's
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After an appropriate gestation period, the Securities and Exchange
Commission has given birth to Rule
14e-3, 1 which is both the latest in the
SEC's efforts to regulate tender offers
and the commission's resp.onse to the
Supreme Court's. decision in the
Chiarella case. 2
Rule 14e-3. has four principal provisions:
.., It imposes a duty to "disclose or
refrain" from trading, or causing oth' ers to trade, in securities which may
be subject to a tender offer, on any
person who has matetial, non-public
. information about the offer or proposed offer if the person knows or has
reason to know that the information
has been obtained directly or indirectly from the offeror, the target, or their
respective insiders. (Rule 14e-3(a).)
I:!> The rule provides an exemption
from its broad reach for multi-service
financial institutions, such as brokerdealer firms and banks, which are organized so that the institution's buy/
sell decisions are made by employees
who are msulatcd tram mtormauon
held by other parts of the firm which,
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It is clear from the · footnote just
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In its characteristically Huberesque releas~ announcing
. adoption of Rule 14e-3; the commission makes no
bones about thefact that it is intended as a direct
response to· the Supreme Court's decision in 'Chiarella'.
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· of Rule 14e-3, the commission makes the Court quite propeih recognized,
no bones about the fact that it is in- as numerous commentators have
tended as a direct response to the Su- done, the much greater conceptual
preme Court's decision in Chiarella. and public policy difficulties which
Nine pages of the 42-page release are are inherent in imposing liability for
directed to an analysis-some would non-disclosure of market information
.say a revision-of the majority opin- which docs not originate with the issuer or an insider who has fiduciary
ion in Chiarella.
In that case , Mr. Chiarella, a finan- duties to the issuer and its .shareholdcial printer's employee who had de- ers.
The emphasized language in the
ciphered the identity of five tender offer targets on the basis of his own ' commission's footnote is an attempt
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Wbat is the Ans,ver to Greater
· Freedom to Practice Lalv?
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, non- author of the maJonty opinion, the release, have not given up on their for a tender on the basis of his analder of- "When an allegation of fraud is based flirtation with a general rule requiring ysis of published _financial informa- ·
upon nondisclosure. there can be no equal access to all kinds of material tion. Nor presumably would it reach
exemp- fraud absent a duty to speak. We hold . information, whether · true inside the tradei: who discerns a - possible ry the that a duty to disclose under § lO(b) ("corporate") information or market tender from his close tracking of mar- ·
the in- does not arise from the mere posses- information.
Continued on page 24
no ac- sion of nonpublic mcrket informaUndeterred by the Supreme Court's
blic in- tion." 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
on has
Although the Court itself indicated
ch are that its holding was not intended to
ircum- undercut true insider trading or insidf mate- er tippee cases such as Cady, Rob-·
depart- erts 5 and Texas Gulf Sulphur 6 and the
Court preserved the reach of §IOb-5
rom its in cases involving fiduciaries who
r or its trade with their beneficiaries/ the
ictions SEC apparently is not satisfied with
tivities this more than half a loaf result.
JOb-13.
Clearly signaling its displeasure
LECi-AL A .D MINISTRATORS
3(c).)
with Chiarella in its Rule 14c-3 rcst con- lease, the commission makes an at1800 PICKWICK AVENUE I GLENVIEW, I L 60025 I 312, 724-7700
shes a tempt to re'Vise the Court's gpmton.
ng"; it Fo?-~xample, in an -extraordinary
of rna- footnote that flies in the face of the
elating plain language of the Court's holding,
n (even the commission asserts that the
he tar- ·~court in Chiarella did not distinguish
is rea- between corporate and market inforIs the general admmistration of your firm including the financial management,
motivation of employees, delegation of work, and selection ·o f equipment being done
ommu- · mation where there exists a duty to
(or not do:1c) by one or more.attorneys of your firm in their spare moments?
viola- disclose such information or abstain
on the from trading. Nor does the CommisHave yvu given any consideration to employing a trained administrator who could
disclo- sion believe that any such distinction
perform all these tasks-and more-thereby allowing your attorneys to practice law
again?
son to is 2ppropriate, since both corporate
om the and market information may be rnaThe
Capital Chapter of the Association of Legal Administrators provides its members
es pee- terial to an investment decision. "R
with educational infom1ation, the latest data on equipment, and acts as a vital source
ng for (Emphasis supplied.)
center on information regarding implementation and maintenance of management
d faith ·
To say that the Supreme Court did
and much more.
systems
ion to, not distinguish between corporate inJf you arc cottsidcring an Administrator who would play a key role in planning,
he tar- formation. which is true inside infororganizing, :~ 10tivating, and innovating fun .::tions necessary for conducting your
empt.) mation originating with the iss11Cr, and
business, wrilc or call Mr. Dick Hrcbik, Chairman, Public Relations Committee,
market information, such as a tender
Capital Chapter, Association of Legal Administrators, 1735 Eye Street, N.W.
Wn~hin~ton, D.C. 20006 I R61-3R68.
offeror's intentions, is nonsense. ThC' .
urt
Court clearly knew the difference, as
Contact ALA TODAY?
Huber- the above-quoted statement from Jusdoption tice Powell's opinion indicates, and
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The new rule will, however, reach
the Chiarcllas of the world who receive inforrnation-cvcn purloined information-directly or indirectly from
the offeror or the target, or someone
acting for one of them. And the rule
will reach through each link of a chain
of tippers and tippees, even those who
have no association with or other duty
to the offeror or target, so long as they
know or have reason to know that the
source of the non-public information
was the offeror or target or one related to them.
The breadth of Rule 14e-3 raises
very real difficulties for arbitrageurs
and others who trade on the basis of
rumors on the street about an impending tender or a new development in
an ongoing offer. At least one recent
decision in a respected circuit, SEC
v. Monarch Fund, 13 has strongly suggested that once street rumors become widespread, the duty to disclose
disappears.
When can a trader who has had no
direct contact with either the offeror
or the target or any of their fiduciaries, but who has heard persistent rumors of an impending tender, safely
act? When does he have "reason to
know" that the rumor~ have originated with the offeror or the target? Neither Rule 14c-3 nor the release which

Breadth of the Rule

ket activity in the target issuer's
stock.

s
cl{at Court

providing a fc<.1eral cause oFact1on tor
breaches of such standards, including

aaorncvs i
eral Co.uns
of this artic
1 Sec Se
14970 (July
"See Se
16104 (Au
1979).
3 See, fo
S-K.
4
·
For ex
the commi
quired for
tween two
is a commo
cent. ·
' Report
Corporate
change Co
terstate an
1st Sess. D
"Rule I4
7 435 U.
8 The
Board's St

announces it offer any real help in an- marketplace is extended further by
the anti-tipping provisions of Rule
swering such questions.
Although the commission does not 14e-3(d) which, subject to limited exacknowledge the Monarch Fund prin- ceptions for those involved in "good
ciple-or the common sense logic on faith" communications in making or
which it is based-in its release on responding to the· offer, prohibit any
Rule 14e-3, it implicitly rejects it by person from passing on material, nonemphasizing that there must be formal public information about the tender
public disclosure ''by press release or offer if it is reasonably foreseeable
otherwise" by the would-be trader or that a violation of Rule l4e-3 may resomeone else before the duty to re- sult.
Thus, the new rule would reach the
frain from trading disappears. If the
commission's view is correct, then in intermediate tippee' even though he
practice no one can safely trade on himself does not act upon or even
Standard~
the basis of street rumors-even of bcncflt fron~ the information he passes tains the a
. the most persistent kind, since rumors on so long as he has reason to know ncr in whic
are always likely to originate with the it originated wi!;1 the issuer or the tar- counted for
9 Rule !4
offeror or the target-until a formal get, or their respective affiliates, emof various
public announcement is made by the ployees or advisers, and he can fore- aays prior
see that his hearer or someone farther how many
offeror or the target.
In considering the chilling effect of down the line may trade on the basis record-hol
o
the new rule, it is important to remem- of the information. Although in its re- beneficial
10
Securi
ber that it relates to material tender lease the commission rather primly .
15385 (Dec
offer information of all types, not just states that the "rule is not intended
11
The re
the knowledge that a tender is to have an irnpact on casual and in- the issue o
molivated
social
dis- ercising th
planned. Thus, information as to a nocently
change in price, an extension ·of the course,"14 there is nothing in the lan- to obtain t
pie, pensio
offer, or an intention to abandon the guage of the rule to suggest any such interest in
12
offer would all be subject to the "dis- limitation, even if innocence and soOne e
close or refrain" obligation. And the cial discourse were not mutually ex- quirements
rule takes effect from the time that clusive concepts, at least on Wall companies.
13 S. 256
any offeror has "taken a substantial Street.
14 H.R.
step or steps to commence" the offer,
The commission's example of an
thus presumably covering even such application of the anti-tipping rule is
events as an oJTcr which is approved sure to slow the normal pre-tender of(or perhaps even only considered) by fer rumor mill, at least among wella would-be offeror's board but aban- advised securities professionals: "For
doned before being made or an- exa'Tlple, a person who receives such
nounced.
The reach of Rule 14e-3 into the
Continl'ed on page 29 ·

le

deems it prcmat1Jrc to recommend the
adoption of legislation since many or

C Tender Offe

Continued from page 19

s

power courl'i lo grant litigation expenses to the prevailing party.

In short, in the tender offer area,
.the commission has come as close to
a general equal access rule as it dares
in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella. And in its release
announcing the rule, the SEC has
made it clear th_at it may go farther
still; it threatens to take the more controversial step of prohibiting pre-announcement purchases by a possible
offeror. 17
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clearly show that no harm was done ella was d
in the case at bar, it must also show · for disting
that its procedures are adequate in informatio
information from the offering person
general.
intrinsic t
such as a broker dealer not involved
This curious double-teaming be- fo rmation.
in the tender offer will violate Rule
tra ys a mistrust · of judicial process- that Loss
l4e-3 If he communicates such infores, 18 and a misconce~tion of the prop- context of
mation to another person under cirer use of anti-fraud rules by the com- liability o
cumstances where it .is reasonably
mission. The commission is unwilling and their d
foreseeable that the other person will
to settle for a practical case-by-case, use of eit
trade on the basis of the information
or such other person will tip somean·e
no harm/no foul exception. Instead it formation.
uses the 14e-3(b) exemption to apply feror or h
else." (Emphasis supplied.) 15
•
•
•
•
This little horrible presents the
Mulh-Scrvtce Insbtuhons
pressure on broker-dealer firms and derive ma
. specter of A, a b:oker who overhears
Although the commission's some- ba nks to develop a nu implement poli- insider so
the offeror's banker discussing a pos- what Calvinistic approach in Rule cies and procedures designed to pre- with the v
sible tender at his club, passing the 14e-3 can be criticized, the SEC de- vent information flow. Thus, what such pers
rumor of the impending offer on to B, serves praise for including, in both the purports to be an anti-fraud rule de- disclose
his brother-in-law, who in turn tells November 1979 proposal and in the signed to assure market integrity is Comments
· C, a business associate, who buys rule as adopted , the exception, in also used as a tool to regulate the the code .
In Rule
shares of the target , with the result Rule . I4e-3(b), which permits multi- structure and procedures of market
some of t
that A and B may both be held to have service financial institutions to contin- · institutions.
Although the SEC's release com- release an
violated Rule 14e-3 e·ven though nei- ue to serve two masters so long as mather had any finuciary duty to the tar- terial information known to those ad- ments on the presently utilized "Chi- SEC is st
get or to the offeror and neither prof- vising the parties to a tender offer in nese Wall" and res:ricted list proce- ward posit
ited from the information they passed one part of the institution is not made dures, it notes that neither is perfect drawn by t
on. Shades of Johnny Carson's wife's available to the investment decision- and refuses to concede that, alone or a/la and t
together, they are necessarily ade- statutory
masseuse.16
makers elsewhere in the firm.
The burden of qualifying . for the quate to assure qualification for the the Federa
With . Rule l4e-3, the SEC has
adopted a rule that goes well beyond 14e-3(b) . exemption is a tough one, second test of the 14e-3(b) exemption.
the traditional bases of the anti-fraud however. The insti tution must show, The commission even suggests that
rules. In reaching intermediate tippers first, that its traders had no actual institutions employing the "Chinese
' Propose
and tippees and those who receive in- knowledge of material tenJer offer in ~ Wall" proced ure may have special comment , al
formation from the offeror, it reaches . formation in the particular casc· and, disclo ~ ure obligations to their invest- · offer propos
1979), 44 Fe
persons who have no fiduciary rela- second, that the institution has placed ment advisory clients since; by defi- rule
wa s ad
tionship with the target or its share- ' in effect reasonable procedures to en- nition, these clients will not have the 4, 1980), 45
2 Chiarell
_ .holder~·wno have engaged in no mar- sure that forbidden flows of informa- benefit of all of the institution's
Ct. 1108,48
kct manipulation or rigging. and who tion will not occur in any case. In oth- knowledge.
3
Release
The commission' s hesitancy should
· er words, even if the institution can
. have made no misstatement.
bears the u
serve as fair warning to those who ad- drafting sty
~
' " , ,, ···« •. 1 vise multi-service institutions . as to ciate direct
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·Among the better corporate
investments in today's market is the
acquisition of fine art. Few other .
investments offer the appreciation .__..
opportunities and none will be as gratifying
in your environment.
H.H. Leonards, Inc., Art consultant
and dealer, offers many flexible programs
including decorating consultation, rotating
collections, private exhibitions, museum
framing and exclusive representation of
several European artists whose work offers
attractive growth potenti~ at current prices.
Call H. H. Leonards for an
evaluation and proposal.

2020 "0" St., N.W
Vvbshington, D.C. 20036
(202) 659-8787

ANEART ·

H.H.lfONARDS INC.,

Affiliated
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Federal Securities Code
The approach taken in Rule 14c-3
is particularly interesting in light of ·
the commission's recently announced
.support of . the American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, which ·
deals somewhat differently wl'th insider and tippee liability. While § 1603 of
th e proposed code would impose liability on intermediate tippers and tippees if they knowingly have received
material information directly or indirectly from the issuer or a corporate
insider, it provides a defense, not
"Seen.IO
present in Rule 14e-3(b), where it
12 Sections
would be "inequitable" to impose li- Excha nge Ac
13 SEC v.
ability. The drafters of the code sperent]
Fed. Se
cifically declined to impose liability
96, 338 (2d Ci
on an outsider who is not a tippee
14
Release
1
from an insider.
• Ibid.
10
Thus, the code would not impose
Securitie
liability for non-disclosure with re- National K
.N.Y. Ju
spect to pre-announcement purchases (S.D
17
Release
by a prospective tender offeror, or by
18 The com
an analyst who has dug out informa- dicial fact-fin
tion on his own which is not yet pub- by n . 43 at p
licly available. See Comment 3(d) to the following
person attem
§ 1603 of the code. (That is not to say ability
of the
that the code would not permit the institution ha
commission to ad0pt a rule , like Rule ing tha t its t
l4e-3, that reaches ~orne of such per- of the ma teri
stances unde
sons.)
able to ass um
The code's reporter, Professor kers(s) did no
Louis Loss, does agree with the SEC
Lewi s Carr
staff (although he wrote before Chiar- at the SEC .

128 (1972). A
tion them, pr
manipulation,
nor.-insiders
Rule !Ob-5. S
F.2d 1261 (9
Refocu ses on
Times, Jan. 2
8 Release 3
uSee n. 3
which says, "
continue to c
tiatives in the
public inform
10
S ee 48
Court said,
duty, which
lished doctrin
relationship
not be under
dence of co
supplied.)
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control procedures should be studied
and compared with those used by other institutions; procedures should be
carefully documented and should be
approved by outside counsel and,
where possible, by knowledgeable independent directo:-s; and the e~fec
tiveness of such procedures should be
monitored on a regular basis.
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t 848.
includes within the tippee category all persons who obtain from a
e material nonpublic information that they have reason to know
"improperly by selective revelation or otherwise." Investors
., 44 S .E.C. 633, 641 (1971). See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
833, 852-53 (zd Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976

.

f materiality is whether a reasonable investor would consider the
portant in determining his course of action. See SEC v. Texas
o., 401 F .zd 833, 849 (zd Cir. rg68) (en bane), cert. denied, 394

be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
ns or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
cility of any national securities exchange,
mploy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
ght of the circumstances under which they are made, not misor
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
with the purchase or sale of any security.
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). For
tary on the rule, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1421-74
6 id. at 3526-70; A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD-SEC
974); A. JAcoss, THE IMPACT oF RULE rob-s (1978).
insiders include officers, directors, and certain employees of the
e, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F .2d 833, 847-57
(en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), and controlling
ee, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8, 828-29

ent of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.rob-5
le states:

ell-established that rule rob-s 1 prohibits corporate
rom trading in their company's securities on the basis
l 3 nonpublic information obtained while performing
rate duties. Such individuals must either disclose the
:mation to the investing public, or refrain from buyling.4 A duty to disclose or abstain from trading has
mposed on the tippees of corporate insiders, 5 and on
ms who, because of a special relationship with the
Joration, are privy to its internal affairs. 6 In United

United States v. Chiarella

'HE APPLICATION OF RULE 10b-5
TO "MARKET INSIDERS":
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MARKET INSIDERS

Noel & Co., 43 S.E.C. 1o8o, 1081--86 (1969) (underwrite
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.zd 787, 796 (2d Cir. 196
quires information in course of negotiations with corporation
u.s. 822 (1970).
7
588 F.2d 1358 (zd Cir. 1978) , cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W.
1979) (No. 78-1202).
8
588 F .2d at 1365.
9
!d. at 1363.
10
SEC v. Chiarella, No. 77 Civ. 2534 (S.D.N.Y. May
decrees had previously been entered against printers engaged
to Chiarella's. See SEC v. Manderano [1978 Transfer Binder]
(CCH) U 96,357 (D.N.J .); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc.
fer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) U 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 197
Ayoub [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
(CCH) u95,034 (S.D.N.Y. I976).
11 588 F.2d at 1364. Chiarella was convicted of willful
nonpublic information under § 32(a), the penalty provisio

States v. Chiarella, 1 the Court of Appeals for the
imposed the duty on an individual who obtain
from a source outside the issuing company, holdi
who regularly receives material nonpublic inform
to a disclosure obligation. 8
Vincent Chiarella was an employee of a fi
firm. During r97S and r976 , he helped prepare
five companies contemplating takeover bids. T
fidentiality, the names of the tender offerors a
panies were kept coded until the final press run.
however, Chiarella deduced the name of the t
from information contained in the documents,
shares of its stock. As soon as public announceme
offer precipitated a price increase, he sold the
stantial profit. 9 In early r977 , the SEC and C
into a consent decree in which Chiarella agree
profits. 10 A year later he was convicted of wi
material nonpublic information.U The Second
the conviction. 12
In his opinion for the majority, Chief Jud
acknowledged that Chiarella was not an insider o
whose securities he traded. He noted, however,
is based "on the justifiable expectation of the se
place that all investors trading on impersonal
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1365 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833,
) (en bane), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
1365.
tiona! support for his decision to impose a duty to disclose,
fman argued that members of the class of "market insiders"
rred from trading under the American Law Institute's Federal
88 F.2d at 1365 (citing ALI FED. SEC. ConE §§ 16o2-1603 &
'roposed Official Draft 1978)). He also claimed that "[a] duty
out of regular access to market information is not a stranger
lb-s," 588 F.2d at 1366 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
r28 (1972) (disclosure obligation imposed on bank that had
transfer agent for shares of a corporation)). In his dissent,
ticized Chief Judge Kaufman's interpretation of the Federal
td Affiliated Ute. 588 F.2d at 1374-75 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
s Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1976), imposes disclosure
would-be tender offerors whenever they purchase more than
of their prospective targets. Below this limit, tender offerors
in their target's stock without announcing their intentions. See
ndus. v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. ro66, 10733) (no such disclosure required by Williams Act), aff'd on
6 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973); General Time Corp. v. Talley
159, r64 (2d Cir. 1968) (no disclosure required under rule
:d, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER
IRATE CONTROL 19-24 (1973). But see p. 1548 & note 60 infra
ations recently proposed by SEC would foreclose preannounce-

al access to material information." 14 Thus, he
le should not be limited to protecting investors
ulations" of corporate insiders. 15 A disclose-orion should also be imposed on "market insiders,"
lude " [a ]nyone - corporate insider or not- who
ves material nonpublic information." 16
e Kaufman rejected Chiarella's contention that
-as analogous to that of a tender offeror, which,
liams Act, may purchase up to five percent of a
get's stock before disclosing its intentions to make
st, he noted that tender offerors are not market
they do not regularly receive nonpublic informag any stock but their own; in fact, with respect
ids, they do not receive information, but create
argued that a distinction between tender offerors
n Chiarella's position is appropriate, since the
ake "substantial economic risk." 19 After a takeounced, they will be buying, not selling. Thus,
la, who traded to take advantage of the impending
~ tender offeror's profits are not guaranteed, but
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Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or i
tion intended to be available only for a corporate
the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the in
volved where a party takes advantage of such infor
it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing
here is to identify those persons who are in a speci
company and privy to its internal affairs, and ther
duties in trading in its securities.
!d. at 912 (footnote omitted). See also SEC v. Texa
F .2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (access is "
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Radiation Dynamics.

20
!d. The court disposed of a number of other cl
First, it rejected Chiarella's assertion that because the
application of rule rob-5, the imposition of criminal sa
notice element of due process. Chief Judge Kaufman
posted in the printing firm warned that trading on the
formation might be unlawful. !d. at 1369. In dissen
that the printing firm 's belief that Chiarella's conduct wa
clear and definite statement of the prohibited conduct "m
guage of the statute itself, from prior judicial interpreta
custom and usage." !d. at 13 77 (Meskill, J ., dissenting).
sure obligations on market insiders, however, is not a suf
from prior case law to give rise to a fair notice problem,
broad policy statements made in earlier cases, see note
Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes, 6
8r (1948) (if defendant could have learned from lawye
be unlawful, no due process violation).
Second, the court rejected Chiarella's assertion that
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), prosecutions for violat
show specific intent to defraud. 588 F.2d at 13 70-71.
of Chief Judge Kaufman's view are compelling. See Bu
Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule wb-5- Ernst
29 STAN. L . REv. 213 (1977). Finally, the court rejected
claims made by Chiarella. 588 F.2d at 1371-73·
21
588 F.2d at 1374 (citing A. BROMBERG, supra note
This access formula, which covers corporate insiders an
enunciated by the SEC in Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.

depend on the accuracy of its judgment tha
is undervalued. 20
In dissent, Judge Meskill criticized the
rob-s to Chiarella's activities, since Chiare
on the basis of information obtained from
target company. He noted that courts gene
an individual is subject to a disclose-or-abs
if he obtains material nonpublic information
to the issuing company. 21 Judge_ Meskill in
or some other special relationship is essentia
liability can be imposed; regular receipt of
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tion, by itself, does not give rise to a disclosure obligation, nor
is it enough that Chiarella's trading was "unfair." 22 Judge
Meskill also criticized the majority's distinction between preannouncement purchases by tender offerors and purchases by
individuals in Chiarella's position, pointing out that rule rob-s
precedent does not support the view that the degree of economic
risk assumed by a trader determines his liability. 23
Although the court's refusal to insist on access to the issuing
corporation represents a novel application of rule rob-s, the
duty to disclose or abstainfrom trading does not depend on the
existence of an access relationship. 24 It is true that rule rob-s
prohibits fraud/" and that according to common law fraud
principles, nondisclosure is actionable only where there is an
access relationship. 26 This fact may partially explain Judge
Meskill's reluctance to join the majority. 27 However, rule rob-s
prohibits more than ordinary fraud; it was adopted in part
because existing common law did not provide investors with
sufficient protection. 28 The courts have recognized this remedial
purpose in interpreting the rule; they have repeatedly insisted
that it is not simply a codification of common law fraud. 29 As
Chief Judge Kaufman implies, the question whether a disclose22

S88 F.2d at I374-7S·
I d. at 13 7S.
24
The rule does not explicitly state that access is required. Indeed, it regulates trading by "any person." See note r supra.
23

25

See id.
See, e.g., Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. S30, r6 P.2d S3I (1932) (directors
and officers have fiduciary duty to disclose facts to a shareholder). There are
apparently no common law cases imposing disclosure duties on persons without
access. See generally 3 L. Loss, supra note r, at 1446-48; 6 id. at 3SS6-s8.
Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions have held that access alone will not give
rise to a duty of disclosure at common law. See 3 id. at 1446.
27
See 588 F.2d at I374-7S· Judge Meskill cited W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
TIIE LAw OF TORTS 694-99 (4th ed. r97r), in addition to 3 L. Loss, supra note
r, at I44S-74; 6 id. at 3SS6-70.
28
See r A. BROMBERG, supra note r, § 2.2, at 22.6-.8 (discussion of origins
of rule rob-S). See generally id. at ss-s6.
29
See, e.g., Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F .2 d I9S, 20r (Sth
Cir. 1960) (" [rob-s] greatly expands the protection frequently so hemmed in
by the traditional concepts of common law misrepresentation and deceit, the
requirement of privity, proof of specific damage, inadequacy of the right of
rescission"), cert. denied, 36S U.S. 8r4 (r96r); accord, SEC v. Great Am.
Indus., 407 F.2d 4S3, 462-63 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (Kaufman, J., concurring);
Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 '(7th Cir. 1963); cj. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. r28, rsr (1972) (rule should be construed
flexibly in order to effectuate its remedial purpose). But cj. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 42S U.S. r&s, 214 (1976) (when statute speaks in "commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing," it should not be extended to cover
negligent conduct).
26
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or-abstain duty is appropriate must be answered in light of the
relevant policies.
The primary objective of a disclose-or-abstain rule is the
equalization of access to material information. 30 Active pursuit
of this goal will promote investor confidence in the fairness and
integrity of the securities market. 31 The courts must also recognize, however, the importance of preserving incentives for
legitimate economic effort, such as gathering new information or
perceptively analyzing generally available facts. 32 For example,
trading by the researcher who concludes on the basis of publicly
available information that a stock is undervalued should be
permitted; his analysis and subsequent investment in the stock
will enhance the efficient allocation of resources. 33
The access requirement described by Judge Meskill, which
covers trading by corporate insiders and their tippees, does implement, within its range of application, the policies which must
be considered in designing a disclose-or-abstain rule. Imposing
disclosure obligations on persons with access to the issuing
corporation increases public confidence in the fairness of the
securities market. In addition, there is no interference with the
desire to reward legitimate economic effort. 34 The same policies,
30

See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F .2d 228,
236 (2d Cir. 1974); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851- 52
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); cf . Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 8o8, 829 (D. Del. I9·5 I) (rule is aimed at equalization of
bargaining positions) . Sec generally 3 A. BROMBERG, supra note I, §§ 12 .1-.2,
at 267-80 (policies underlying rule rob-s).
31
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the R es ponsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798, 816 (1973); cf.
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German,
8o HARV. L. REV. 23, 27 (1966) (impact of insider trading on investor confidence
in Germany). In addition to promoting investor confidence, strict disclosure
rules will enhance the efficient allocation of investment resources. See Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy, mpra, at 816.
32
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 816- 17; Leech,
Transactions in Corporate Control, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 742 (1956). Several
decisions have recognized the importance of preserving the incentives for perceptive analysis of generally available facts. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 39'4 U.S. 976
(1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E .C. 907, 915 (1961).
33
See S. ROBBINS, THE SECURITIES MARKET 47-49 (1966) . But cf. R. POSNER,
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 324- 26 (2d ed. 1977) (questioning effectiveness of
securities analysis).
34
Depriving corporate insiders and their tippees of the opportunity to exploit informational advantages will not significantly reduce the corporation's
incentives to gather new information or to analyze publicly available facts. In
the case of a mineral discovery, for example, the corporation will still profit
even if its insiders cannot trade; a disclose-or-abstain rule will not significantly
reduce investment in exploration. But see H . MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
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however, suggest that a disclose-or-abstain rule should also be
applied to individuals in Chiarella's position, even when they
obtain information from a source outside the issuing corporation.
Prohibiting the employees of financial printing firms from trading on the basis of information acquired during the course of
their employment will enhance public confidence in the fairness
of the securities market. Furthermore, prohibiting such trading
will not interfere with anyone's incentives to gather new information or to analyze publicly available facts. Thus, the requirement that there be access to the issuing corporation leaves a
substantial gap in the disclose-or-abstain rules.
In an effort to close this gap, the Chiarella court created the
new "market insider" category, defined to include persons who
regularly receive material nonpublic information. As Chief Judge
Kaufman intended, the "regular receipt" test will limit trading
by the "cogs" and "auxiliaries" of the securities industrypersons who, because they provide vital market services, have
regular access to nonpublic information. 35 More specifically, the
regular receipt test will certainly cover the employees of financial
printing firms; it might also be expected to cover the personnel
of various law firms, financial institutions, and government
agencies. 36
Although the court's refusal to insist on access to the issuing
corporation is appropriate, its regular receipt test must still be
evaluated in light of the policies underlying rule Iob-s. Ordinarily, imposing disclose-or-abstain obligations on persons who
regularly receive nonpublic information will serve these policies.
In certain situations, however, applying rule Iob-s to market
insiders will stifle legitimate investigative activity. More specifically, although the regular receipt test justifiably protects
trading by tender offerors, it will restrict trading by certain
tippees of tender offerors, even though it might be argued that
such trading is desirable.
As Chief Judge Kaufman was careful to explain, the regular
receipt test excludes tender offerors from the class of market
insiders, since they are not the regular recipients of nonpublic
information concerning any stock but their own. The court's
conclusion that disclosure obligations should not be imposed on
STOCK MARKET 131-45 (rg66) (insider trading is the only satisfactory incentive
for entrepreneurial activities). For a criticism of Manne, see Schotland, Unsafe
at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53
VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967).
35
588 F.2d at 1364-65.
36 Although Chief Judge Kaufman does not mention this point, it would also
be reasonable to impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on the tippees of market
insiders.
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tender offerors is correct, although its reliance on the degree of
economic risk undertaken as a justification for this conclusion
is misplaced. 37 A more straightforward explanation for the distinction between tender offerors and persons like Chiarella would
have emphasized the fact that tender offerors are engaged in
activity roughly analogous to that of securities analysts; they
also investigate corporations on the basis of publicly available
information, in order to determine whether a stock is undervalued and represents a sound investment. 38 This is precisely
the sort of activity that should be encouraged, since it promotes
the efficient allocation of investment resources. 39
If a disclose-or-abstain rule were applied to the tender offeror,
however, the incentives for its investigation of the potential
target would be substantially reduced. As Chief Judge Kaufman
noted, under the Williams Act, the tender offeror may purchase
up to five percent of the shares of the target company before disclosing its intention to make a takeover bid. 40 Such purchases are
desirable from the tender offeror's point of view, because they
reduce the cost of the acquisition plan, and increase the likelihood that it will be able to acquire control of the target. If the
tender offeror must disclose its intentions even before it reaches
the five percent limit, however, the cost of its acquisition plan will
be substantially increased, given the likelihood that announcement
of the impending takeover bid will have a significant impact on
the cost of the target's stock. In fact, in some cases, the cost of
acquiring the necessary shares may be so great that the tender
offer will collapse. 41
Although the regular receipt test correctly excludes tender
offerors from the class of market insiders, it will not protect
37
Chief Judge Kaufman explicitly rejected an argument which distinguished
between persons like Chiarella and tender offerors because the latter have a
legitimate business purpose and are promoting economic growth. 588 F.2d at
1368 n.xs.
38
See generally Barnhill, The Corporate Raider: Contesting Proxy Solicitations and Takeover Offers, 20 Bus. LAw. 763, 764-65 (1965); Brudney, A Note
on Chilling Tender Offer Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 6o9, 625-34 (x¢7);
Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, II$ U. PA. L.
REV. 317, 325 (1967); Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control,
73 ]. PoL. EcoN. uo, u2-13 (1965).
39
Indeed, the efficiency arguments are stronger with respect to tender offerors
than they are with respect to securities analysts. Trading by analysts simply
helps ensure that stock market prices reflect true economic value. Tender offerors
purchase stock so that they can actually acquire control of a company and
manage its underutilized assets more efficiently.
40
See p. 1540 & note I 7 supra.
41
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 8II.
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trading by certain tippees of tender offerors. 42 In particular,
Chiarella might be applied to limit the common practice of
"warehousing," 43 whereby tender offerors obtain the assistance
of institutional investors in financing their takeover bids. 44 If
the tender offeror lacks the funds necessary to make the preoffer
market purchases permitted by the Williams Act, it might seek
a loan from a bank. Frequently, however, banks are not willing
to finance tender offers unless they are assured that a controlling
block of the target's stock will be available as security for the
loan.45 Thus, the tender offeror may urge institutional investors
to buy stock, with the expectation that their acquisitions
will be tendered when the takeover bid is announced. In effect,
warehousing serves as an interim financing device, until the
tender offeror has acquired control of the target. 46
An institutional investor that frequently engages in warehousing would be a market insider, and therefore subject to a
disclose-or-abstain rule, since it regularly receives nonpublic
information from tender offerors. 47 Arguably, however, a
42

In most cases, tippees of tender offerors should not be permitted to trade,
because their trading does not implicate the desire to preserve incentives for
investigative activity. For example, there is no reason why trading by the
relative of an employee of a tender offeror should be protected. See generally
p. I S48 infra.
43
See generally 4 SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc.
No. 92-64, 92d Cong., ISt Sess. 2273 (I97I) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY]; 5 id . at 2828-29, 2832-37, 2848; Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, supra note 3I, at 8II-I5.
44
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 3I, at 8I2-I4; 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at 2828-29, 2836-37, 2848.
45
5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at 2828 j Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814.
46
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814. It is important
to recognize that warehousing will probably not be permitted where it constitutes
part of a scheme to avoid the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. For
example, it is unlikely that a tender offeror would be allowed to ask each of
II institutional investors to purchase 5% of the target's stock, thereby ensuring, without announcing its intentions, that the stock necessary to achieve control
is in friendly hands. See 5 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 43, at
2835; E . ARANOW & H . EINHORN, supra note 17, at 25-29. See also Thomas,
Warehousing, 3 REv. SEc. REG. 975,977 (1970).
47
Chief Judge Kaufman might be willing to exclude certain persons from the
class of market insiders when they are engaged in particularly risky trading;
economic risk was the basis for his distinction between tender offerors and
persons like Chiarella, see pp. I54o-41 supra. Yet an examination of the degree
of risk undertaken, which is of dubious analytical value in any event, would be
of no assistance here; the institutional investor's profits are almost as certain
as Chiarella's. Of course, its profits are not guaranteed, since the takeover bid
might be unsuccessful. Because it is unlikely that the stock was overvalued,
however, the price of the shares acquired probably will not fall below the purchase price even if the bid fails.
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disclose-or-abstain rule should not be applied to warehousers, 48
since they are simply acting as the tender offerors' agents, 49 in
order to help them reap the benefits of their analysis of the
target companies. 50 Indeed, if a tender offeror cannot obtain
financing elsewhere, it may be unable to proceed with the takeover bid. 51 Therefore, prohibiting warehousing will interfere
with the incentives for desirable economic activity.
Since the court's regular receipt test fails to protect activities
like warehousing, a narrower rule might be desirable. Specifically, persons who provide services to the securities industry, and
therefore regularly receive material nonpublic information, could
be forbidden from using that information other than in connection with the performance of their market function. 52 This
rule would reflect more clearly the desire to regulate trading by
the service auxiliaries of the securities industry. It would limit
trading by persons in Chiarella's position, but would not apply
to tender offerors. It would not prohibit trading by warehousers,
since the market service they provide necessitates the purchase
and sale of securities.
Even after Chiarella, some unfair trading may still escape
the net of rule Iob-s. Both Chief Judge Kaufman's definition
of the market insider category and the definition proposed here
emphasize regular access to nonpublic information. Thus, since
48
See E. A:AANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note r7, at 24; [SuMMARY VOLUME]
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 431, at XXXI-XXXIII (disclose-orabstain rules should distinguish between warehousers and other tippees of tender
offerors); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 814-15; Sandler &
Conwill, Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Onro ST. L.J, 225, 254 n.r45
(1969). Some might argue that because warehousing is "unfair," it should be
prohibited, regardless of the interference with economic incentives. See, e.g.,
Thomas, Warehousing, 3 REv. SEc. REG. 975, 977 (1970) (rob-5 should be used
to prohibit warehousing). The arguments for and against warehousing will not
be evaluated in detail here. The arguments in favor of warehousing are compelling, however; thus, for the purposes of this Case Comment, it will be assumed
that such activity is desirable.
49
See Sandler & Conwill, supra note 48, at 244 n.r45 (institutional investors
are agents of offeror and therefore have no greater duty to disclose than principal).
50
See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 8r4-15.
51
See p . 1545 supra.
52
Fleischer, Mundheim, and Murphy suggest a similar rule. See Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 31, at 822 ("it may be realistic to expect that
a market professional who is given a preferred position in order to fulfill a
particular market function will use any confidential information received as a
consequence of his position solely to further his assigned role"). Their analysis
is not strictly policy-based. They suggest that they are unwilling to depart
from the notion that there must be some special relationship before a discloseor-abstain duty can be imposed, and that the "preferred position" of service
auxiliaries, plus the public expectation that they will not exploit informational
advantages, gives rise to such a relationship. ld. at 822-24.
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neither limits trading by persons who receive such information
from a source outside the issuing corporation on a single occasion, there is still a gap in the disclose-or-abstain rules. It is
not clear, however, that a broad rule regulating these individuals
is desirable. Their trading may have a less significant impact
on investor confidence in the fairness of the securities market
than trading by those who receive a continuous flow of nonpublic
information. Furthermore, if a broad rule were adopted, significant administrability problems would arise. Market insiders
and corporate insiders are readily identified and easily policed, 53
but it would be far more difficult to scrutinize the activities of
all those who do not regularly receive nonpublic information;
enforcement would be random and costly. 54 Thus, if the courts
do choose to impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on persons
outside the corporate or market insider categories, they must
balance the fairness concerns underlying rule Iob--5, not only
against the desire to preserve incentives for investigative activity,
but also against the need for administrability.
A set of tender offer regulations recently proposed by the
SEC 55 would impose disclose-or-abstain obligations on all persons who ·have knowledge of an impending takeover bid. 56 These
regulations, which are promulgated under section 14 (e) of the
Williams Act, 57 extend beyond the corporate and market insider
categories; thus, as the SEC suggests, they will help close the gap
left in the disclose-or-abstain rules by Chiarella's regular receipt
test. 58 Furthermore, they minimize problems of administrability
because they are limited to the tender offer context. The proposed regulations are unsatisfactory, however, in that they do
not preserve incentives for desirable investigative activity. Not
only is no exception made for warehousing, 59 but the SEC apparently intends to foreclose preannouncement trading by the
tender offeror itself. 60
~ 3 A tippee trading rule is broader and therefore less administrable, but it is
at least limited by the requirement that the information must come from an insider.
04
The SEC would not be able to identify and police all those persons who
might, on a single occasion, obtain nonpublic information. Reliance on private
actions as a policing tool would likely result in random enforcement.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 9954 (1979) (to be codified if approved at 17 C.F.R. § 240).
~ 6 See 44 Fed. Reg. at 9976-79, 9987- 88 (proposed rule 14e-2) . Proposed rule
14e-2 would cover trading by both tender offerors and their tippees.
~ 7 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) .
~ 8 44 Fed. Reg. 9954, 9977 (1979) ·
50
The rule covering tippees of tender offerors would clearly include warehousers, and is therefore overinclusive. In most cases, however, tip pees of tender·
offerors should be covered. See note 42 supra.
60
See 44 Fed. Reg. 9954, 9978, 9988 (1979) ·
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Chiarella and the SEC tender offer regulations reflect a
willingness to expand disclose-or-abstain obligations beyond
traditional categories. In general, this expansion is justified,
given the central importance of the desire to equalize access to
material information. In designing new disclose-or-abstain rules,
however, the courts and the SEC must also recognize the need
to preserve incentives for desirable economic activity. Both the
Chiarella decision and the proposed SEC rules may interfere

with this goal.
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